Feeding the Empire: Grain, Warfare, and the Persistence of the British Atlantic Economy, 1765-1815 by Callaway, Patrick
The University of Maine 
DigitalCommons@UMaine 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Fogler Library 
Summer 8-23-2019 
Feeding the Empire: Grain, Warfare, and the Persistence of the 
British Atlantic Economy, 1765-1815 
Patrick Callaway 
University of Maine, patrick.callaway@maine.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/etd 
Recommended Citation 
Callaway, Patrick, "Feeding the Empire: Grain, Warfare, and the Persistence of the British Atlantic 
Economy, 1765-1815" (2019). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 3092. 
https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/etd/3092 
This Open-Access Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UMaine. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@UMaine. For more information, please contact um.library.technical.services@maine.edu. 
 
 
FEEDING THE EMPIRE:  GRAIN, WARFARE, AND THE PERSISTENCE OF THE 
BRITISH ATLANTIC ECONOMY, 1765-1815  
By 
Patrick Callaway 
B.A. University of Montana-Western, 2004 
B.S. University of Montana-Western, 2005 
M.A. Montana State University, 2008 
 
A DISSERTATION 
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
(in History) 
 
The Graduate School 
The University of Maine 
August 2019 
Advisory Committee: 
Liam Riordan, Professor of History, Advisor 
Jacques Ferland, Associate Professor of History 
Stephen Hornsby, Professor of Geography and Canadian Studies 
Stephen Miller, Professor of History 
Scott See, Professor of History
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright 2019, Patrick Callaway  
All Rights Reserved
FEEDING THE EMPIRE:  GRAIN, WARFARE, AND THE PERSISTANCE OF THE 
BRITISH ATALNTIC ECONOMY, 1765-1815  
By Patrick Callaway 
Dissertation Advisor: Dr. Liam Riordan 
 
An Abstract of the Dissertation Presented 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 in History 
August 2019 
  
The importance of staple agriculture in the development of the modern world can hardly 
be overstated.  The connotations surrounding the word “bread” and the phrase “staff of life” bear 
witness to the close association between the availability of grain and the overall well-being of 
western societies.  It is not a coincidence that bread is both an important religious symbol and a 
causal force in the maintenance or collapse of entire societies.   
This dissertation aspires to provide a clearer understanding of the leading place of 
overseas trade in the American economy in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries by 
showing how European war restored colonial trade relationships and reintegrated the US into 
trans-Atlantic and international economic exchanges led by grain exports.  By challenging the 
assumption that the rupture of the American Revolution led naturally to economic separation, 
this project argues that material forces and long-standing cultural ties were more powerful than 
politics in shaping the contours of the British Atlantic world in the nineteenth century. Assessing 
the political economy of the grain trade deepens our understanding of the late colonial and early 
republican US. 
Grain was also vital to the British Atlantic and British North American economy of this 
era. The inherent difficulties of overcoming national, imperial, and war-divided historiographies 
conceals grain from our easy gaze.  Mistaken ideas of periodization and politically inspired 
limitations to historical assessments ultimately hide connections that were fundamental at the 
time.  The availability of surplus grain, particularly from the mid-Atlantic colonies in what 
would become the United States, were essential to the viability of societies around the British 
Atlantic.  Simply stated, without food society ceases to function.  Ideology falls to the wayside, 
plantations cease production, populations collapse, and long-distance warfare becomes 
impossible.  Examining the availability of food products, the laws enabling or limiting trade, and 
the extraordinary (and sometimes illegal) steps taken to ensure that the staff of life was available 
to fuel social development was crucial to the rise of Anglo-American power in a tumultuous Age 
of Atlantic Revolutions whose political drama should not completely eclipse its economic 
foundations.
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CHAPTER 1   
INTRODUCTION 
 
The importance of staple agriculture in the development of the modern world can hardly 
be overstated.  The rise of the west and the expansion of Europe relied upon various grain 
products, among which corn, wheat, and rice relatively quickly became the staples that fed the 
majority of the world’s population.  The connotations surrounding the word “bread” and the 
phrase “staff of life” bear witness to the close association between the availability of grain and 
the overall well-being of western societies.  It is not a coincidence that bread is both an important 
religious symbol and a causal force in the maintenance or collapse of entire societies.  Unlike 
other commodities, there is no substitute for grain.  If adequate supplies are not or cannot be 
grown locally, surpluses from another region must be imported. Control of grain carries political 
consequences of the highest order. Despite the importance of subsistence as the foundation for 
all economic and political relationships, this is a relatively neglected subject of study.  Few 
historians think of bread or grain as significant until there is a supply or distribution crisis that 
causes chaos. Understanding the trans-Atlantic and circum-Atlantic grain trade is vital to 
understanding how the early modern Atlantic world functioned.1     
                                                          
1Three quite different studies make plain the crucial place of subsistence agriculture for the rise of the west. See the 
condemnation of the origins of sedentary agriculture and early state formation in James C. Scott, Against the Grain: 
A Deep History of the Earliest States (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017); the classic view of environmental 
historian Alfred W. Crosby’s Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-1900 (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2004); and the outcome of North American colonization as foreordained by the 
disparities in the timing of the Neolithic Revolution in Camilla Townsend, Pocahontas and the Powhatan 
Dilemma (New York: Hill and Wang, 2004).  
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This dissertation examines the production and export of grain and related food 
commodities from the mainland British North American colonies (and subsequently the United 
States) throughout the Atlantic world in a period of sustained warfare from 1765 to 1815.  It 
bridges the long-standing political periodization that separates the late colonial and early 
republican periods of US history as well as the American-Canadian divide to argue for the 
persistence and even expansion of late-colonial Anglo-American economic integration into the 
nineteenth century.   
 Three related investigations shape this project.  First, it explores trade patterns before and 
after the American Revolution by analyzing merchant documents and government trade records 
about grain, a staple foodstuff. The contours of colonial trade for 1768-1772 are particularly well 
known due to the rich American Board of Customs records, however, a systemic examination of 
how the Revolutionary political transformation changed the grain trade remains elusive.  This is 
particularly true of the key role that “American” grain played in supporting the northernmost 
British colonies that remained within the empire and later became Canada.2   
Second, the dissertation examines the slow growth of grain production in and exports 
from British North America in the post-Revolutionary period, and the implications this had for 
US commerce.  British North America possessed limited agricultural potential, primarily due to 
ecological factors, made dire when its population boomed due to the loyalist migration that 
outstripped the existing capacity of subsistence farming. Ironically, US independence linked 
British North America more firmly to the American economy than prior to the Revolution, a 
bond that persisted through the War of 1812 and beyond.  Grain production shortages in British 
North America led British authorities to encourage economic reconciliation with the US to 
                                                          
2See John McCusker and Russell Menard, The Economy of British North America, 1607-1789 (Chapel Hill:  
University of North Carolina Press, 1985). 
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access essential grain, which caused a divergence between British political objectives and 
foreign policy, on the one hand, and the pragmatic needs and economic interests of British 
officials, the military, and settlers in North America, on the other. This key tension also shaped 
the emergent US political economy as Federalist and Democratic-Republican administrations 
struggled to navigate reintegration into the British Atlantic economy, which especially exposes 
how the Jeffersonian goal of political neutrality in its foreign policy was undermined by a 
desperate need for external markets to restart the war-ravaged economy.  This critical tension 
informed key developments from the Peace Treaty of 1783, to the Embargo of 1807, the War of 
1812, and its aftermath.   
The third major theme examined here is the role played by US grain exports to Iberia to 
sustain the allied British forces in the Peninsular War from 1809 to 1813. While a North 
American continental focus helps to shift our understanding away from a strictly national view, 
this trans-Atlantic trade further highlights the profound integration of US grain producers and 
merchants, British capital, and the exigencies of provisioning the army and civilians in a period 
of large-scale military mobilization.  The Iberian Peninsula had been an important destination for 
colonial period grain exports, and British military records indicate that US grain supplies were 
vital for the British army commissariat through the 1813 campaign.   
This dissertation aspires to provide a clearer understanding of the leading place of 
overseas trade in the American economy in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries by 
showing how European war restored colonial trade relationships and reintegrated the US into 
trans-Atlantic and international economic exchanges led by the expansion of grain exports.  By 
challenging the assumption that the martial and political ruptures of the American Revolution led 
naturally to economic separation, this project argues that material forces and long-standing 
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cultural ties were more powerful than politics in shaping the contours of the British Atlantic 
world in the nineteenth century. Indeed, the power of Britain’s “informal empire,” based on trade 
rather than direct political control, was first operative in its former American settlement colonies 
over the many years of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.  
Economic historians Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher’s influential examination of 
the intersection between imperialism and free trade in the British Empire usefully informs the 
analysis of the post-independence persistence of trade in the Anglo-American world.  Their 
article “The Imperialism of Free Trade” considers the mid- and late-Victorian era, however, their 
conceptualization applies to earlier imperial developments, indeed, the US may have served as a 
model for later trade relations with the non-British world.  According to Robinson and 
Gallagher’s theory, the official governing bonds of empire could be supplemented or replaced by 
informal bonds of commerce provided that the paramount position of British economic interest 
was not imperiled.3  Commercial ties could often be more effective, less risky, and certainly less 
costly to the British than formal annexation. After the Revolution, returning the former colonies 
to the empire was not a realistic possibility.  Rather, trade networks between Britain—and by 
extension the British Empire—and independent countries like the US encouraged the growing 
power of local elites who depended on foreign trade for prosperity.4 
Robinson and Gallagher focus on the interests of mercantile elites. The unique nature of 
grain, however, expands the interest in international trade much more broadly to other social and 
economic groups.  Markets for surplus grain was not just an elite concern.  Economically, the 
“revolution of 1800” in the US with Jefferson’s presidential election changed nothing.  
                                                          
3 John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” The Economic History Review, Vol. 6, 
No. 1 (1953), 1-15, 4.  
4 Ibid, 10. 
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Jefferson’s beloved yeoman farmers depended on the West Indies and Iberia as a vent for their 
surplus production. Thus, they shared pro-trade commitments with the more Federalist-leaning 
merchant class.  The financial interest in reopening and sustaining trade cut across other social 
and political boundaries as well.  Efforts to disengage from trade with Britain provoked a 
visceral response from a wide swath of American society.  This outrage caused the failure of 
Jefferson’s embargo and subsequent trade restriction schemes under Madison, even those called 
for during wartime. 
  This dissertation contributes to new scholarly knowledge about the economic and 
political structures of an imperfectly divided first British Empire.  The durability of trans-
national business relationships based on mutual self-interest—despite wars, international 
tensions, and domestic political rancor—is the essential terrain to be mapped by this project. This 
dissertation also challenges the politically-dominated chronology of late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century US history, but risks being an historiographical orphan as it tries to break 
from that traditional periodization.  Nonetheless, by doing so a richer understanding of trans-
national trade can be achieved with valuable implications for better understanding contemporary 
globalization and its dynamic flow of capital and goods.  
The chronological divide between late colonial and early republican American history is 
a recognized problem among specialists.  The October 2017 joint editions of the William and 
Mary Quarterly and the Journal of the Early Republic sought to illustrate integrative connections 
across the Revolutionary rupture.  Chronologically, the issues attempted to explore   
if we have miscast the American Revolution by treating it either as the 
culmination of colonial history or as the foundation for the early republic.  Does 
focusing on the coming revolution distort the colonial past to serve a teleology?  
Or do we a priori assume that the revolution was a watershed between a rather 
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somnolent colonial society and a modernizing republican order?  What happens to 
our histories if instead we plant the revolution in the middle of a longer flow of 
change:  does it appear more or less transformative?5    
 
This valuably questions the teleology of the Revolution and draws attention to the difficulties 
national histories impose on historians.  Despite the stated goal, however, none of the articles in 
either journal provided a substantive response to this call for a more inclusive perspective.  
Rather, they tacitly delineate the connections and boundaries between the two journals.  This 
dissertation, however, embraces the challenge set forward by Eliga Gould in Among the Powers 
of the Earth:  what would happen if the Revolution were in the midst of the story rather than its 
organizing structure?6  By adopting an economic frame of reference centered on a particular set 
of commodities that transcend the Revolutionary divide, this dissertation provides an answer.  
While the wheat trade became more complex due to post-war US independence, Anglo-
American grain trading patterns continued and intensified even during the War of 1812.    
 Any study of international economy encounters multiple national perspectives, 
frameworks, and chronologies.  The US was only one part of the early modern Atlantic grain 
exchange system.  Unfortunately, pre-Confederation Canadian historiography often hinges on 
two events that dominate its chronology and conceptualization of British North America.   The 
fall of New France in 1760 with the subsequent introduction of British rule and the arrival of 
loyalist refugees in 1783, which serves a parallel function to the American Revolution in US 
scholarship.  Again, political events, actors, and perspectives are at the forefront of scholarship.  
While this dissertation post-dates the conquest of New France, 1783 is not an apt starting point 
                                                          
5 Alan Taylor, “Introduction: Expand or Die: The Revolution’s New Empire,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd 
Series (hereafter WMQ), Vol. 74, No. 4 (October 2017), 619.  
6 Eliga Gould, Among the Powers of the Earth: The American Revolution and the Making of a New World Empire 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012). 
 
7 
 
for anglophone British North America’s relationship with the wheat economy.  The date is 
significant, however, as the increasing population’s need for US provisions led to closer 
economic integration. 
British Imperial history also provides limited insights.  As the British historian Peter 
Marshall noted long ago, the loss of the thirteen colonies “seems so clearly to bring to an end one 
imperial system, and to be followed so slowly and reluctantly by the gradual accumulation of a 
second empire, that the importance of American independence as a line of demarcation has never 
been in doubt.”  Yet Marshall questions this truism by seeing the Revolution as part of a 
continuity: “the first and second empires were divided by a war, but they were linked by long 
term and perhaps more fundamental trends than those which have been believed to divide 
them.”7  Marshall astutely questions the chronological divide but does so with a different 
rationale than is pursued here.  
The core periodization of this study from 1765 to 1815 follows Marshall and focusses 
intensively on the commercial tenet of empire highlighted by David Armitage’s Ideological 
Origins of the British Empire, which proposes that the first empire was defined by its’ 
“Protestant, commercial, maritime, and free” nature.8  Imperial ideology did not automatically 
cease or transform in 1783 nor did Americans totally reject British values and norms. They, too, 
saw themselves as Protestant, commercial, maritime, and free, independence mostly meant that 
the colonies rejected and transcended their inferior position within the British Empire.  The 
political context changed, but patterns of trade and its sweeping cultural and social implications 
                                                          
7 Peter Marshall, “The First and Second British Empires: A Question of Demarcation,” History, Vol. 49, No. 165 
(1964), 13, 23. Marshall extends this commitment to a common empire in his recent, more global, work The Making 
and Unmaking of Empires: Britain, India, and America c. 1750-1783 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
8 David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
8. 
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were not fundamentally altered in either theory or practice.  In the context of the wheat trade, the 
first empire persisted for both British and US actors.  The wheat trade offers a revealing case 
study of a continuous development from the first empire to the second with hard work and 
intensive negotiations to reintegrate the US back into an important place as an agricultural 
exporter in the British-dominated Atlantic economy. 
Despite the importance of grain for early modern political economy, the topic has been 
neglected with just a small handful of exceptions.  These reflect a twentieth-century interest in 
American trade with Europe in the wake of World War I and World War II.  Studies of US grain 
exports to Europe bloomed briefly in the 1920s, led by W. Freeman Galpin’s The Grain Supply 
of England During the Napoleonic Era and a couple of subsidiary articles.9  The 1960s also saw 
several publications on the political economy of the American grain trade to Europe.  Mancur 
Olson’s The Economics of the Wartime Shortage stressed the continuity between the Napoleonic 
era, World War I, and World War II through an examination of trade barriers to US grain exports 
due to European wartime struggles.10  Galpin and Olson both focus on trade directly with Great 
Britain, which was actually one of the smaller markets for American grain in the period.  
Nevertheless, both persuasively demonstrated the significance of European warfare on neutral 
US trade.   
                                                          
9 W. Freeman Galpin, The Grain Supply of England During the Napoleonic Period (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1925); Galpin’s other works include “The American Grain Trade to the Spanish Peninsula, 1810-
1814,” The American Historical Review, Vol. 28, no. 1 (1922): 24-44; “The Grain Trade of Alexandria, Virginia, 
1801-1815,” The North Carolina Historical Review, Vol. 4, no. 4 (1927): 404-27; “The Grain Trade of New 
Orleans, 1804-1814,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 14, No. 4 (March 1928), 496-507. See also 
Anna C. Clauder, “American Commerce as Affected by the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon, 1793-
1812” (unpublished Ph.d. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1932).  
10Mancur Olson, The Economics of the Wartime Shortage: A History of British Food Supplies in the Napoleonic 
War and in World Wars I and II (Durham: Duke University Press, 1963). 
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 Emphasizing continuity rather than disjunction presents several theoretical challenges.  
Eschewing nationalistic narratives requires a different type of framework without an obvious 
alternative.  Grain compounds that challenge.  Unlike other agricultural staples, grain does not 
require a particular form of labor or social structure for production. The ubiquity of grain has 
dissuaded historians from serious inquiries into its trade as it does not fit into familiar categories 
of historical analysis.  Grain farming occurred in feudal, semi-feudal, free, and slave-based labor 
systems.  As a result, social historians examining the intersections of race, class, and gender have 
ignored grain as a category of analysis in favor of other staples such as sugar, cotton, tobacco, or 
fur that clearly demonstrate a link between forms of labor, the goods produced, and local social 
and economic development.11  
Cathy Matson’s essay “Thoughts on the Field of Economic History” provides a broad 
state of the field assessment and notes that economic history has had “an uneasy co-existence” 
with both history and economics because of modern disciplinary distinctions.12  A separation 
among economics, history, and politics, however, would not be recognizable in the eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries.  In that era leading commentators such as Adam Smith, Thomas 
Malthus, David Ricardo fully fused these and other fields that would be sundered by later 
professional specialization.  
The intersection of grain, economics, and politics is extensively examined in Adam 
Smith’s pioneering study of political economy The Wealth of Nations (1776).  According to 
                                                          
11 See Harold Innis, The Cod Fisheries: History of an International Economy, 2nd edition. (Toronto: Toronto 
University Press, 1954); Stephen Hornsby, British Atlantic, American Frontier: Space of Power in Early Modern 
British America. (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2005); Richard S. Dunn, Sugar and Slaves: The 
Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624-1713 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1972); Phillip Morgan, slave Counterpoint:  Black Culture in the Eighteenth-Century Chesapeake and Lowcountry. 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988). 
12 Cathy Matson, “A House of Many Mansions:  Some Thoughts on the Field of Economic History” in Cathy 
Matson, ed. The Economy of Early America: Historical Perspectives and New Directions (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006), 1.   
10 
 
Smith, a scarcity occasionally arose due to war or natural causes, however, “a famine has never 
arisen from any other cause but the violence of government attempting, by improper means, to 
remedy the inconveniences of a dearth.”13  Essentially, for Smith, government intervention into 
the marketplace causes greater distress in markets and for people.  In his view, government 
interference, even to protect domestic peace by controlling grain prices, only made catastrophe 
more likely.14  In conclusion, governmental restrictions on the grain trade  
may every where be compared to the laws concerning religion.  The people feel 
themselves so much interested in what relates either to the subsistence in this life, 
or their happiness in a life to come, that government must yield to their 
prejudices, and, in order to preserve the public tranquility, establish a system 
which they approve of.15    
 
Smith’s analysis of the volatile links among the people, the government, and subsistence was 
correct.  In the most famous case of the eighteenth century, the women’s march on Versailles in 
1789 started as a bread riot in Paris.   
 Smith’s primary focus was on internal British trade laws and domestic production.  The 
multiple and conflicting interests of the crown, landowners, the public, and merchants combined 
to restrict the practical application of an unfettered supply and demand grain economy.  
Eliminating internal trade barriers drove Smith’s narrative with a main focus on Great Britain as 
a country rather than as an empire.  Beyond Britain itself, a system of freer trade in grain already 
existed.  
In his recent analysis of the early modern mercantile system historian Steve Pincus notes 
that there was a “profound and highly politicized debate between those who thought trade was in 
fact a zero-sum game based on landed wealth and those who felt substantial worldwide economic 
                                                          
13 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Vol. II (London: W. Strathan and 
T. Cadell, 1776), 109. 
14 Ibid, 117-120. 
15 Ibid, 126. 
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growth created by human labor was possible and desirable.”16  Clearly, a mercantile system of 
controlled and regulated trade was not universally accepted or defined even among Britain 
officials.  Thus, the more active trade management reforms of the post-Seven Years War period 
marked more than the end of a period of supposedly salutary neglect.  For Pincus, it heralded the 
ascendance of a new policy with a significant coalition of British support.17           
  The mercantile roundtable in which Pincus’ article appeared provoked several strong 
responses.  Cathy Matson argued that his ideological argument stressing partisan polarization 
was over simplified.  Mercantilism was “neither a static nor a coherent system of interests and 
policies but rather an ever-changing approach to the economic development of the British 
Empire and always politically charged.”18  Susan Amussen’s critique acknowledged the 
unsatisfactory capaciousness of the term mercantilism, but defended it as a useful description for 
an “overall framework within which changing economic policies functioned, as both theory and 
practice were debated in coffeehouses and the pamphlet literature….[but] rather than assuming 
that debates about economic ideas mean that some particular thing is happening, we need to ask 
whether and how they affected policy.”19   
 The grain trade fits awkwardly within these structural debates.  Other commodities, sugar 
above all, were certainly politically charged. Organized groups such as the West Indies planters 
utilized mercantilistic arguments to exploit the political system to protect their economic 
interests.  There was no organized grain advocacy group or agitation on behalf of grain producers 
outside of England itself. It rarely appears in any of the debates over imperial trade regulation.  
                                                          
16 Steve Pincus, “Rethinking Mercantilism:  Political Economy, the British Empire, and the Atlantic World in the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” WMQ, Vol. 69, No. 1 (January 2012), 3-34, 15. 
17 Ibid, 31-34. 
18 Cathy Matson, “Imperial Political Economy: An Ideological Debate and Shifting Practices,” WMQ, Vol. 69, No. 1 
(January 2012), 35-40, 35-37. 
19 Susan Amussen, “Political Economy and Imperial Practice,” WMQ, Vol. 69, No. 1 (January 2012), 47-50, 50. 
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Colonial grain was the ideal trade commodity to support the mercantile system of the British 
empire precisely because it was allowed to be exported beyond the empire.  The inherent 
imbalance between food production and food consumption in the Caribbean plantation complex 
could only be reconciled through trade with Great Britain or its mainland colonies.  Thus, a key 
element of the extreme overcommitment to slave staple production in the Caribbean by all 
European empires were payments to Great Britain in exchange for food.  
The definitive feature of mercantilism is not as a system to control trade; rather, it is a 
system of import controls on external products entering the empire.  As efforts to enforce 
stronger central oversight of the British Atlantic economy in the 1760s demonstrates, it was not 
grain exports that created conflict between colonial traders and imperial officials.  Rather, it was 
the content of the return cargos that provoked dispute.  The colonial grain trade was the key 
commodity in the Atlantic World that made mercantilist theory viable in the real world of 
market-based trade driven by practical self-interest.  Allowing free grain exports, in the end, 
served mercantile needs effectively even as it operated outside of imperial regulation and 
taxation.    
Political economy is a key concept for this dissertation, and its definition by historian 
Drew McCoy in The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America offers a 
useful starting point.  McCoy defined political economy in the era as  
the necessary existence of a close relationship between government, or the polity, 
and the social and economic order.  Thus to the revolutionaries in America, the 
notion of “political economy” reinforced the characteristically republican idea of 
a dynamic interdependence among polity, economy, and society.20      
 
                                                          
20Drew McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1980), 6. 
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Political economy, of course, is not exclusively characteristic of a republic nor the sole claim of 
Jeffersonians.  Every government in the early modern Atlantic World was keenly aware of the 
political dimensions of trade.  McCoy’s definition also does not highlight the importance of 
provision agriculture in the era’s political economy, a widespread shortcoming, as noted earlier.  
As the writings of Smith and Malthus persuasively demonstrate, political economy was 
understood in explicitly agricultural terms in the early modern world.  Commerce based in 
agricultural products—especially grain products that form the basis for subsistence—were 
fundamental to political economy and to viable societies throughout the Atlantic world.  Our 
understanding needs to be more fully grounded in this context.   
 Marxist interpretations of the early modern economy examine the effects of trading 
networks on labor, however, the focus is on the European working classes more than the system 
itself.  Scholars such as Immanuel Wallenstein seek to explain the industrialization of a 
European core as the result of structural exploitation by European capital of the periphery.21  
Class relations are significant, of course, but to only consider the connection between grain 
shortages and revolution fails to offer a holistic understanding of the central place of the 
economics of grain as the emergent Atlantic world was created and provided a foundation for 
later globalization.  The intersection of the politics of grain and the economics of grain lie at the 
center of this dissertation.  
The combination of politics and economy have yielded landmark studies of colonial 
societies. Harold Innis developed the staples thesis to explain the development of the Canadian 
economy, and the theory’s emphasis on the importance of the export economy is applicable to 
other societies in the early modern period.  Underlying the theory is the assumption that the 
                                                          
21 Immanuel Wallerstein, Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World Economy (New York:  
Academic Press, 1980).  
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export sector “is the leading sector of the economy and set the pace for economic growth.”22 In 
his 1936 article “Some Aspects of a Pioneer Economy,” W.A. Mackintosh stipulated that it was 
only through the production and export of staples that a pioneer economy could gain the capital 
necessary for further economic development.  Exports link immature frontier economies to 
developed economies, thereby encouraging further capital investments, settlement, and the 
development of subsidiary economic activities around staples production that allow for further 
development.23  While Mackintosh focused his research on the development of the Canadian 
west and the production of wheat for export markets in the late nineteenth century, the theoretical 
model that he followed also applies to earlier forms of staples production.  In most ways, the US 
economy in the period under study remained a colonial-frontier economy. 
According to historian Marc Egnal, the staples theory approach to colonial economic 
growth suffers from many limitations.  The breadth of staples theory does not lend itself to 
quantifiable analysis, does not adequately account for non-staples driven growth, nor for cultural 
characteristics that influence social development, and it rests on a static conception of rates of 
economic growth.  A critical shortcoming of staples theory in the case of grain is that there is not 
a discernable social or labor structure associated with grain.  At its heart, the staples thesis is a 
theoretical explanation of how a single resource economy developed to support the production 
and sale of that commodity to distant markets.  Wheat fits this model poorly, for, unlike the 
classic examples such as sugar or fur, there is no inherently necessary backwards or final demand 
linkages associated with its production or consumption.  For grain, 75-80% of production was 
                                                          
22 Melville Watkins, “A Staple Theory of Economic Growth,” The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political 
Science, Vol. 29, No. 2 (May 1963), 141-158, 144.   
23 W.A. Mackintosh, “Some Aspects of a Pioneer Economy,” The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political 
Science, Vol. 2, No. 4 (November 1936), 457-463, 458, 460-1. 
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consumed on the farm rather than for trade.24  Staples theory works well as a frame of analysis 
for luxury goods that yielded enormous profits via an overwhelming orientation toward exports, 
yet it does not permit an evaluation of the importance of grain.  
Generally, this is a work of Atlantic history that uses the trans-Atlantic political and 
economic implications of the grain trade to emphasize persistent and durable trade connections 
despite political change.25  According to historian Alison Games, the Atlantic World concept 
centers on an effort by scholars to examine “the four continents that surround the Atlantic Ocean 
and the people contained therein.” This complex undertaking has been influentially organized 
into three core approaches by historian David Armitage:  circum-Atlantic (focus on the Atlantic 
experience as a whole), trans-Atlantic (focus on a comparative approach), and cis-Atlantic (focus 
on a single place within an Atlantic context).26  An Atlantic World conceptualization valuably 
recognizes the complexities of a multi-century, multi-layered history within an interactive 
geographic space.   
The trans-national quality of the Atlantic World concept is especially helpful to assess 
issues such as smuggling and illegal trade that fall outside the boundaries of nationalistic or 
empire-centric narratives. The British Atlantic economy depended on trans-Atlantic connections 
to provide Africans as slave camp laborers, North American lumber and provisions fueled slave 
subsistence, and European capital investments and markets were essential for colonial 
                                                          
24 Marc Egnal, New World Economies: The Growth of the Thirteen Colonies and Early Canada (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 6-8. 
25 Bernard Bailyn, Atlantic History: Concepts and Contours (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005); Alison 
Games, “From the Editor:  Introductions, Definitions, and Historiography: What is Atlantic History?” Organization 
of American Historians Magazine of History, Vol. 18, No. 3 (April 2004), 3-7; Karin Wulf, “No Boundaries?  New 
Terrain in Colonial American History” Organization of American Historians Magazine of History, Vol. 25, No. 1 
(January 2011), 7-12.         
26 Alison Games, “Atlantic History:  Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities,” American Historical Review, 111 
(2006), 741-757. 
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development.  This complicates the traditional view of the “triangle trade” which connected the 
Americas to Europe and Africa.  According to historian Bernard Bailyn, the triangle trade was, in 
fact, “an unstable, flexible, multilateral geometry of trade that shifted in unpredictable ways.” Its 
pan-oceanic trade networks were “interwoven, complex, and multitudinous- so complex, so 
numerous, that they can only be illustrated, not catalogued, enumerated, or fully summarized.”27  
Under this theory, the regions within the Atlantic system are important in and of themselves, 
however, the most valuable insights concern interconnections among them.  The flexibility of the 
Atlantic World model encourages the examination of trading patterns that pursue the actual 
movement of commodities rather than the assertions and claims about trade by politicians.   
Atlantic history continues to be a dynamic and productive approach to assess the early 
modern world.  Writing in 2009 on the expanding literature in the field, Bailyn wrote “the main 
stimulus to the proliferation of studies in and references to Atlantic history has been the 
explanatory power and suggestive implications created by the vison of the Atlantic region as a 
coherent whole.”28  Trade has been an important beneficiary of this focus.  By transcending an 
overly simplistic narrative of centralized control of economic development and trade.   
The field of Atlantic history now threatens to become nearly as large as the Atlantic itself 
with many large multi-essay guides to the subject. A leading example by Oxford University 
Press posits that “over the course of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries, several 
Atlantic worlds, each with distinctive features but sharing much in common, were fashioned,” 
yet it was not until the eighteenth century that these were absorbed “into a larger unit of 
                                                          
27Bernard Bailyn, Concepts and Contours (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 2005), 47, 84. 
28Bernard Bailyn, “Introduction: Reflections on some Major Themes” in Bailyn and Patricia Denault, eds., 
Soundings in Atlantic History: Latent Structures and Intellectual Currents, 1500-1830 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2009), 2.  See also David Hancock, “Connection and Control in the Atlantic Economy,” ibid, 115; 
Wim Klooster, “Inter-Imperial Smuggling in the Americas, 1600-1800” ibid, 141, 145-48.   
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interdependency” so that “a single functioning Atlantic World….flourished through much of the 
eighteenth century.”  However, the volume “emphatically rejects” viewing this history as “an 
extension of European history and teleological delineations of transitions from ‘colony to 
nation,’” thus distancing their conception of Atlantic history from an older and less inclusive 
tradition of imperial history.29 Despite these grandiose goals, and perhaps, in part, because of 
them, vital agricultural commodities are ignored entirely in this state of the field assessment that 
aspires to be comprehensive.  Wheat, grain, food, and agriculture do not even appear in the index 
of this 37-chapter tome.   
Historian David Hancock’s contribution on commodities and trade to the volume 
exemplifies the ways in which provision agriculture has been overlooked. His essay in this 
compilation reflects several similar themes to the Bailyn volume. Clarification on his points 
about networks and self-organization centered on the importance of the family firms and private 
partnerships in commerce. The role allotted to agriculture outside of the plantation complex by 
Hancock is limited.  He suggests that management of agricultural trade by imperial structures 
was looser due to the labor intensive (rather than capital intensive) nature of the commodities.30   
Hancock’s contributions to this dissertation are important, as family-based merchant 
firms, such as the Hollingsworths of Philadelphia, were crucial actors in the grain trade. 
American independence did not sever the self-organized and decentralized trading networks that 
linked the US and Great Britain.  Temporary political conflict could not abolish the important 
ties of family, mutual economic interests, and shared culture created over decades of exchange.    
                                                          
29 Nicholas Canny and Phillip Morgan, “Introduction: The Making and Unmaking of an Atlantic World” Canny and 
Morgan, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Atlantic World, c.1450-1850 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 2. 
30 David Hancock, “Atlantic Trade and Commodities, 1402-1815” in Ibid, 337-339.  See also David Hancock, 
Oceans of Wine: Madeira and the Emergence of American Trade and Taste (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2009); Ibid, Citizens of the World:  London Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735-
1785 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
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As historians David Armitage and Michael Braddick wrote, “the British Atlantic might be an 
imprecise geographical expression, but it was a real social phenomenon.  Over time, identifiable 
networks of trust, trade, and kinship grew up between British people moving in this larger 
Atlantic world.”31  The persistence of commerce after US political independence illustrates the 
ongoing power of these connections to maintain an English-speaking Atlantic World.   
Informal and illegal trade is important as well, particularly in the context of the 
Caribbean.  The food commodities trade between the mainland colonies and foreign colonial 
empires was long established by the 1770s.  Focusing on illicit trade, however, is not the main 
part of the story.  Grain does not fit neatly into the licit/illicit dichotomy associated with sugar 
and other better-studied products.  Legal commerce across imperial boundaries was common in 
the grain trade.  Spain and Portugal both relied on British colonial surpluses that were legally 
exchanged under the laws of both kingdoms as well as Great Britain.  After US independence, 
need compelled British officials in the Caribbean and British North America to legalize trade that 
under the strict mandate of the mercantile system would have been illegal.  It is a telling 
commentary that there were only three brief moments when the grain trade was outlawed after 
the American Revolution and all were unusual: the US embargos from 1807-1809, again by the 
US in early 1814, and by the British government in 1814 as part of its wartime blockade of the 
US    
The Atlantic World was a coherent whole by the mid-eighteenth century and the place of 
trade in wheat and subsistence crops was a key element of this integrated world that needs 
further study.  Scholarship on the economy of the Atlantic World has been novel and exciting, 
but it remains incomplete.  An analysis of US exports prior to 1820 illustrates this shortcoming.  
                                                          
31 David Armitage and Michael Braddick, eds., The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800 (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002), 3. 
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According to Robert Lipsey’s research, vegetable foods (including grain products) represented a 
plurality of US exports during the early republic.  The expansion of cotton production and 
exports starting in the 1820s shifted this trade pattern to the more famous leading role of the 
slave-produced commodity.32  The grain trade played a crucial role in a volatile political era of 
change from the 1760s to the 1810s and helped to stabilize the Anglo-American Atlantic via 
dynamic and persistence commercial exchanges and relationships.             
 Persistent commercial ties stemmed from a lack of viable alternatives for both producers 
and consumers. Despite the lack of attention to the grain trade by historians, early modern 
observers were keenly aware of wheat as an essential product and trade commodity.  The direct 
connection between social stability, grain prices, and the availability of bread was central to 
wide-ranging and frequent political debates.  In Great Britain, the landowning class depended on 
agricultural profits and rents to sustain their economic and social status.  Thus, an uneasy balance 
between profit and access shaped the grain trade.  These social and political forces, however, did 
not exist for the rest of the empire.  After the American Revolution the British would have 
preferred to prohibit American trade with the empire but efforts to find a non-US granary 
remained elusive for the next four decades. The consequences of this failure are significant as it 
created a dichotomy between political policy and economic necessity. 
 This dissertation has six substantive chapters.  Each approaches the continued 
connections between the US and the British Empire through the grain trade over time.  Chapter 2 
explores the late colonial and early republic era trade patterns, especially in regard to two 
essential primary source collections.  The Colonial Office 16 records (hereafter, CO 16) for 
                                                          
32 Robert Lipsey, “US Foreign Trade and the Balance of Payments, 1800-1913” Stanley Engerman, and Robert 
Gallman eds. The Cambridge Economic History of the United States. Vol. 2, The Long Nineteenth Century 
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1768-1772 provide the most important quantitative assessment of colonial era trade.  Second, 
Timothy Pitkin’s A Statistical Analysis of American Trade (1816) provides an important 
corroborating source.  Unenumerated grain and grain products were not constrained by law to 
trade within the empire and could be exchanged directly with Iberian, Caribbean, and 
Mediterranean markets in both the late colonial and early republican periods.  This legal 
difference from famed products like tobacco and sugar contributes to the obscurity of grain in the 
secondary literature.  There are no grain-based counterparts to the Sugar Act or the Boston Tea 
Party that illustrate ruptures in trade to attract historians.  Rather, grain underwrote quotidian 
continuity, rendering it a less emotive—but still vital—subject of inquiry.   
John McCusker and Russell Menard’s groundbreaking study The Economy of British 
North America dedicates only thirteen pages to early American provision agriculture.33  Within 
this brief section, the connection of food production to external markets are not mentioned.  The 
research in grain production is relatively strong as part of the “transition to capitalism” debates.34  
Paul Clemens’ From Tobacco to Grain illustrates the transition to grain production for external 
markets on Maryland’s eastern shore.  By the mid-1760s, the expansion of grain farming in 
Maryland and Virginia due to multiple factors was clear.  Clemens argues that a growing demand 
for grain fused with the complementary nature of grain and tobacco agriculture encouraged a 
                                                          
33 McCusker and Menard, The Economy of British North America, 295-308. See also Edwin Perkins, The Economy 
of Colonial America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980); James Shepherd and Gary Walton, Shipping, 
Maritime Trade, and the Economic Development of Colonial North America (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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34 See James Henretta, The Origins of American Capitalism: Collected Essays (Boston: Northeastern University 
Press, 1991), Allan Kulikoff, The Agrarian Origins of American Capitalism (Charlottesville:  University Press of 
Virginia, 1992).  For environmental factors in production, see James Lemon, The Best Poor Man’s Country:  A 
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significant shift in regional production, but how this happened, why, and exactly when these 
strands combined remains unclear.35  
The trade patterns outlined by these two landmark studies note a significant change in 
colonial grain exports by the 1730s as “Europe in general became less and less able to feed 
itself.”36  Integration with European markets, especially those of southern Europe, is an 
important continuity connecting the colonial and early republican eras.  James Lydon’s Fish and 
Flour for Gold persuasively argues that the colonial grain trade with Iberia reached significant 
levels by the 1730s that persisted despite the temporary disruption of the American Revolution.  
However, “Iberia’s need for foodstuffs and lumber products worked to America’s 
advantage…and the European wars after 1790 saw this valuable trade firmly and profitably 
regenerated.”37    
  The American Revolution changed the political geography of the previously united 
empire.  Andrew O’Shaughnessy offers a political interpretation of its impact on the British West 
Indies in An Empire Divided.  The separation of the West Indies from their traditional sources of 
provisions caused starvation for thousands of enslaved people and poor whites on the islands of 
Nevis, St. Kitts, Montserrat, and Antigua during the war.38  Further research on the post-war US 
grain economy by Brooke Hunter confirms the importance of the Caribbean as an export market.  
Hunter argues that the 1780s were a profitable time for American grain exports despite the short-
term disruption of the war.  In theory, US trade was excluded from British Caribbean markets.  
                                                          
35 Paul Clemens, The Atlantic Economy and Colonial Maryland’s Eastern Shore: From Tobacco to Grain (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1980), 169. 
36 McCusker and Menard, Economy of British North America, 79. 
37James Lydon, Fish and Flour for Gold, 1600-1800: Southern Europe in the Colonial Balance of Payments 
(Philadelphia: PEAES, 2008), 252. 
38 Andrew O’Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided: The American Revolution and the British Caribbean (Philadelphia:  
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 161, 239.   
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However, “to declare a law and to enforce it were two different things.”39  According to Gordon 
Bjork’s work, although the volume of legal trade in the 1780s declined, the actual value of trade 
remained constant since the price of grain increased.  As Europe slid into disorder and then into 
war in the 1790s, the price for grain rose even more dramatically.40  Hunter’s 2001 dissertation 
“Rage for Grain: Flour Milling in the Mid-Atlantic, 1750-1815” advances our understating of the 
flour production industry in the mid-Atlantic region.  Hunter’s chronology is significant, 
however, her research focuses on technological evolution, environmental factors such as the 
Hessian fly, and labor requirements of production more than trade.41  Despite the call for more 
research on the grain trade, this has not occurred, as David Hancock noted in his 2006 article 
“Rethinking the Economy of British North America.”42  A thorough quantitative analysis of this 
trade, however, is impossible as a fire in the London Customs House in 1814 destroyed most of 
the Ledgers of Imports and Exports for 1780 and after.43   
 Chapter 3 examines post-US independence grain farming in the British North American 
colonies as a potential alternative to traditional American sources that were now outside the 
empire. To establish a reliable grain surplus would require the British to accomplish a level of 
agricultural development in Quebec that the French had not achieved in 150 years and to do so 
for a suddenly enlarged population due to the loyalist migration.  This chapter has two 
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subsections:  Quebec (Lower Canada post-1791) and the Maritime Provinces (New Brunswick, 
Cape Breton, and Nova Scotia).  Politically the regions were linked by British rule, but a variety 
of factors create distinct historiographies for each in relationship to agricultural development.  
Despite important differences, in the face of conflict with the US, British North America 
functioned as a coherent unit.  This is particularly true in the nineteenth century when economic 
regulations (and the defiance thereof) were increasingly cast in nationalist and imperialist terms 
rather than cross-border regionalist ones.         
 The grain economy was central to a post-Revolutionary debate about how (or if) the new 
United States would be reintegrated into the British Atlantic economy.  A series of trans-Atlantic 
treatises on the political economy of trade ensued.  Writing in 1783, Lord Sheffield’s tract 
Observations on the Commerce of the United States presented a traditional outline of mercantile 
theory combined with the hopeful assertion that British North America would soon replace the 
US as an imperial granary supporting the West Indies and export markets in Iberia.  This 
provoked many responses on both sides of the Atlantic.44    
 The practical problems of replacing US production were clear almost immediately, 
especially with local production in the Maritimes.  As Neil MacKinnon’s This Unfriendly Soil 
persuasively demonstrates, loyalist refugees in Nova Scotia faced a formidable environment, a 
lack of infrastructure, and near famine conditions.45  In response, the provincial government of 
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Nova Scotia permitted food imports from the US on a “temporary” basis until establishing an 
adequate agricultural base to feed itself.  This plan, if practicable as an abstract policy, did not 
account for how markets function.  Graeme Wynn’s research on agriculture in the Bay of Fundy 
suggests that hopes for provincial self-sufficiency on foodstuffs did not make economic sense.46  
By the early years of the nineteenth century, the temporary expedient of US grain imports into 
the Maritime Provinces was effectively permanent.  Dreams of the Maritimes as an alternative 
granary to supply massive demand in the West Indies proved illusory.    
Quebec (Lower Canada, after 1791) represented the most developed and heavily settled 
colony in British North America, and, thus, the most likely source of grain exports from British 
North America.  Lydon’s Fish and Flour for Gold and the CO 16 ledgers record exports from 
Quebec to Iberia prior to the American Revolution.  Assessing agriculture production, however, 
is difficult due to the lack of quantitative data.  According to Robert Armstrong’s Structure and 
Change:  An Economic History of Quebec, no agricultural census was made prior to 1827.47    
Historical assessments of Lower Canadian agricultural development has produced a 
significant and emotive, yet somewhat misdirected, series of inquires between two contending 
schools of interpretation. In short, the conflict between Fernand Ouellet and the Laval School 
and their opponents in the Montreal School are based on clashing assessments of export data.  
Lacking any broad agricultural census data, both interpretations rely on export records and hotly 
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dispute whether or not it can be used as a proxy for production.  The inability of Quebec grain 
production to serve as a replacement for US imports is agreed upon.48  Whether this was due to 
increasing domestic demand (as proposed by the Montreal School, thus indicating a productive 
but not export oriented agricultural economy) or as a sign of declining production (as proposed 
by the Laval School, thus indicating an agricultural society in crisis) need not be resolved for this 
dissertation.  Agricultural exports in this long-standing historiographic dispute became a proxy 
argument for the overall state of French-Canadian society.  What is central to this dissertation, 
however, is that both sides agree that there was a decline in grain exports from Quebec after 
1802. 
 Beyond the contending schools of interpretation lies a material reality.  When compared 
to the mid-Atlantic colonies, all of British North America faced difficulties in transportation, 
infrastructure, and the environmental conditions required to sustain a large-scale grain export 
economy.  Time is another important factor.  The colonial grain economy was built over the 
course of decades; recreating that economy overnight was simply not possible.  In the case of 
Lower Canada, the potential development of other crops, such as peas and potatoes, diminished 
the overall importance of wheat to the local economy, and thus detracted from the ability to 
expand grain exports.49    
 Chapter 4 examines the connections between the US and the Atlantic grain economy 
during the French Revolution through the end of Jefferson’s administration in 1809.  With 
British North America unable to produce necessary grain surpluses to meet demand, British 
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policy makers turned to the US  Political changes throughout the Atlantic World brought change 
to the US economy as well.  Jay’s Treaty in 1794 reopened official connections between the US 
and the British Empire and legalized the pattern of exchange that already existed informally.  
Wartime conditions, familiarity, and neutral trade offered great potential for mutually beneficial 
exchanges.   
The focus on exports and re-exports for the European markets as the vehicle for 
American prosperity has been dubbed the “Taylor-North” thesis. This explicitly explores the 
power dynamic between the United States and European powers (especially France and Great 
Britain), and its impact on the US export-based economy.  The European war placed most trans-
Atlantic trade into the hands of neutral powers and was particularly beneficial for the United 
States as a fragile new nation.  According to historian Douglass North, the 1793-1808 time 
period brought “years of unparalleled prosperity” for the US led by the rapid expansion of 
exports in the overall economy, advantageous import prices, and the growth of domestic 
manufactures driven by export-sector profits.50 
War in Europe meant opportunity for neutrals, as the US, in theory, could legally trade 
with any belligerent power.  However, this became increasingly dangerous as the European war 
changed. According to historian Reginald Horsman, neutrality and the European conflict 
provided the United States both the opportunity to secure western expansion as well as the 
danger that those great powers might interfere with US shipping.51 One major beneficiary of 
these wartime conditions were grain farmers.  In her analysis of the early republican political 
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economy, historian Joyce Appleby wrote that “the new European demand for American 
grains…. created an unusually favorable opportunity for ordinary men to produce for the Atlantic 
trade world.”52 
The 1790s exposed stark cleavages among US political leaders.  Divisions over how the 
US should respond to the French Revolution, taxation and economic policies, the power of the 
federal government in relation to the states, and other issues sharply polarized politics.  The 
Federalist and Democratic-Republicans (or Jeffersonian Republicans) disagreed on many issues, 
but the need for external markets to sell surplus US agricultural products was an important point 
of agreement.  The continuity of trade policy from Federalist regimes under Washington and 
Adams through Jefferson’s first term reflects this consensus.      
Thomas Jefferson’s presidency after 1800 brought a new examination of the young 
republic’s political economy and its relationship with the rest of the Atlantic world.  Studies of 
Jeffersonian political economy, such as Drew McCoy’s The Elusive Republic and Doron Ben-
Atar’s The Origins of Jeffersonian Commercial Policy and Diplomacy, draw attention to the 
philosophical debate among Jeffersonians over the appropriate relationship between the 
economy, foreign trade, and the republic.53  According to  McCoy, the political economy of 
Thomas Jefferson’s yeoman republic depended on three factors:  “a national government free 
from any taint of corruption, an unobstructed access to an ample supply of open land, and a 
relatively liberal international commercial order that would offer adequate foreign markets for 
America’s flourishing agricultural surplus.”54  For the grain trade, the “revolution of 1800” did 
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not lead to a new era of commercial liberalization.  It was already liberated.  Massive 
commercial changes were attempted between 1805 and 1807 as the new trade policies of Britain 
and France ensnared US commerce in the widening reach of European economic warfare.55   
The famed Leopard-Chesapeake incident in summer 1807 sparked the most draconian 
trade regulation of the time—the Embargo Act of the United States.  Beyond the economic 
consequences of the embargo, law enforcement posed an unanticipated difficulty for the 
Jefferson administration.  Even the introduction of extraordinary measures, including the use of 
military force, had little effect.56  
The total embargo transformed an international political dispute about neutral trade 
regulations into a de facto referendum on Thomas Jefferson’s scheme of political economy and 
the strength of the federal government. Gautham Rao’s National Duties persuasively argues that 
seaborne commerce was aided by a malleable customs enforcement structure that favored 
merchant interests rather than national policies restricting trade.57  Historian Joshua Smith’s 
work illustrates the link between flour and grain smuggling between US ports on 
Passamaquoddy Bay into adjacent New Brunswick that effectively evaded the embargo.58 
Moreover, H.N. Mueller and Alan Taylor persuasively argue that cross-border exchange by land 
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in the northern interior was virtually unchecked by the embargo.59  Efforts to compel obedience 
to the policy sparked derision from the local population, rendering future efforts to eliminate 
trade by edict ineffective.  According to historian Reginald Horsman, the Embargo Act 
“shattered American trade and finances, created bitter internal opposition, and left no possibility 
of stepping up the pressure on Great Britain by further escalation of the economic measures.”60   
Chapter 5 outlines the continued development of Canadian agriculture in the wake of 
Jay’s Treaty.  The arrival of the “late loyalists” and the growing settlements in Upper Canada led 
to a new variable in British North American agricultural development.  The environment of 
Upper Canada was more favorable for wheat production due to soil and climate.  The late 
loyalist immigrations of the 1780s and 1790s provided some labor for clearing farms and 
creating infrastructure.  However, this proved inadequate to replace the US as a major imperial 
granary until at least the mid-nineteenth century.  The labor and infrastructure for this 
development would only come with the large waves of immigration from Britain after 1815.  A 
trio of major monographs approach grain production from slightly different frameworks but 
agree on the limited nature of early grain agriculture in the Canadas and Ontario.61  Subsistence 
farming with only minor export surpluses characterized Upper Canadian agriculture through the 
1830s. Grain surpluses in Lower Canada were variable but declining, while the Maritime 
Provinces continued to be dependent on external sources of grain.    
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Of course, the international situation remained volatile during the embargo years, and 
Chapter 6 traces Napoleon’s efforts to expand the reach of his Continental System and the 
ongoing influence British naval mastery in the Atlantic.  A growing dissatisfaction with 
Napoleonic rule in Iberia sparked the Peninsular War in 1808.  On its surface this theater of war 
had nothing to do with the United States as a neutral power. It was not a belligerent power nor 
was there any realistic possibility of American intervention on either side of the contest.  The 
historiography of the Peninsular War mistakenly reflects this perceived isolation.  Only two 
articles focus directly on the United States and the Peninsular War.62  Histories of the period are 
generally divided between a domestically oriented examination of Jeffersonian policies or on the 
growing conflict with Great Britain that would culminate in the War of 1812.  Conversely, 
studies on the Peninsular War generally treat it as a European event with little direct connection 
to American affairs other than as a stimulant to Latin American independence movements.63 
Ignorance of the US role in the Peninsular War is a considerable oversight.  Grain 
connected the US to the conflict in a vital way and provides a powerful example of the continuity 
of the grain trade.  Importantly, these connections are consistent with pre-war and indeed pre-
American Revolution patterns of exchange. The outbreak of the Peninsular War deepened two 
long-standing elements of the traditional triangular trade.  First, the connection between the mid-
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Atlantic and Iberia, where the latter provided access to salt, wine, and bills of exchange drawn on 
British merchant houses.  The war changed the nature of this trade.  Production of wine and salt 
was severely curtailed by wartime destruction.  Thus, bills of exchange, notes drawn on the 
British Treasury, and specie became the primary products of exchange.  Even as the political 
animosity between the US and Great Britain descended into war, the Iberian trade continued.  
Chapter 7 outlines the persistent trade between the US and British North America from 
the end of Jefferson’s embargo through the War of 1812.  The rationale behind the American 
declaration of war remains a matter of scholarly dispute.  A sampling of theories range from 
“desperation” and the desire to avoid disgrace, to more substantive US considerations of British 
interference with American overseas trade, US opposition to British alliances with the First 
Nations that restricted westward expansion, and American fury at impressment.64  More 
helpfully, historian J.C.A. Stagg offers a persuasive economic rationale for US goals in its 
invasion of Canada as an effort to “affect Britain’s capacity to exercise its commercial and naval 
powers against Americans in harmful ways that they could not otherwise control.”65  The war 
was a reactionary measure by the US to indirectly combat British trade regulations by improving 
the US bargaining position through the use of Canada as a bargaining chip to obtain concessions 
on neutral trading rights.66  
Other elements of the historiography reflect the ambiguous nature of the conflict for 
many in both British North America and New England.  John Boileau’s Half-Hearted Enemies 
on the wartime relations between Nova Scotia and New England reflects the general 
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ambivalence toward the war in both regions.  Although privateers on both sides damaged the 
calm on occasion, commerce co-existed with the conflict.67  Faye Kert’s Prize and Prejudice 
puts the point succinctly:  the war “seems to have been declared by the unprepared and fought by 
the unwilling for reasons that remain unexplained.”68   
Much like the connection between the US and the Peninsular War, the wartime economy 
remains relatively ignored. Historian Donald Hickey, a sort of Dean of War of 1812 studies, has 
repeatedly bemoaned that we lack a thorough treatment of the economic and financial history of 
the War of 1812 as well as attention to the role of trade with the enemy.69  Hickey’s earlier 
article, “American Trade Restrictions during the War of 1812,” argues that the British blockade 
and trade restrictions were not designed to stop US trade with Canada nor could American laws 
designed to end trade with the enemy be enforced.70 Part of Hickey’s critique was answered by 
Brian Arthur’s How Britain Won the War of 1812.  Arthur’s focus is on the British blockade of 
US ports and the economic dislocation it caused.  The work persuasively links the overall health 
of the US economy to external markets.  Awareness of the link between customs revenues levied 
on exports and the stability of US government finance is a significant contribution to 
scholarship.71   
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The Treaty of Ghent that ended the War of 1812 was signed on Christmas Eve 1814.  The 
end of the war provided one last test for the persistent connection between US grain producers 
and imperial consumers.  The dawn of 1815 saw the resumption of the regular grain trade, 
rendering the disruption of the North American blockade year of 1814 a rare aberration in the 
long-established trade pattern.  Without the interference of war, commerce in subsistence goods 
again pursued their accustomed channels.      
The grain trade deepens our understanding of the late colonial and early republican US  It 
was just as vital to the British Atlantic and British North American economy of this era. The 
inherent difficulties of overcoming national, imperial, and war-divided historiographies conceals 
grain from our easy gaze.  Mistaken ideas of periodization and politically inspired limitations to 
historical assessments ultimately hide connections that were fundamental at the time and should 
be better understood.  The availability of surplus grain, particularly from the mid-Atlantic 
colonies in what would become the United States, were essential to the viability of societies 
around the British Atlantic.  Simply stated, without food society ceases to function.  Ideology 
falls to the wayside, plantations cease production, populations collapse, and long-distance 
warfare becomes impossible.  Examining the availability of food products, the laws enabling or 
limiting access via trade, and the extraordinary (and sometimes illegal) steps taken to ensure that 
the staff of life was available to fuel social development was crucial to the rise of Anglo-
American power in a tumultuous Age of Atlantic Revolutions whose political drama should not 
completely eclipse its economic foundations and the vital lens of political economy.   
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CHAPTER 2 
THE GRAIN TRADE IN THE THIRTEEN COLONIES, 1768-1793:  THE STAFF OF 
LIFE AND THE PERSISTANCE OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
 
New World settlement created a dynamic new economic structure for the increasingly 
interconnected Atlantic World. Colonial development expanded production of familiar European 
crops (as well as exotic newer ones) and created powerful market ties among previously isolated 
locations.  One foundation of this new economic framework was the emergence of the middle 
colonies of the North American mainland as the granary of the Atlantic World.  Exports of 
colonial wheat and corn proved essential to sustain societies in other corners of the Atlantic.  The 
sugar plantations of the Caribbean, the settled fisheries of Newfoundland, and increasingly 
portions of Europe itself all depended on surplus colonial grain by the mid-eighteenth century, 
creating a complex and interlocking system of exchange.  Complexity led to continuity in the 
case of the wheat trade. Although the dramatic political rupture of the American Revolution 
should (in theory) have caused a significant and lasting rupture in trade, this was not the case.   
The contours of exchange in the grain trade remained remarkably consistent from the late 
colonial era to the early republic.  Rather than a decisive break, the War for American 
Independence marked only a temporary aberration in the existing pattern.  Reconciling political 
change with economic continuity challenged political leaders and merchants throughout the 
1780s and early 1790s as the dichotomy between the dictates of mercantilism (and nationalism) 
and the quotidian demands for profit and food strained against one another until the outbreak of 
the French Revolution and the Napoleonic War created a new geo-political context that spurred a 
return to traditional patterns in the grain trade with the Mid-Atlantic US exporting to much of the 
multi-national Atlantic.   
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Grain as an export commodity is a surprisingly expansive category that was also rarely 
documented by government sources in a systematic manner. Grain and grain products were 
unenumerated commodities not subject to customs duties under British law.  For tax and 
regulatory purposes, there was little need to fully define the category.  Depending on who was 
doing the counting and how they organized their ledgers, different grain products were itemized 
and combined in varied ways.  For example, the Halifax Naval Office Records for the 1750s and 
early 1760s do not provide set columns for commodities.  Cargo manifests were written into the 
ledgers on a ship-by-ship basis.  By October 1811, columns for flour, corn, and bread had 
appeared.1  The essential CO 16 records for the period 1768 to 1772 itemize Indian corn, barley, 
rice, and wheat under the label of “grain”.  Bread and flour, however, were combined as one 
item, categorized separately as “provisions.”2  US Congressman Timothy Pitkin’s A Statistical 
View of the Commerce of the United States itemizes wheat, flour, Indian corn, corn meal, and 
rice under the general label of “Agriculture.”3   
The clearest definition of grain in this era appears in the Corn Laws passed by 
Parliament.  The May 1814 bill identified corn, grain, meal, malt, and flour as regulated 
commodities under the Corn Laws.4  In the Parliamentary debates in early 1815, the label “Corn” 
was used to describe the itemized list of wheat, rye/pease/and bean, barley/beer/bigg, and oats.  
Included in this was any meal or flour made of these products.5  By the debates of 1814-1815, 
                                                          
1 Provincial Archives of Nova Scotia (Hereafter PANS), rolls 13968 and 13969. 
2 Customs Office, 16/1, David Library of the American Revolution collection 412, roll 1. Hereafter CO 16, DLAR 
collection 412, roll 1.   
3 Timothy Pitkin, A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States (Hartford: Timothy Hosmer, 1816). 
4 “Bill to Regulate Importation of Corn into United Kingdom (as amended by committee). 1813-14 session, Vol. II 
No. 
197.https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/result/pqpdocumentview?accountid=10406&groupid=106067&pgI
d=1aaba435-edd0-414f-b354-7c7cf4726ba9&rsId=16602D1C1E2#108   
5 House of Commons, “Resolutions of the Committee of Whole House of Commons on State of Corn Laws, 
February 1815. House of Commons Papers, Vol. 1337, No. 86. 
36 
 
bread and rice had disappeared from the legal definition of “corn” although bread was implied by 
the context.  This dissertation focuses on wheat, and its direct products of flour and bread.  
“Indian corn” (or maize) is also a significant cereal crop that can be important as a 
complementary or substitute commodity based on shifting market circumstances.  There is a 
differentiated market for these two major cereal crops.  Wheat was the preferred export product 
to British North America (i.e., Canada) and Europe.  Indian corn was more significant for the 
West Indies market and could supplement imported wheat in other markets in case of need.             
Quantifying the grain trade prior to start of the CO 16 records in 1768 is impossible.  
However, the increasing trade volume and importance of colonial grain is clear at least as early 
as the 1730s. As the leading economic historians of the era John McCusker and Russell Menard 
have observed, by that decade colonial grain exports played an increasingly important role in the 
Atlantic economy as “Europe in general became less and less able to feed itself.”6  James 
Lydon’s Fish and Flour for Gold persuasively argues that colonial grain exports to Iberia 
reached significant levels by the 1730s.  This trade was actively encouraged by British officials 
as a crucial means to gain specie from Iberia.  The direct beneficiaries of this inter-imperial trade 
were colonial grain merchants and farmers in the large grain-growing region of the middle 
colonies that stretched from Connecticut to northern Maryland.7 
To what degree colonial farmers planted grain explicitly for the export market is 
disputed.  Historical geographer James Lemon’s study of the major grain-producing region of 
Pennsylvania and Delaware stresses its environmental advantages.  Fertile soils allowed for 
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farmers to plant a variety of grains, garden crops, and forage crops required for an effective 
mixed-farming economy.  Although surpluses would be sold, monocrop specialization was not 
the norm in this era.  Yields per acre could vary widely from 20-40 bushels per acre on new 
lands to an average of 5-12 bushels on older farmlands. Corn was even more productive, 
averaging a yield of 20-30 bushels per acre.  However, most corn was used as fodder rather than 
traded or consumed.8  Overall, Lemon noted that farmers existed in both a local subsistence 
economy and a market economy linking them to external consumers.  He estimated that by the 
1740s farmers of “middling status” sold between one third to one half of their total production 
during peace time.9 
Geographic factors assisted the development of the grain trade in the Delaware Valley 
and the adjacent Chesapeake and Susquehanna watershed, where grain exports were also notable.   
The deep and broad Delaware River connected farmers and merchants in Pennsylvania, New 
Jersey, and Delaware directly to the Atlantic.  Despite being far upriver, Philadelphia was a 
major seaport and the largest British colonial city of the latter half of the eighteenth century.  
Smaller streams provided energy for water mills, which allowed millers in the region to convert 
semi-processed wheat into flour for local consumption and export.10  The Chesapeake facilitated 
a similar export-based economy of bulk products, especially in areas where tobacco did not 
dominate or became less profitable over time. It is not possible to precisely quantify early grain 
production and export in a systematic manner, but it was without question a robust and consistent 
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export surplus from the Delaware Valley and the broader middle colonies to customers 
throughout the eighteenth-century Atlantic World.  
Colonial grain exports followed three major paths—the first to the Caribbean, the second 
to Iberia, while the third pursued coastal trade.  Although there were temporary fluctuations, this 
order of export destinations remained stable.  John McCusker and Russell Menard assessed the 
relationship between mainland exports and these markets in their work The Economy of British 
North America.  McCusker and Menard provide a more nuanced interpretation of the export 
driven economy theory and the impact that the staples trade had on the development of the North 
American colonies.   The middle colonies benefited from an increase in cereal prices in Europe 
in the mid-eighteenth century.  Combined with the pre-existing trade in grain with the West 
Indies, the size, geographical expanse, and profitability of the grain trade dramatically increased 
after 1750.  In turn, the increased demand facilitated expanding production throughout the 
region, including the repurposing of some agricultural lands from other staples commodities into 
grain production.11       
A useful proxy measurement for the colonial grain trade is the scope and scale of efforts 
to curtail its trade during the Seven Years War. Two related studies illuminate the overall 
importance of the multi-national Caribbean as a destination for North American grain and the 
complications arising from this exchange.  According to Thomas Truxes’ Defying the Empire, 
trade with the enemy from New York during the Seven Years War was widespread and the result 
of a “naked manifestation of a powerful commercial impulse synonymous with the great 
metropolis.”  Truxes emphasizes how New York merchants engaged in illegal, quasi-legal, and 
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morally dubious trade.12  The outbreak of war in 1755 brought renewed imperial focus to 
colonial trade practices.  As part of the war effort, it was necessary to eliminate exports of flour 
and other provisions to French posts in Cape Breton, New Orleans, and the Caribbean.13   
The Provisions Act of 1757 theoretically made any trade in provisions (grain, flour, 
bread, and salted meat) with any trading partner other than Great Britain or other British colonies 
illegal, with enforcement provided though bond requirements that amounted to three times the 
value of all shipped cargo.  This was evaded by first shipping New York products to New 
London or other colonial ports with lax customs enforcement and obtaining documents to ship 
exports to Monte Christi, a neutral Spanish Caribbean port.14  The Royal Navy was unable to 
interdict this trade.  Another method of evading restrictive British trade law was through the flag 
of truce.  Prisoner exchanges between colonial British America and the French West Indies were 
common.  According to Truxes approximately 25% of New York’s trade with the enemy was 
covered by an official flag of truce.15  The imperial government attempted to curtail this traffic 
through mandating better law enforcement by colonial officials. However, most colonial 
governors denied the existence of illegal practices.16  The first conviction in the New York courts 
for provision smuggling was not until April 1763, and the two convicted merchants were 
released with a fine.17  
According to Cathy Matson’s Merchants and Empire, trade with the West Indies was 
particularly attractive to younger and middling merchants due to the lower capital investments 
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required to enter those markets.18  From 1715 to 1765 one half of all of New York’s trading 
vessels and tonnage cleared for destinations in the Caribbean.19  Overall, in McCusker and 
Menard’s assessment, the West Indies 
served as a major market for colonial exports, particularly foodstuffs and wood 
products; they supplied a variety of goods that the continental colonists imported, 
processed and consumed, and re-exported; and they provided an important source 
of foreign exchange that helped balance colonial accounts and pay for British 
manufactures.20      
A quantitative analysis of the system described by Lydon, Truxes, Matson, and McCusker and 
Menard is possible for the years 1768-1772.  Customs records for this period were preserved as 
the Ledger of Imports and Exports for America, 1768-1772, better known as the CO 16 
records.21  Effective trade regulation and customs enforcement were problematic due to the great 
distances between customs houses, the coasting and fishing trades, and the lack of a substantive 
enforcement mechanism on the scale found in Britain or Ireland.22  Despite these inherent 
limitations, the ledgers provide an essential overview of the grain trade and provide the 
opportunity to examine market differentiations in product and volume over time.  
 Not surprisingly, the West Indies were the most significant export market for colonial 
grain products in volume.  The data reveals several elements to the trade and help to explain the 
place of grain within the contested mercantile system that aspired to keep trade within the British 
Empire. Indeed, the first important argument here is more political than economic.  The headings 
within the CO 16 records explicitly acknowledged grain exports to the West Indian colonies of 
non-British imperial powers.  There is no differentiation between exports to the foreign West 
                                                          
18 Cathy Matson, Merchants & Empire: Trading in Colonial New York (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1998), 4. 
19 Ibid, 184. 
20 Ibid, 145. 
21 David Klingaman, “Food Surpluses and Deficits in the American Colonies, 1768-1772,” The Journal of Economic 
History, Vol. 31, No. 3 (September 1971), 553-569, 554. 
22 See Lord Liverpool to the Lords of the Treasury, February 21, 1769. DLAR collection 430, roll 1.       
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Indies and the British West Indies in the ledgers, thus shedding light on an important question of 
peacetime trade when agricultural exports to other empires were lawful as a means to gain 
wealth at the expense of a foreign land.  This acceptability was contingent upon the form of the 
return, however, and whether the profit impinged on the opportunities of other interest groups 
within the British Empire.      
            A closer examination of the Sugar Act (1764) illustrates the contingent nature of the 
mercantile system. Developed by George Grenville in response to the costs of the Seven Years 
War, the act attempted to raise revenue while asserting some measure of control over the colonial 
economy.  The methods to accomplish this reflected mercantilist thinking by regulating imports 
to Britain rather than exports from its colonies.  While certainly politically volatile, this 
legislation did not directly affect lawful grain exports to foreign colonies, and they remained 
untaxed.  Indeed, no grain or grain products are mentioned within the legislation.  Only imported 
sugar products (especially molasses), Iberian wines, and a handful of other commodities were 
subjected to the new duties.23  Despite this, access to grain underlay the entire scheme.     
An analysis of the Sugar Act emphasizes its flexible blend of political interests and 
careful economic considerations via a pragmatic application of mercantilist ideas.  In Grenville’s 
conception, lowering taxes on imported sugar products while providing for a more effective tax 
collection bureaucracy would not inconvenience colonials.  Rather, the tax would be passed on to 
French sugar producers in the form of higher costs for provisions.  Since the French islands had 
no other potential source for foodstuffs, they would be forced to pay whatever price colonial 
merchants charged or face the collapse of the plantation system due to lack of sustenance.  As 
                                                          
23 The Sugar Act. Great Britain The statutes at large ... [from 1225 to 1867] by Danby Pickering. Cambridge: Printed 
by Benthem, for C. Bathhurst: London, 1762-1869. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/sugar_act_1764.asp.  
Accessed October 27, 2018.  
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historian Fred Anderson notes, “if legitimizing trade between the mainland colonies and the 
sugar islands of a foreign empire did not fit comfortably within the mercantilist conceptions that 
framed the rest of the [sugar] act’s provisions, it made excellent economic and strategic sense in 
the postwar world.”24   
Anderson’s point makes good sense, but one could go further and insist that the Sugar 
Act was entirely consistent with mercantile thought.  It was not the exportation of agricultural 
goods into another imperial system that caused a more stringent regulatory regime.  Rather, it 
was the competition of the return cargo of foreign sugar products into the British imperial 
economy that provoked vociferous complaints from powerful British West Indian interests. The 
broader economic framework of the Sugar Act was not analyzed by colonial subjects. Rather, it 
was perceived as a political measure introducing new imperial oversight that did not exist before.  
Popular outrage nullified the law, but the outrage was based upon a political conception of the 
disagreement rather than a coherent economic view of the place of the colonies within the 
empire.             
 Grain lies at the intersection of political machinations and economic interests because 
there were no ready substitutes for grain exports from the middle colonies.  This was true for the 
French and Spanish West Indies, indeed, for the entire sugar plantation economy.  Resource 
dependency illuminates the profound trade connection between the mainland and the planation 
colonies of the Caribbean.   
                                                          
24 Fred Anderson, The Crucible of War: The Seven Years War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 
1754-1766 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 579. See also Cathy Matson, “Imperial Political Economy: An 
Ideological Debate and Shifting Practices,” WMQ, Vol. 69, No. 1 (January 2012), 35-40; Susan Amussen, “Political 
Economy and Imperial Practice,” WMQ, Vol. 69, No. 1 (January 2012), 47-50.   
43 
 
Table 2.1 outlines the CO 16 records for the West Indies trade and exposes two important 
elements. 
Table 2.1:  Exports to the British and Foreign West Indies , 1768-177225 
Year Flour/Bread (Tons) Indian Corn (Bushels) Wheat (Bushels) 
1768 17,292 638,883 No Line Item 
1769 20,319 514,848 No Line Item 
1770 23,442 402,958 955 
1771 20,652 607,532 1,028 
1772 23,575 541,962 154 
 
The sheer scale of exports is significant and further illustrates the difficulty of replacing the 
mainland colonies as a source of provisions.  Second, the diverse selection of commodities 
displays a degree of market segmentation within the grain trade.  The lack of wheat suggests a 
distinct class element to provision exports.  Indian corn was cheaper than wheat, considered a 
cruder food item, and could also be used as animal fodder.   
The ledgers do not distinguish between flour and bread, thus disaggregating the total into 
its constituent parts is impossible.  Yet it is notable that raw flour spoiled quickly in a tropical 
environment.  According to one estimate, after four months of storage most raw flour would be 
uneatable and after six months of storage all flour would be rancid.26  Due to the perishability of 
flour and the relative durability of hardtack bread, it is likely that the majority of the non-corn 
grain exported to the West Indies was in the form of bread.   
                                                          
25 Customs Office, 16/1, David Library of the American Revolution collection 412, roll 1.  Hereafter CO 16/1, 
DLAR 412. 
26 Sherry Johnson, “El Nino, Environmental Crisis, and the Emergence of Alternative Markets in the Hispanic 
Caribbean, 1760-70s,” WMQ, Vol. 62, No. 3 (July 2005), 365-410, 395. 
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Perhaps the most significant information within this section of the ledgers is not the 
commodity data at all.  Acknowledging and labeling the foreign West Indies as a major trading 
partner for the grain economy is an important illustration of how the mercantile system operated 
in practice.  The ledgers show how provision exports functioned within mercantilist thought.  
The regulatory emphasis and fears of economic competition lie only in certain enumerated 
imports to British domains.   
The open market connections between the colonies and the non-British Caribbean reveals 
the political economy of the grain trade under mercantilism.  In theory, trade between Britain’s 
North American colonies and the non-British Caribbean was illegal.  However, as Truxes and 
Matson have demonstrated, this was a polite fiction by the 1750s.  The trade was entirely legal 
under British law during peace time.  It was Spanish law that threatened to curtail the exchange.  
The fear of British colonial imports was grounded in fears of competition with Spanish producers 
in Mexico.  However, according to historian Sherry Johnson’s examination of the 1760s and 
1770s, climatic fluctuations undermined these trade restrictions, and legally opened markets for 
British colonial farmers. A series of hurricanes, floods, and droughts combined to disrupt local 
production and distribution routes that prompted changes in Spanish colonial regulations.  Dire 
need overrode the fear of imported provisions.  By 1766, the Asiento’s monopoly on foreign 
flour imports was broken due to urgent demand. In its place, a more flexible system emerged.  In 
Cuba, for example, the Captain General gained the authority to permit flour and other food 
products from outside the Spanish Empire at his discretion.  Although this concession was 
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supposed to be limited emergencies, in practice British colonial produce became a regular 
sight.27 
Efforts to reconcile the monopoly interest of the Asiento and the practical need of 
Spanish colonists for British colonial products on a permanent basis resulted in an unusual 
solution.  Grain products from the colonies would be exported to Cadiz, and then transshipped to 
the Caribbean under the auspices of the Asiento.  Thus, the monopoly existed in form but not in 
function.  Even this polite subterfuge was abandoned in time.  The fact that most of the flour 
imported into the Spanish Caribbean from Cadiz was from the British colonies was an open 
secret.  The horrific hurricane season of 1772 brought into the open what was already widely 
practiced.  The devastation resulted in the direct and open importation of British colonial grain 
no matter what the law demanded.28          
The demographics and land use patterns of the Caribbean slave plantation system 
regardless of empire required cheap provisions at all times.  According to Selwyn Carrington, in 
the 1770s the British West Indies received most of its corn, pickled fish, and oats from the 
mainland colonies. Half of all flour imports and the vast majority of wood imports were also 
from the mainland colonies.29  The trade in low quality and inexpensive provisions to the West 
Indies was a key factor in the expansion of the slave-based plantation economy as booming slave 
numbers in the eighteenth century required ever more cheap food from the mainland.30   
 Southern Europe was the second most important destination for colonial grain exports.  
These exchanges provided a different set of supply and demand relationships based on imports of 
                                                          
27Ibid, 366, 376-8. Under the Asiento (formally the Asiento de Negros regarding the slave trade), the company was 
allowed to import flour in relationship to the number of slaves it imported into the Spanish Caribbean. As the 
Asiento held a monopoly on slave imports, by extension it monopolized legal flour imports. See Johnson, 375.    
28 Johnson, 383-85, 392. 
29 Selwyn H.H. Carrington, “The American Revolution and the British West Indies’ Economy,” The Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1987), 823-850, 823.   
30 Innis, The Cod Fisheries,164. 
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Madeira wine, salt, and British bills of exchange in return for colonial grain.  Salt was a vital 
resource for the fisheries, as well as for preserving pork and beef.  Madeira wine was enjoyed in 
enormous quantities by colonial elites, while bills of exchange helped to limit the colonial trade 
deficit with Great Britain.  Despite the different context, the European trade also reflected 
classically mercantilist characteristics as the unusable colonial grain surplus was exported 
outside of the empire in exchange for specie equivalents or for resources, like salt, that were not 
readily available within the British Empire. 
 The correspondence of merchants Thomas Lamar, Henry Hill, and Robert Bisset provide 
insight into this trade network.  The three brothers-in-law engaged in a triangular trading 
relationship between Philadelphia, London, and Madeira.  Beginning in 1756 and continuing 
through 1798, their letters illustrate the potential and the perils of southern European trade.  
Writing to his brother Richard in 1756, Henry Hill spoke highly of the trading prospects for 
wheat and corn due to scarcity.  A poor local harvest in Madeira combined with an unexpectedly 
scanty crop in Lisbon led to opportunity for colonial British merchants.  By December, the 
situation was so dire that the Portuguese crown was obligated to provide grain to the public at the 
crown’s expense.  Hill’s firm provided a portion of this bounty and profited handsomely in the 
transaction.31  The letter implies a close connection to the governing authorities of Madeira and 
illuminates how grain merchants sustained the public and good order with provisions, while also 
making a profit for themselves. 
Their surviving correspondence is sparse during the 1760s, however, two letters reflect 
the essence of the Hill family’s business transactions for this decade.  The first letter in July 1762 
laments the lack of wheat and flour, although this is suspected to be temporary.  Corn is plentiful, 
                                                          
31 Henry Hill to Richard Hill, August 22, 1756 and December 11, 1756. Sarah A.G. Smith Collection, Historical 
Society of Pennsylvania collection 1864 (hereafter Smith Collection, HSP), Box 1, folder 4.   
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but other commodities were scarce.  A second letter from June 1769 inquired as to the fate of a 
Philadelphia ship in route to Madeira with a cargo of 3,000 barrels of flour.  Robert Bisset, the 
family’s merchant in residence, was particularly anxious as he had no flour in stock and had 
none due for some time.32  The correspondence illustrates two important features of this trade.  
First, the movement of information and goods was slow.  Reconciling supply and demand 
relationships from across the Atlantic was difficult.  Second, a key management strategy relied 
on mercantile family networks.  Business management at a distance required trust, reliability, 
and a shared faith in the judgement of the merchants involved.  
Historian David Hancock’s study of the Madeira trade outlines the broad intersecting 
interests of American grain merchants, Madeiran wine producers, and their places within the 
mercantile system.  Like grain, Madeira crossed imperial boundaries with an open disregard for 
official regulations.  According to Hancock,  
Madeira shows how decentralized the early modern Atlantic was, with widely 
dispersed agency and frequent transgressions of imperial boundaries….analysis of 
the Madeira wine complex show that world as extensively linked by networks- 
family, ethnic, religious, business, and social- that participants created and 
managed.33                      
 
However, also much like grain, the regulations governing this trade were also more liberal than a 
cursory glance suggests.  An Anglo-Portuguese treaty in the mid-seventeenth century opened 
trade between the English colonies and Madeira.  The Navigation Acts restricting trade did not 
apply, and no crown duty was imposed on imported Madeira.34       
                                                          
32 Henry Hill to Richard Hill, July 18, 1762 and Robert Bisset to “Dear Brother” [unnamed] June 2, 1769. Smith 
Collection, HSP, Box 1, folder 4. 
33 David Hancock, Oceans of Wine: Madeira and the Emergence of American Trade and Taste (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2009), xvi. 
34Ibid, 394. 
48 
 
Effective trade regulation under mercantilism during the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century consisted of three parts:  the creation of regulations, the ability to enforce those 
regulations, and then the will to enforce them.  The creation of laws was relatively easy, but the 
capacity of the various empires to enforce trade regulations was rudimentary at best.  Smuggling 
and corruption were epidemic, and the application of the law as imagined by its authors was an 
uncertain proposition.  The third premise is, perhaps, most interesting.  The Madeira trade did 
not operate in defiance or contradiction of mercantile regulations.  The trade was an 
acknowledged exception to those rules.  Thus, there was no will- and no effort- to curtail these 
exchanges on mercantilist grounds.  Loose networks of independent merchants did not seize the 
opportunity from an unwilling or inattentive mother country, rather they took advantage of an 
opportunity freely offered. 
 The same set of circumstances held true for grain.  It was not an enumerated commodity, 
therefore exports to southern Europe were legal and consistent with Britain’s mercantile policies.  
Direct trade between the middle colonies and Europe increased in the last years of the colonial 
era.  By 1770, more than 30% of all ships clearing from Philadelphia were bound for Europe.  
The fastest growing sector of this trade was grain bound for Iberia and Mediterranean Europe.  
The expanding foreign market led to new grain production throughout the Chesapeake Bay 
region.35  More systemically, the focus on export markets as a causal force in domestic economic 
development reflects a modified form of the staples thesis of development.  Although this is 
more often associated with single resource economies such as the fisheries, sugar, tobacco, ride, 
or the fur trade, it can also be applied to wheat. 
                                                          
35 McCusker and Menard, Economy of British North America, 195-7. See Paul Clemens, The Atlantic Economy and 
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Yet, the expanding volume of trade was not always advantageous for the merchants 
involved.  Writing in August 1771, Robert Bisset lamented the flood of corn, wheat, and flour 
entering into Madeira.  Prices were already low, and threatened collapse as more vessels 
arrived.36  As a small island, its markets could be overwhelmed by a handful of cargos.  The 
economic law of supply and demand remained intact, although the varying fortunes of the Hill 
and Bisset correspondence does illuminate an important feature of the grain trade.  Surplus and 
dearth could fluctuate in a location based on many factors.  The arrival of unexpected imports or 
an unexpected shortfall caused by a poor harvest could alter the grain market’s dynamic from 
month-to-month and year-to-year.  The markets of Iberia and Mediterranean Europe were larger, 
less volatile, and sustained an increasing volume of exports.   
Table 2.2 outlines the CO 16 export statistics from the mainland British colonies to 
Southern Europe.    
Table 2.2:  Exports to Southern Europe , 1768-177237 
Year Bread/flour (tons) Indian Corn (Bushels) Wheat (Bushels) 
1768 5,059 tons, 16,336 
barrels.  
351,573 430,530 
1769 20,852 393,068 862,926 
1770 18,501 175,221 588,561 
1771 12,312 215,353 371,310 
1772 17,945 261,837 415,433 
 
The data offers several important insights about the European grain trade.  First, under the 
classification established within the ledgers, all of Europe south of Cape Finisterre in 
                                                          
36 Robert Bisset to “Dear Brother”, August 9, 1771. Smith Collection, HSP, Box 1, folder 4.  
37 CO 16/1, DLAR 412. 
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northwestermost Iberia were grouped together, including the Wine Islands (Madeira).  Thus, 
trade with Iberia and the rest of the Mediterranean basin cannot be differentiated.  However, 
given Lydon’s findings the clear majority of these exports landed in Spain or Portugal.  The 
volume of bread and flour exported there is comparable to that to the West Indies.  Although 
less, the volume of Indian corn is still consequential.  The volume of wheat, however, is 
massively higher.  Southern Europe drew the clear majority of all wheat exports from the 
colonies.  Semi-processed wheat is cheaper than flour or bread and is more durable.  The milling 
capacity of southern Europe could process both local corn and wheat production as well as 
colonial imports. 
 The West Indies and southern Europe represent the two primary external markets for 
grain products, but the CO 16 data clarifies the place of two other markets as well.  Exports to 
Ireland and Great Britain itself were less common but could be important on a year-to-year basis.  
Of course, mercantile impediments to trade did not apply within the empire.  Table 2.3 outlines 
the mainland colonial grain exports to Ireland.   
Table 2.3:  Exports to Ireland , 1768-177238 
Year Bread/flour (Tons) Indian Corn (Bushels) Wheat (Bushels) 
1768 471 5,095 21,174 
1769 2,332 294 116,045 
1770 3,583 150 149,985 
1771 No Line Item 8,500 129,638 
1772 228 No Line Item 19,941 
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Grain exports from North America to Ireland were volatile from 1768 to 1772, especially the 
spike in imported wheat from 1769 to 1771.  Bread and flour see a similar increase for 1769 and 
1770 but disappear from the ledgers in 1771.  These exports reflect substitution for poor Irish 
harvests in those years, and the use of colonial grain to supplement failed local production.39  
Long term, the prognosis for Ireland as a stable market for grain was poor.  The 1770s represent 
a transition point in Irish agricultural history.  By the end of the decade, Ireland would be a net 
grain exporter, rather than a potential customer for colonial producers and merchants.  The 
primary export market for Irish grain was Great Britain.40  This evolution in Irish agriculture 
potentially challenged colonial exports to the British market, however, the significant geo-
political events of the 1770s and 1780s obviously disrupted colonial trade with Ireland and Great 
Britain profoundly.  
 Great Britain forms the fourth key market for colonial grain and represents yet another 
distinct trade relationship, as seen in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4:  Exports to Great Britain , 1768-177241 
Year Bread/flour (Tons) Indian Corn (Bushels) Wheat (Bushels) 
1768 3,400 105,161 171,211 
1769 2,254 100 48,778 
1770 263 No Line Item 11,739 
1771 214 No Line Item 47,069 
1772 4,785 (quarters) No Line Item 14,108 
                                                          
39 Paul Sharp and Jacob Weisdorf, “Globalization Revisited: Market Integration and the Wheat Trade Between 
North America and Britain from the Eighteenth Century” Explorations in Economic History, Vol. 50 (2013), 88-98, 
92. 
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Except for 1768, Great Britain itself was not a significant recipient of colonial grain from 1768 
through 1772. The cause for this, however, is political rather than economic.  Great Britain’s 
agricultural economy had two features that the other markets did not.  The importance of 
agricultural rents to British elites provided an economic rationale to inflate grain prices via 
legislative controls on grain imports.  Thus, exports to Britain faced regulatory barriers that 
sought to balance the economic interests of politically powerful landowners with the need for 
social stability that rested upon adequate access to affordable foodstuffs for the general 
population.  Second, the 1770s were a period of transition in the British agricultural economy.  
Prior to this, Britain was self-sufficient in grain production and tended to be a net exporter of 
grain.  Colonial imports competed with domestic production except in cases of an exceptionally 
poor harvest.  However, as the British economy started to industrialize, and the population 
increased, the need for outside provisions grew.42    
 Customs regulations provide one means of tracing attitudes towards grain imports.  
Duties payable on imported grain products fluctuated with its market price in Britain.   Other 
grain products were regulated with a similar sliding duty structure.43  This represented a 
significant limitation on grain imports into Britain.  At its highest rates, the customs levy would 
add a 50% surcharge on imported wheat, making it impossible for colonial producers to compete 
with local ones.  There is a certain degree of flexibility as prices rose, but this also created 
market uncertainty for colonial producers who operated under weeks, if not months, old market 
information.            
                                                          
42 Sharp and Weisdorf, “Globalization Revisited,” 91. 
43 Henry Thornton, Historical Summary of the Corn Laws, Containing the Substance of the Statues Passed from the 
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A change in regulations in 1774 presented a potential opportunity for colonial producers.  
Paul Sharp and Jacob Weisdorf found a significant increase in imports in 1774 and 1775 because 
of changes in the Corn Laws.  The revised impost regulations resulted in “practically free” trade 
in grain, which does not overstate the scope of change.44  In 1774, the duty on wheat was 
reduced to 6d per quarter if the market price was 48s per quarter or higher.  Other grain 
commodities saw similar impost rate adjustments.45  These changes represented an enormous 
potential opportunity for colonial farmers and grain merchants.  
The final branch of trade explored in the CO 16 ledgers is the important and elusive 
“coastal trade” between mainland colonial ports whose connections are often difficult to follow.  
In James Shepherd and Samuel Williamson’s analysis of the records, “one can’t determine 
specifically to which colonies the exports were going.  The general directions of trade can be 
surmised, of course, but one does not know exactly ‘what when where.’”46  For the grain trade, 
the broad pattern was the export of surpluses from the upper Chesapeake and middle colonies to 
New England. In 1816, Connecticut congressman Timothy Pitkin compiled a quantitative 
analysis of colonial-era grain exports.  According to Pitkin, local growth of wheat in New 
England had failed for some years past requiring the region to import grain.47       
The CO 16 ledgers offer the most complete picture of the late-colonial grain trade.  
Surplus agricultural production in the middle colonies, Chesapeake region, and (to a lesser 
degree) New York was exported to markets in the West Indies and southern Europe in vast 
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quantities.  Exports to Ireland fluctuated from year-to-year but could be substantive.  Trade 
directly with Great Britain was not significant from 1768 to 1772.  Legal changes in 1774 and 
the expanding trade in 1774 and 1775 suggests that this could become a potential growth market 
for colonial grain exports.    
 The Revolutionary crisis of the 1770s eventually overthrew British rule of the thirteen 
colonies by the early 1780s.  A combination of ideological ferment and material factors 
combined to incite a vocal minority of colonists to lead a successful rebellion against the crown 
and departure from the British Empire.48  There were degrees of enthusiasm even among those 
who supported the Revolution.  Colonial merchants, particularly those with strong economic ties 
to the empire, were notably reluctant.  Historian Thomas Doerflinger’s A Vigorous Sprit of 
Enterprise illustrates the conflicted responses of Philadelphia’s merchant community to the 
crisis.  Although there was a deep concern about British policies regulating the colonies, these 
did not lead to automatic support of the resistance.  As a whole, the merchants were apolitical, 
divided culturally, and well aware of the commercial benefits that Philadelphia enjoyed as part of 
the empire.49          
Philadelphia merchants’ fears of economic disruption as a result of rebellion were 
realized early in the war.  A mass panic to clear as many vessels for foreign markets prior to the 
severing of political ties flooded many markets with excess goods.  A June 1775 letter from 
                                                          
48 The historiography on the origins of the American Revolution is, of course, vast.  For classic, and sometimes 
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Robert Bisset reflected this problem, and the looming promise of disruption.  Lamenting the 
“amazing glut of grain and flour that has poured in upon us since the beginning of the month” 
and the corresponding decline in prices, it was unlikely that the firm could profit if the present 
circumstances continued.  Continuity was fleeting however.  The same letter closed with the 
observation that two ships with grain cargos from New York had not arrived as expected.  Bisset 
speculated that “it is shrewdly suspected here from their not having appeared, that they must 
have been detained by our frigates, who we are told have orders to stop all of your shipping.”50  
 Bisset’s letter reflects a significant feature of the Revolutionary war.  It was not just 
pursued on the battlefield, it had a major economic element as well.  British efforts to suppress 
the rebellion included efforts to cut the colonial connections to foreign markets in addition to the 
direct war effort.  The grain producing regions of the Chesapeake faced numerous interlinked 
wartime threats.  British military intervention and regulatory barriers forced the collapse of 
coastal trading routes.  This disruption was serious, and it forced reliance on costly land-based 
transportation networks that lacked an adequate infrastructure.  The lucrative southern European 
trade was also interdicted, thus removing an important resource base for the Revolutionary 
government.  Domestically, inflationary pressures caused by Congressional monetary policy 
hamstrung merchants.  The physical destruction of war further reduced outputs even as martial 
mobilization also increased demand.51 
Provisioning both armies during the war illustrates the difficulties of recreating the 
agricultural economy overnight.  For actors in the new US, repurposing agricultural surpluses 
from a focus on external trade to domestic consumption proved very challenging in the face of 
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massive inflation and transportation limitations that could not be resolved by Congress or the 
Continental army.  E. Wayne Carp’s work To Starve the Army at Pleasure outlines both of these 
daunting obstacles.  Land routes suitable for transporting bulk commodities were rare and subject 
to all sorts of weather and military disruption.  There was no administrative infrastructure for 
purchasing, storing, transporting, or distributing bulk commodities on the scale required by the 
war effort.  Compounding these problems was the precarious financial condition of Congress.  
By 1780, the expense of the Quartermaster and Commissary Departments alone were estimated 
to reach the ruinous sum of $200 million.52  Although the figure was in part a product of 
inflationary pressures, the disastrous state of Congress’s credit deepened the collapse of the 
army’s logistical system.  Contributions from the states, French loans, and the personal credit of 
merchants such as Robert Morris temporarily filled the breach, however, the system remained 
unstable.53   
The need to create a functioning national government and the infrastructure to support an 
army did not affect the British.  Many of the institutions that Congress vainly attempted to 
organize already existed for the British.  Yet, logistics and supply would be a major problem for 
British forces fighting a distant war and no longer able to reply upon local support as during the 
Seven Years War. Historian R. Arthur Bowler examines the new logistical framework and the 
similarities between the American and British efforts to reconnect suppliers and consumers in the 
changed wartime landscape. Denied supplies from the Massachusetts countryside in the wake of 
Lexington and Concord, General Gage’s forces imported provisions from Ireland as surplus 
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goods from Halifax and Quebec were soon exhausted.54  The experience of 1775 was repeated 
throughout the war as hopes of local supply proved illusory.  Provisions from Britain were 
available, but only at enormous expense and subject to the vagaries of long-distance 
commerce.55  Building a provisions reserve adequate to support the army, provincial forces, and 
loyalist refugees within British lines remained a challenge throughout the war.  Although there 
was not a British counterpart to the deprivation of Valley Forge or Morristown, the extended 
supply line directly influenced British conduct of the war.56  
Three chief lessons for the grain trade emerge from wartime disruption.  First, the root of 
the problem for both armies was the difficulty in replacing the usual connections among 
producers, traders, and consumers that existed during the Seven Years War and colonial 
peacetime.  American grain surpluses were traditionally exported, and establishing internal 
markets- and more importantly, the financial and infrastructure to support this change- could not 
be fully accomplished.  Likewise, although the strain of supporting the British army with 
provisions from across the Atlantic did not have the same institutional challenges that face 
Congress, the practice was ruinously expensive and undependable.  Second, this unique grain 
economy would be impossible to sustain without the demands of the war, an aberration from the 
norm that would soon disappear.  Third, the inability of Quebec and Nova Scotia to supply the 
British army during the war was a telling commentary on the state of agriculture in those 
colonies.  Although the rebel invasion of Quebec in 1775 might provide a partial explanation for 
modest agricultural production that year, the general lack of surplus throughout the war reflects 
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the inability of British North America to function as an imperial granary even during a grave 
emergency.  The implications for post-war grain production and trade were not promising. 
   The American Revolution changed the boundaries of the previously united empire, but 
all was not as it appeared on the political map.  US independence changed the geo-politics of 
trade but did not alter the interlocked trade networks that underpinned the Atlantic economy.  
Whether the British government’s diplomatic relations with the new United States would 
emphasize the political or economic aspects of mercantilism remained uncertain.  The most 
obvious point of conflict was the dependence of the British Caribbean colonies on imports of 
provisions from the mainland.  This urgent need required Great Britain to more precisely define 
the mercantilist framework for the domestic nation, empire, colonies, and foreign entities.   
The Treaty of Paris in 1783 completed Anglo-American political separation, but whether- 
and on what terms- the United States would be allowed to interact with the imperial economy 
was unclear.  At its heart, mercantilism is a system of political economy.  How each observer 
balanced the often-conflicting dictates of political and economic interest widely varied.  One of 
the most ardent defenders of a closed mercantile system was Lord Sheffield.  His interpretation 
of the political/economic balance decidedly favored the political.  The interests of the nation and 
empire demanded severing ties with the US for the benefit of Great Britain and the loyal colonies 
remaining under the crown.  In his formulation, removing the US from the empire was a positive 
good: “Both as a friend and as an enemy America has been burthomsome to Great Britain.  It 
may be some satisfaction to think, that by breaking off rather prematurely, Great Britain may 
find herself in a better situation in respect to America, than if they had fallen off when more 
ripe.”57   
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Sheffield acknowledged that this new geography would come at some cost to the West 
Indies colonies until the agricultural base in Nova Scotia and Canada developed.  However, this 
small cost to one interest group within the empire was a necessary (if temporary) burden that 
could be offset by other changes.  Streamlining customs administration, curtailing smuggling, 
and encouraging a diversified agricultural economy in the Caribbean would provide the means to 
effectively reformulate imperial trade shorn of the US and its past colonial contributions.58          
Sheffield’s Observations strives to balance political and economic relationships within 
the empire.  For the first time, trade regulations underlying the mercantile system as a theory 
were explicitly applied to the grain trade.  This is a significant transition that politicized and 
attempted to regulate a trading network that had been practically exempt from peacetime 
regulations prior to the War for American Independence.  The quest to define the new 
relationship between the mother country and her estranged child only served to illuminate 
unexamined contradictions within the colonial relationship.               
Sheffield’s strident assertions were questioned in Britain.  West Indian leaders such as 
Brian Edwards accepted Sheffield’s application of mercantilist doctrine as a political concept but 
questioned whether or not it made economic sense.  In direct response to Sheffield in 1784, 
Edwards wrote:   
 Because they [the Americans] well know that Great Britain must in time 
concede; for America has the advantage in this contest, that sugar and rum, and 
coffee, and molasses, though very wholesome things, are not, however, like 
American provisions, absolutely necessary to the preservation of life.  Secondly, 
because if they are not permitted to purchase those commodities from us, in their 
own way, they can get them elsewhere.  The commerce of America, therefore, is 
beyond all equivalent more necessary to the British West-India Islands, than that 
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of the islands to her.  The misfortune is, that our devoted planters may be 
famished before the contest is settled.59  
 
Edwards’ critique highlights three issues.  First, politics is an inherent element in economic 
debates.  Trade within the empire is preferable to external connections.  However, the nature of 
grain as a commodity does not allow for economic policies to strictly follow abstract principles.  
Simply stated, the US could survive in the absence of trade with the British West Indies.  The 
sugar plantations, however, could not survive without foodstuffs from the mainland.  Second, 
Edwards points to the enduring influence of customary patterns of exchange.  There were no 
reasonable substitutes for US grain production within the empire, and no available markets to 
absorb the surplus production of the Caribbean colonies if the US was excluded from trade.  The 
long integrated the grain trade of British mainland colonies with the British Caribbean needed to 
survive.  For the British, the economic infrastructure of empire could not be dismantled as easily 
as the political empire that created it.  Third, time did not favor radical changes in trade policy.  
Implicit within Edwards’ critique of Sheffield is the urgency of reestablishing trade connections 
for the preservation of life in the Caribbean.  This illustrates another specific quality of 
provisions commerce—its urgency.  The empire faced a stark and immediate choice:  either 
allow US provisions into the empire immediately or face the prospect of the Caribbean plantation 
complex collapsing almost overnight.    
Remaining loyal to the empire had consequences.  Separating the British West Indies 
from their traditional source of provisions led to starvation for thousands of slaves and poor 
whites on the islands of Nevis, St. Kitts, Montserrat, and Antigua.  On Antigua, 20% of slaves 
died between 1778 and 1781, and the survivors were too weak to harvest the sugar crop. The 
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conclusion of hostilities in 1783 did not end the threat of famine.  Sugar plantations remained 
profitable during the 1780s, but their margins diminished due to trade restrictions prohibiting a 
mutually beneficial trade with the United States.60 The official prohibition on such trade 
encouraged smuggling, and the prices paid for rice, meat, and fish imports rose in the West 
Indies between 40 and 100 per cent between 1775 and 1784.61   
  The increase in prices for staple foods was a product of geo-political changes.  In the 
place of relatively accessible supplies, West Indian planters were forced to rely on food imports 
from Ireland and Britain, lumber from the Baltic, and other provisions from Florida and 
Canada.62  According to historian Herbert Bell, this system of restrictions caused local distress, 
but the overall objective of increasing trade between Britain and the Caribbean colonies was 
successful and still allowed for a reasonable profit margin.63  Other historians are less positive 
about the success of redrawing the trade networks.  The rise in costs, along with the destruction 
of local food sources in series of hurricanes from 1784-1786, caused the death of 15,000 slaves 
in Jamaica alone due to famine.  By 1791, the assembly of Jamaica called for the cultivation of 
other crops such as yams, caco, maize, and plantains to decrease dependency on external food 
importation.64  Other Caribbean sugar islands had similar experiences, leading planters to 
advocate for the legalization of trade with the United States.  These pleas fell upon deaf ears, 
leading to the creation of an informal colonial resolution to the crisis. 
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 British colonial governors could temporarily suspend the Navigation Acts in the case of 
urgent need.  The interpretation of “need” varied from colony to colony, but the trend of defining 
US provisions as an essential commodity was commonplace.  The difficulty for US merchants 
lay in the return cargoes.  While the concessions reconnected American exports to their 
traditional consumers in the West Indies, imperial legal restrictions on colonial exports to the US 
remained.  In particular, cargos of tropical products were limited to British ships, causing distress 
for US merchantmen.65  Bolstering the merchant marine by limiting foreign competition was a 
long-standing British practice under mercantilism.  It was not just the products at question, it was 
also their means of transport.  The Caribbean colonies were one side of a three-sided debate over 
trade policy conducted by the United States, Great Britain, and the Caribbean planters within the 
British Empire.  It was in the interests of planters and US merchants to resume open trade 
without restrictions immediately after the war.66  This would officially reestablish two portions 
of the triangular trade, however, new political relations did not allow for a seamless 
reestablishment of the colonial commercial system.  US objectives were to reestablish trade with 
the British West Indies, while limiting direct trade with Great Britain in favor of domestic 
manufactures.67  In essence, all three sides recognized the need for trade but could not agree on 
how to reconcile political and economic interests.  
  Under the authority of the colonial governors, with the acquiescence of the imperial 
government, and the enthusiastic participation of American merchants, the grain trade continued.  
Complete disengagement was not viable except in the extreme posturing of a figure like Lord 
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Sheffield.  John Darwin’s theory of empire that emphasizes the independent agency of actors on 
the periphery of empire can usefully be applied to this situation.  Although the imperial 
government maintained some control over its agents on the periphery, for Darwin the most 
striking feature of the British Empire was its limited governmental influence.68  Colonial 
governors in the Caribbean, Canada, and the Maritime Provinces that depended on US grain 
consistently permitted trade that favored local need over imperial policies.  In time, many of the 
local trade arrangements received tacit official acceptance as no practical alternatives presented 
themselves.   
          Scholarship on the post-war US grain economy confirms the continuing importance of the 
Caribbean.  Brooke Hunter argues that the 1780s were a profitable time for American grain 
exports despite the short-term disruption of the war.  In theory, American trade was excluded 
from most Caribbean markets, yet “to declare a law and to enforce it were two different 
things.”69  According to Gordon Bjork, although the volume of legal trade in the 1780s declined, 
its actual value of trade remained constant as the price of grain increased.70  Doerflinger’s 
interpretation is less positive.  He agrees with Bjork that trade with the West Indies was not 
particularly high but finds that overall price levels declined.  Added to his analysis is the ripple 
effect that trade stagnation had throughout Philadelphia’s regional economy.  For Doerflinger, 
economic depression persisted until 1789 or 1790, after which the demand for foodstuffs in the 
Indies and Europe buoyed the economy.71   
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A conclusive quantitative study of the economic conditions within the British West Indies 
and the connections to the US is almost impossible due to the lack of reliable sources.  
According to John McCusker’s article “Growth, Stagnation, or Decline,” records of the West 
Indian economy were destroyed due to the conflicts between Britain and France.  A fire in the 
London Customs House in 1814 also destroyed most of the Ledgers of Imports and Exports for 
the 1780 and later time period.72  Quantitative government records for sugar production also do 
not exist. The best estimates of production are derived from export figures from the islands and 
import figures for external markets.73  McCusker hypothesizes that the economic conditions in 
the West Indies were strong before and after the American War for Independence based on per 
capita imports to and exports from the islands.74  Circumstantial evidence is persuasive that pre-
war trends in the grain trade were reestablished soon after the war’s end.  Brought together by 
custom and need, the US and the British West Indies remained linked by mutually beneficial 
commercial connections with grain as their foundation.  
The creation of the new Federal Government of the US in 1789 marks a significant 
transition from the lax authority of the Confederation Congress to a stronger central government 
and the need for coherent national economic policies has long had a contested place in 
explaining the change.75  For US merchants, the need for stability was essential to support the 
domestic economy and foreign trade.  The new constitutional government held many powers to 
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regulate and support commerce, among them to collect taxes, imposts, and excises, to regulate 
foreign commerce, and to coin money.76  How these new federal powers would be exercised 
under the administration of George Washington was unclear and provoked divisive controversy 
at the time.  Traditional accounts of the growing divide between Federalist and Jeffersonian 
partisans cite economic policy as a significant point of division; however, on closer examination 
there is remarkable consistency between Federalist and Democratic-Republican views about the 
value and importance of agricultural exports in the new nation’s economy.   
One of the most influential figures in Washington’s cabinet was Treasury Secretary 
Alexander Hamilton.  His reports to Congress on US economic policy set forward a coherent 
doctrine of national economic development.  His proposals were often controversial and 
intersected with several separate but related questions about how the new nation should develop 
and interact with the rest of the world.  The first manifestation of this was Hamilton’s Report on 
the Public Credit (1790) that stressed how public debt and a strong national currency benefited 
every sector of the economy including agriculture and foreign trade. Revenues from the Post 
Office and taxes on liquor distillation would be two useful sources of income for the federal 
government, but its major source of revenue would be imposts and customs duties.77   
It is significant to note that there was no proposal to tax US exports.  Although the 
distilled liquor tax was controversial, the early outlines of Hamilton’s economic plan closely 
parallel Jeffersonian initiatives in the early-nineteenth century.  In historians Stanley Elkins and 
Eric McKitrick’s evaluation of the report, it was clear that the dynamic force behind the 
                                                          
76 Constitution of the United States of America, Article I, section 8. https://www.archives.gov/founding-
docs/constitution-transcript. Accessed November 6, 2018.    
77 Reports of the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, prepared in Obedience to the Act of the 10th May, 
1800, to which are prefixed The Reports of Alexander Hamilton, on Public Credit, On a National Bank, On 
Manufactures, and on the Establishment of a Mint  (Washington: Duff Green, 1818), 5-6, 23-4. 
66 
 
American economy would be merchants.78  The interests of merchants and farmers were not 
necessarily opposed to one another in the pre-industrial context of the overwhelmingly 
agricultural economy of the early republic.   
Hamilton’s Report on the Subject of Manufactures advocated for federal action to 
promote industrial development in the US.  Superficially, this appears to conflict with Thomas 
Jefferson’s ideal of the yeoman farmer, and thus produced a conflict between two competing 
visions for the national economy.  Yet, this is not necessarily the case.  Hamilton’s plan was not 
inimical to agricultural production nor to the value of the agricultural export sector of the 
economy.  To Hamilton, “foreign demand for the products of agricultural countries, is, in a great 
degree, rather casual and occasional, than certain and constant….there appear strong reasons to 
regard the foreign demand for that surplus as too uncertain reliance, and to desire a substitute for 
it in an extensive domestic market.”79  In essence, a domestic market would be more sustainable 
because the foreign demand for US surpluses was too inconsistent.  If Hamilton’s supposition 
was correct, his economic program would benefit farmers.  The development of an industrial 
base would provide a more certain market, especially as it drew labor away from farms.  Thus, 
manufacturing was not opposed to agriculture but rather became possible due to expanding 
agricultural surpluses.  Beyond the supply and demand dynamics, a domestically oriented 
economy was also less subject to disruption due to foreign political maneuvers and wars.  The 
domestic political effects of Hamilton’s economic recommendations, nevertheless, exacerbated 
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partisan tensions whose political dimensions has been better remembered than its economic 
basis.80          
There are other less theoretical criticisms of the Report on Manufactures.  Hamilton’s 
theory overlooks the long duration of American agricultural exports.  By the 1790s, this had been 
a substantive part of the economy for at least 70 years.  Although there had been fluctuations and 
disruptions due to varied causes, the supply and demand relationship was steady.  His program 
provided a potential solution to a problem that was not yet apparent to many observers.  This is 
particularly true for figures like Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, who had close links to 
agricultural interests and opposed Hamilton on a number of other grounds.  The Report’s fate in 
Congress reflects an interesting split.  Although direct government investment to support 
industry were not approved, the customs tax structure proposed by the Report was established.81        
The practical state of the agricultural export economy by 1790 did not lead to a popular 
outcry for reform. Political economist Tench Coxe provided an American critique of Britain’s 
formal trade restrictions.  He argued in 1791 that efforts to replace the US as a granary for the 
West Indies had failed.  Nova Scotia and Canada had not been able to produce an adequate 
surplus and substituting imports from Europe was impossible as the volume required was 
prohibitive.82  Dependence on the US was not disappearing.  Rather, the provisions trade 
expanded in value.  For Coxe, “the British West India islands are proved to have been indebted 
to the United States, in 1790, for more lumber, more grain, and more bread and flour, than they 
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imported from these states before the revolution.”83  The export-based agricultural economy of 
the US was so profitable that few people called for structural changes to it nor were there any 
feasible alternatives.   
Reports from Madeira also reflected optimism for US agricultural products in post-war 
Atlantic markets.  Henry Hill learned in February 1790 that every article was in great demand.  
Prices for flour and wheat were high and even corn, “which is almost too bad to be eaten,” still 
commanded a market.  The high prices attracted exports from England as well as the US leading 
to a decline in prices by August, but the market remained open for American foodstuffs.84  There 
is a degree of variability in the marketplace, and there remained the danger of a glut caused by 
over-importation, however, these were familiar and long-standing factors in Atlantic commerce.       
The observations of Coxe and Hill reflect a broader trend.  The export sector of the US 
economy was booming.  According to Geoffrey Gilbert’s research, the volume of bread related 
products exported by the US had expanded by over 50% between the years of the CO 16 data set 
(1768-1772) and a comparable data set from the US Treasury Department for 1790-1792.85  
Coxe recognized this pattern and assumed continuity, others, like Hamilton, were more 
suspicious that the expansion of trade in agricultural commodities would falter.  The raw data 
from Timothy Pitkin’s accounting supports the conclusion that trade expansion was viable as 
noted in Table 2.5. 
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Table 2.5:  American Grain Exports by Year, 1791-9386 
Fiscal Year Wheat (bushels) Flour (barrels) Corn (bushels) Meal (bushels) 
1791 1,018,339 619,681 1,713,241 351,695 
1792 853,790 824,464 1,964,973 263,405 
1793 1,450,575 1,074,639 1,233,768 189,715 
 
Compared to the CO 16 records, there are several structural changes to the ledgers.  The category 
of “bread” has been removed from the tabulations, the unit of measure for flour changed from 
tons to barrels, and corn meal was added as a new the category.  Despite these changes, the 
overall increase in grain product exports from the US is clear.  Pitkin’s statistics give an 
aggregated total for all exported grain products and also provides the regional destinations for 
these exports that reflects a pattern familiar from the CO 16 ledgers.    
Table 2.6:  American Exports by Destination, 1790-179387 
Year Exported to/Amount 
Wheat (bushels) 
Flour (barrels) Corn (bushels) Meal (bushels) 
1790 Spain: 390,585 
Britain: 292,042 
Portugal: 269,502 
France: 136,908 
FWI: 173,290 
BWI: 139,286 
Britain: 104,880 
Spain: 97,288 
France:  61,049 
Spain: 747,840 
BWI: 516,794 
Portugal: 370,122 
FWI: 120,968 
Britain: 98,407 
Portuguese 
Islands: 98,416 
BWI: 39,860 
Danish WI: 
22,716 
FWI:  13,529 
Spain:  4,103 
Britain: 1,401 
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Table 2.6:  American 
Exports by 
Destination, 1790-
1793, continued 
1791 England:360,139 
Scotland: 177,705 
Portugal: 156,119 
Fayal, Azores: 
142,530 
Spain: 116,149 
FWI: 177,578 
BWI: 134,599 
Spain: 98,640 
England: 46,879 
Dutch WI: 45,720 
Portugal: 731,121 
BWI: 269,387 
FWI: 181,852 
Spain: 133,555 
Fayal, Azores: 
110,723 
BWI: 43,503 
Danish WI: 7,996 
FWI: 5,392 
Dutch WI: 3,536 
Spain: 2,936 
1792 Portugal: 397,683 
Spain: 257,148 
Scotland:  121,702 
England: 37,643 
FWI: 220,099 
BWI: 187,357 
Spain: 164,367 
Dutch WI: 67,563 
England: 62,116 
BWI: 604,871 
Portugal: 391,683 
Spain: 381,555 
FWI: 217,203 
Dutch WI: 74,177 
BWI: 19,776 
Danish WI: 
17,316 
Dutch WI: 7,479 
FWI: 5,597 
  
The US Treasury and the CO 16 records vary slightly but organize wheat export data in 
comparable ways.  The West Indies and Southern Europe remain primary export destinations, 
and locations have been disaggregated allowing a clearer geographic understanding of US 
foreign commerce in grain products.  
 The statistics illustrate the continuity between the CO 16 record series for the late-
colonial era and US trade after the war.  The same strong market differentiation remains with 
semi-processed wheat a predominantly European import, while flour, corn, and corn meal were 
exported throughout the Atlantic.  Overall, the chief customers for US grain products remain the 
Caribbean sugar colonies and Iberia.  Superficially, the dramatic increase of exports to Great 
Britain may seem to be a notable change; however, this can be accounted for by changes in the 
British tariff structure in 1774, as noted earlier.  Taking that into account, the wheat export 
pattern endured without notable alterations. 
 The data demonstrate persistence, but not why the persistence matters.  There are a 
number of practical reasons for continuity.  There were no competing producers that could 
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provide an exportable surplus with the consistency and volume required.  Reformulating the 
material basis for a significant branch of the Atlantic economy could not be accomplished in the 
short term.  The constant need for new supplies of grain due to its perishable nature is important. 
Grain could not be stockpiled in large reserves over time.  In southern Europe, the lack of 
American provisions could provoke social disorder.  By contrast, in the Caribbean, the collapse 
of the lucrative plantation complex loomed if US grain was excluded from this major market.  
The need for a regular resupply of essential American food provisions simply did not allow for 
the colonial trading pattern to be reconfigured, even if viable alternatives could be found, which 
seems unlikely. 
 The striking continuity in Anglo-American grain exports provides a fresh view of the 
late-eighteenth century political economy of mercantilism.  British authorities had long 
recognized that colonial grain was traded outside of the empire. Grain exports had not been 
limited to British imperial destinations, as the CO 16 ledgers demonstrate.  It was entirely 
possible to have a mercantile framework co-exist alongside close to free trade in colonial grain 
products if we understand mercantilism as an import control scheme.  After the Revolutionary 
War, it was not necessary to rebuild the trade to adjust to the new political reality because the 
grain trade had never been subject to formal colonial regulatory structures in times of peace. The 
1780s and early 1790s are not a story of integrating a restructured US economy back into the 
Atlantic economy.  Rather, it is the story of a politically freed nation utilizing the same 
agricultural export-based economy that had existed under the colonial regime.  Lack of 
systematic evidence between the end of the CO 16 records in 1772 and the start of US 
government records in 1790 do not allow for a general quantitative argument.  However, there is 
little question that the grain trade continued and even flourished in the 1780s.  Quantitative US 
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government records starting in 1790 conclusively demonstrate the post-war persistence of grain 
exports consistent with colonial patterns. 
Focusing exclusively on the thirteen colonies during this time is attractive as the 
traditional historiography emphasizes the development of the nation state.  It is only one part of 
the equation however.  Geo-political changes in the Maritime Provinces and Canada during the 
mid- and late-eighteenth century presents another layer of complexity to assess the political 
economy of wheat in North America.  These eighteenth-century additions to the British Empire 
attracted grain exports from the mid-Atlantic colonies.  After the War for American 
Independence, whether the Canadian or Maritime Provinces could replace the US as a grain 
exporter was a matter of intense interest throughout the British Atlantic.  Inability to supplant the 
US as a grain exporter, does not suggest a lack of effort to do so.  Analyzing the development of 
agriculture in Britain’s northernmost North American mainland colonies is necessary to 
understand how grain functioned in an interconnected British Atlantic world.    
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CHAPTER THREE 
BRITISH NORTH AMERICAN AGRICULTURE, THE GRAIN TRADE, AND THE  
NEW EMPIRE TO 1794 
This chapter examines grain farming in British North America as a potential alternative 
to American colonial and post-independence producers. The viability of this alternative remained 
doubtful. According to political economist Harold Innis, the conflict within the staples producing 
parts of the French and British empires prior to 1763 was fundamentally economic and 
geographic in nature.  A geographic imbalance in both empires connected a large and productive 
temperate zone agricultural economy to a relatively small tropical one in the British Empire, with 
the inverse relationship for the French Empire.  After the American Revolution, the British faced 
similar colonial agricultural limitations as the French.  To establish productive grain exports 
from post-war British North America would require the British to swiftly accomplish a level of 
agricultural development that the French had not achieved in 150 years.  This chapter has two 
geographic sections:  Quebec (Lower Canada post 1791) and Nova Scotia.  Politically, British 
North America was linked together under British imperial rule.  However, settlement patterns, 
economic development, and chronology present distinct historiographies regarding agricultural 
development in this era that are best examined separately.  Despite these deep differences, in the 
face of conflict with the US, British North America did function as a coherent common unit.  
This became particularly true as the nineteenth century unfolded and when economic regulations 
(and the defiance thereof) were cast in imperial and national terms rather than regional ones.   
Nova Scotia, 1749-1768 
The concession by France of territory to be called Nova Scotia to Great Britain in the 
Treaty of Utrecht (1713) did not have an immediate impact on the province’s agricultural 
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economy.  Acadian farming was productive and generated a surplus.  Usually this was traded to 
New England merchants in exchange for alcohol, textiles, metal goods, and specie from Cape 
Breton.1  Outside of a brief period from 1745 to 1748, Cape Breton remained under the control 
of France.  The French fortress city of Louisburg provided another market for Acadian farmers in 
addition to the New England coastal trade.  Historical geographer Cole Harris’s research on 
Acadian farming reveals a mixed farming economy focusing on subsistence.  Garden vegetables, 
livestock husbandry, and orchard crops combined with peas and wheat to form the basis of 
Acadian agriculture.  A sophisticated system of dykes and sluice gates allowed the Acadians to 
utilize the fertile marshland soils.2     
The establishment of Halifax in 1749 and subsequent developments in the Halifax area 
and Lunenburg represent a significant change in the agricultural economy by providing new 
markets for external producers.  Surplus Acadian production could not be easily transported to 
these new markets due to a lack of infrastructure. According to historian John Bartlett Brebner, 
“Nova Scotian roads across the wooded, watered uplands were totally impassible for the wheeled 
traffic by which bulky farm commodities, except for cattle or sheep or swine on the hoof, could 
be transported.  It was true that the waterway to New England was much easier and more 
expeditious than to Halifax.”3  Conceived as a naval port city rather than as an agricultural 
settlement, Halifax itself produced little despite a system of bounties designed to increase local 
production of hay, roots, and grain.4   
                                                          
1 Andrew Hill Clark, Acadia: The Geography of Early Nova Scotia to 1760 (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1968), 231. 
2 Cole Harris, This Reluctant Land: Society and Space in Canada Before Confederation (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 2008), 55. 
3 John Bartlet Brebner, The Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia: A Marginal Colony during the Revolutionary Years 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), 145. 
4 Clark, Acadia, 356. 
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The settlement of Lunenburg by German Protestants in 1754 also provided little 
immediate relief for the Halifax provisions problem.  This was in part due to the difficulties of 
establishing a new settlement, but government action also intervened.  As historical geographer 
Andrew Hill Clark notes, “Initially, Colonel Lawrence, in charge of the settlement, encouraged 
the sowing of oats, barley, turnips, and potatoes but discouraged the bread grains (wheat, rye, 
indian corn) as taking too much out of the soil until the settlers had manure.”  Despite the 
agricultural basis for the settlement, Lunenburg remained partially dependent on government 
provided rations, and the community remained particularly deficient in bread grains and meat.  
Clark’s assessment of early agriculture in British Nova Scotia outlines both the problem and the 
solution for the province during the 1750s: “Except for fish….virtually all the food was brought 
into Halifax from elsewhere; under pressure, and in inadequate amounts, it came from the 
Acadians until 1755 (including live animals and salted meat derived from confiscations of that 
year) and, before and after, from New England, New York, and Pennsylvania.”5 
The Acadian expulsion disrupted this local provisioning system, making the colony even 
more dependent on external providers.  Historian Julian Gwyn’s analysis of the economic impact 
on Nova Scotian agriculture outlines the collapse of provincial agriculture and the long-term 
effects of this dramatic policy: “It ensured the retardation of agricultural exports at least until 
after 1815.  In economic terms, it was doubtless one of the more destructive political decisions 
ever made in British America.”6  In this light, the Planter migrations of the 1760s were not 
progress towards a more robust agricultural sector that could (in time) support the colony with 
locally produced surpluses, but rather an attempt merely to restore the economy to a past level.  
                                                          
5 Ibid, 354-357. 
6 Julian Gywn, Excessive Expectations:Maritime Commerce and the Economic Development of Nova Scotia, 1740-
1870 (Montreal: McGill-Queens, 1998), 27. 
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Whether this goal was obtainable was questionable, as the New England planters could not 
utilize the marshland soils and associated infrastructure as skillfully as the Acadian.  According 
to Graeme Wynn’s research on agriculture in the Bay of Fundy marshlands, primary production 
was for self-sufficiency with occasional trade by sea with Boston.7   
Whether the newly settled Planters could even replicate the success of the Acadian as 
farmers was unproven.  Julian Gwyn’s research on five townships within the Minas Basin argues 
that the Planters’ success as farmers was “mixed,” at best, as per capita output for wheat and 
grain products declined over time.8  Minas Basin was one of the more productive agricultural 
regions in the colony.  New settlements elsewhere faced even stiffer challenges.  The new south 
shore settlement of Chester turned to the sea for subsistence due to difficulties with clearing the 
land of trees.  Even with that task completed, further barriers to farming loomed.  Chester 
farmers “faced a harvest of stones wherever the plough cut furrow.”  Immediate starvation was 
staved off by one of the terms negotiated by the incoming planters.  The Nova Scotia Council 
agreed to supply each settler with two bushels of grain per month for the first year of the 
settlement.9         
Chester set an important precedent as other new settlements also faced challenges to meet 
basic substance.  Writing to the Provincial Council in April 1762, Lieutenant Governor Belcher 
brought attention to the plight of settlers in several townships, but “particularly those of Onslow, 
Truro, and Yarmouth for want of supplies for provisions and seed corn” that required immediate 
                                                          
7 Graeme Wynn, “Late Eighteenth-Century Agriculture on the Bay of Fundy Marshlands,” Acadiensis, Vol. 8, No. 2 
(Spring 1979), 80-89, 88. 
8 Julian Gwyn, “Shaped by the Soil: Were the Minas Basin Planters Successful Farmers?” The Nova Scotia Planters 
in the Atlantic World, 1759-1830. Ed. T. Stephen Henderson and Wendy Robicheau (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 
2012), 82-3.  
9 Julian Gwyn, “Shaped by the Sea but Impoverished by the Soil: Chester Township to 1830” in ibid,102, 118. 
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relief from the legislature on compassionate and humanitarian grounds.10  The chief source of 
relief was imported provisions from Halifax.   
The Halifax Naval Office recorded entrances and clearances from Halifax harbour from 
1749 through 1765 on a ship-by-ship basis.  Although aggregate quarterly totals are available for 
exports from the port, there was no parallel calculation for imports.  A regular pattern emerges 
from the first quarter of 1749 with ledgers recording tons of flour, corn, biscuit, livestock, and 
provisions entering the port from New York, the Chesapeake Bay region, and Boston.11  The 
Naval Office records from 1765 reflect the same pattern of trade with an increase in volume, 
which surely reflected demand from the growth of population in Halifax and an increasing 
volume of provisions imported, above all from the mid-Atlantic breadbasket colonies, to sustain 
that growth.     
New France/Quebec, 1749-1768 
With the productive capacity of Nova Scotia severely limited, the fate of British North 
America as a breadbasket rested with Quebec.  Here, too, the basis for such hopes were limited.  
Harris’s research on New France’s agriculture reveals a changing pattern of small scale exports 
from 1720-1740, but a general decline after 1742. A pattern of poor harvests, and the coming of 
the Seven Years War combined to create an agricultural depression that “debilitated the entire 
colony.”12  Agricultural practices were expansive rather than intensive, and wheat yields 
remained low due to the lack of manuring.  Crops of peas, oats, and barley along with livestock 
husbandry characterized agriculture in New France.13     
                                                          
10 Lt. Governor Jonathon Belcher to the Nova Scotia Council and House of Assembly, 16 April 1762. Provincial 
Archives of Nova Scotia (hereafter PANS), roll 15371.   
11 Halifax Naval Office Records, 19 July 1749- 25 December 1749. PANS, roll 13968. 
12 Harris, This Reluctant Land, 79. 
13 Ibid, 75. 
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Louis Antione de Bougainville noted throughout his wartime diary of the 1750s about the 
shortage of bread and the poor conditions of the harvest.  In November 1756, he recounted the 
distribution of bread to the habitants which “presented the image of a famine.”14  May 1757 
brought no relief as “bread is scarce,” and the severe shortage of grain dictated that “part of the 
land would remain unsowed.” The provisions shortage prohibited the army from mobilizing for 
the campaign, although the arrival of flour from France in May temporarily curtailed the worst of 
the famine until July when Quebec was again out of bread.15  In his dispatches to Paris in 1757, 
Governor Vaudreuil requested reinforcements but even more importantly provisions as it was 
unclear if the forces already present could be sustained.  The campaign of 1757 almost collapsed 
due to a lack of food.  It was only with great effort that provisions for one month were found 
within the colony.16  Provisions sent from France in spring 1758 provided only enough “to 
prevent dying of hunger.”17  Although Bougainville’s journals are, in part, a scathing accusation 
of malfeasance against the administration of New France, it is significant that his journal and 
Vaudreuil’s dispatches echo one another about the dire effects of provisions on the war effort.  
Both acknowledge a larger truth—the agricultural base of New France could not support both 
subsistence and the surplus adequate to wage a major war.   
Historian Fernand Ouellet’s research echoes Bougainville’s critique of New France’s 
government. Service in the militia reduced the supply of agricultural labor, thus reducing 
productivity and increasing demand for grain.  Many farmers became customers for grain rather 
than producers due to military service.  The constricting supply and expanding demand created 
                                                          
14 Louis Antione de Bougainville, Adventure in the Wilderness: The American Journals of Louis Antione de 
Bougainville, trans. And ed. Edward Hamilton (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964), 72. 
15 Ibid, 108, 112, 136. 
16 George F.G. Stanley, New France: The Last Phase, 1744-1760 (Toronto: McClellan and Stewart, 1968) 155,158. 
17 Bougainville, Adventure in the Wilderness, 206. 
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opportunity for speculators, such as the intendant Francois Bigot and the contractor Cadet.  Due 
to corruption and malfeasance, the predictable scarcity caused by the war was compounded into 
a major subsistence and economic crisis.  Flour prices increased by over 400% between 1756 and 
1759.  Even if flour could be found, many could not afford to purchase it at such inflated 
prices.18       
According to historian George F.G. Stanley’s more measured examination, the colony 
could produce approximately 800,000 minots of wheat per year of which 600,000 were required 
for subsistence. The remainder was not adequate to support French regular troops stationed in the 
colony or provide for First Nations allies. The reduction of the bread ration to two ounces per 
day in spring 1758 stretched provisions until the colony was relieved by the fleet mentioned by 
Bougainville’s journal, but the distress of the colony was not fully relieved.19  The harvest of 
1759 brought little surplus, and with the fall of Montreal in September 1760 hopes for French 
victory in North America collapsed. 
In the last years of the French regime the colony was marginally self-sufficient.  A poor 
harvest or any external pressure created a crisis of agricultural production resulting in famine and 
the need to import provisions from Europe.  Whether the return of peace in 1760 and the change 
from French to British rule would resolve this basic issue remained uncertain. Seeing a potential 
opportunity, established colonial British merchants soon penetrated local grain markets in new 
British domains.  The entry of colonial merchants into a new trade relation was a calculated 
gamble.  Were the real difficulties observed by Bougainville simply an aberration caused by the 
                                                          
18 Fernand Ouellet, Economic and Social History of Quebec, 1760-1850: Structures and Conjonctures (Ottawa:  
Carleton University Press, 1980), 47-50. 
19 Stanley, The Last Phase, 191-95. 
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war, and could British colonial control and imperial integration overcome such challenges and 
effectively incorporate Canada into the British Atlantic grain economy?        
The records of the Philadelphia merchant firm of Baynton and Wharton (later Baynton, 
Wharton, and Morgan) provide an interesting case study to answer this question.  The firm was a 
complex collection of trade interests and connections that spanned the British Atlantic. After the 
fall of New France in 1760, the company expanded its operations to the new British colony of 
Quebec.  The arrival of Anglophone merchants into the new market is revealing, and the actions 
of John Collins (Baynton and Wharton’s agent in Quebec) offers a precise view of the 
opportunities and limitations of integration into the larger grain economy of the British Atlantic.   
Baynton and Wharton specialized in the flour and lumber trade with the West Indies as 
well as with Europe, Newfoundland, and Halifax.  From 1762 to 1766, the firm employed John 
Collins, John Govett, and a handful of other merchants in Montreal and Quebec to seek new 
wheat and flour exports from Canada for Atlantic markets.  This would provide a supplementary 
source of grain within an already well-established trading pattern.  Collins arrived in Quebec 
City in December 1760.  It is unclear how he initially was associated with Baynton and Wharton, 
or what ties he may have had within the broader merchant community.20  Writing to Baynton and 
Wharton in April 1761, he requested trade items for the Canadian market including clothing, 
alcohol, and tropical food that were scarce in the colony.21  Curiously, there is no mention of any 
potential exports from Quebec at this time, although there is regular commentary on the receipt 
of letters of credit and bills of exchange accepted in payment for imported goods. A postscript to 
                                                          
20 There is little record of Collins until his appointment the Deputy Surveyor General of Quebec in November 1764.  
See Robert J. Haywood, “John Collins” in the Dictionary of Canadian Biography.  
http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/collins_john_1795_4E.html  
21 John Collins to John Baynton and Samuel Wharton, April 30, 1761.  Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, 
Pennsylvania State Archives, (hereafter Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, PSA) roll 2.  David Library of the 
American Revolution, collection 384.    
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a letter dated February 7, 1762 contained the suggestion that “if a small vessel, laden with 
provisions should arrive here [Quebec City] early in the spring, the cargo might be sold to 
advantage.”22  There is no record of this suggestion being followed, however, and the perception 
of Collins and the firm about the provisions market shifted at some point in 1762 from Quebec as 
a potential consumer of imported provisions to a potential exporter.  How and why their views 
changed is not addressed in the letters, although it seems likely that the end of the war in Europe 
reopened markets for a wider range of imported foodstuffs.23    
Collins noted that storage facilities near the Montreal area were inadequate and 
investments in warehouses was urgently required.  A key difficulty associated with the grain 
trade was the need to store and ship bulky, perishable, and relatively inexpensive products such 
as grain required an infrastructure that did not exist as this trade was not common under French 
governance.  The problems of travel, distance, and transportation remained unresolved for 
possible Canadian grain exports well into the nineteenth century.    
A pressing concern in May 1763 was whether an export permit would be issued by 
Governor John Murray.  A June 23 letter reveals that there was no resolution to the question. 
Permission was granted to ship 8,000 bushels as far as Quebec City, but it was unknown when, 
or if, permission would be granted for export out of the colony despite the fervent lobbying of 
Collins.  It was not until July 13 that a resolution was reached.  According to John Govett’s 
letter, “Mr. Collins, after a great deal of trouble, had prevailed with Gen’l [sic] Murray to ship 
                                                          
22 Collins to Baynton and Wharton, 7 February 1762. Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, PSA, roll 2.  
Suggested provisions included pork “of the worst kind”, flour “of the common kind”, and Indian corn. 
23 Lydon, Fish and Flour for Gold, 140. 
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off one load of wheat and he is the only person as why who has a permit for doing the same, tho’ 
twenty people have applied for the same thing.”24  
The delay and seemingly capricious nature of securing a permit provides an important 
illustration of the difficulty and fragility of this new trading venture.  The elimination of the 
political border between Quebec and the rest of British North America did not necessarily 
eliminate political obstacles to trade.  The power of the governor to embargo grain exports bears 
witness not only to his power, but also to the unique role of grain as an export item.  Unlike other 
goods, access to grain was fundamental to the survival of the colony, thereby providing the 
rationale for government intervention into the marketplace to a degree not seen with other 
commodities.  This hints at a crucial aspect of the relationship between government officials and 
merchants.  The exact ties between Murray and Collins are not revealed in surviving 
correspondence, but securing an early permit when no one else could and later patronage 
extended to Collins by Murray suggests their close connections.  These circumstances made 
Collins a valuable link between the business interests of Baynton and Wharton and Canadian 
colonial official—in a hierarchical world of patronage networks, personal relationships were 
vital to successful commerce.   
The departure of John Collins from Quebec did not end the involvement of Baynton and 
Wharton in the Quebec grain trade, although the province’s ability to produce surplus flour 
remained a concern in February 1766.  In a letter to the company from Collins’ replacement in 
Quebec City, George Allsopp reported that this years’ crop was “more abundant in straw than 
wheat,” and in his estimation the entire province was not capable of exporting more than 50,000 
bushels even in good years, which was “no great object for a whole province.” For Allsopp the 
                                                          
24 Collins and Govett to Baynton and Wharton, 20 May, 23 June, and 13 July 1763. Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan 
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best opportunity in Quebec arose from the scarcity of currency in the colony, which allowed him 
to purchase wheat for cash at an advantageous rate far below what farmers paid for their debts to 
the company.25  
This aspect of inter-colonial British economic history illuminates a significant point. 
Canadian political economist Harold Innis suggests the primary exports of New France, and later 
the British province of Quebec, remained in fur throughout the eighteenth century.26  Collins’ 
trading efforts in grain commodities highlights that while grain did not become a major Canadian 
export staple until the nineteenth century, its origins began much earlier.  This relatively brief 
early episode expands the narrow focus of the traditional historiography. Perhaps more 
importantly, it highlights how the elimination of political barriers to commerce were 
immediately tested even if the practical difficulties and hazards of navigating on unfamiliar 
political and economic terrain remained. 
Quebec and Nova Scotia:  The CO 16 Records (1768-1772)  
The limitations of Baynton and Wharton’s grain trade from Quebec reflect the larger 
problems of the colony’s agricultural export economy in these early years, and perhaps accounts 
for why agricultural exports are not well researched beyond Fernand Ouellet’s influential 
Economic and Social History of Quebec, which outlines how the growth of a small colonial 
surplus in 1763-64 (correlating to John Collins’ export permit) gave way to two years of dearth 
(as per Allsopp’s observations).  A small surplus again in 1767-68 gave way to another poor 
harvest in 1769.27  The period from 1762 through 1769 resulted in four years of small surpluses 
                                                          
25 George Allsopp to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 17 February and 20 March 1766. Baynton, Wharton, and 
Morgan Papers, PSA, roll 1.   
26 See Harold Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1962).  
27 Ouellet, Economic and Social History of Quebec, 85. 
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and three years of shortages.  Yet, even this mildly optimistic overview is misleading in light of 
the permit difficulties faced by Collins.  The Quebec grain export economy was extremely small 
in scale even during good harvests and it was non-existent after poor ones. With inconsistent 
production, Quebec represented an uncertain addition to the British Atlantic grain economy in 
the 1760s. 
The Colonial Office 16 (hereafter, CO 16) records for 1768-1772 allow the grain trade 
from Quebec and Nova Scotia to be assessed in comparison to other British colonies.  This 
unique quantitative data provides essential insights about grain the export and import of grain 
products.  Table 3.1 outlines the annual net exports and imports recorded in the CO 16 ledgers 
for the port of Quebec from 1768 to 1772.   
Table 3.1: Net Exports and (Imports) from/to Quebec 1768-177228 
Year Flour/Bread (Tons) Indian Corn (Bushels) Wheat (Bushels) 
1768 (148) NA 23,362 
1769 (1566) (16,912) NA 
1770 (411) NA 52,312 
1771 69 NA 194,632 
1772 302 NA 144,667 
 
Quebec enjoyed a general trend of increasing exports after 1770 in the wake of significant 
imports, particularly in the crisis year of 1769.  The early 1770s clearly saw gains for Quebec 
agriculture.  Ouellet relies on the CO 16 data up to 1772, and then expands on it with other 
sources through 1774 that also indicate improved agricultural production in Quebec up to the eve 
of the next major war in North America.   
                                                          
28 Colonial Office 16/1 (hereafter CO 16) January 1768-January 1773. David Library of the American Revolution 
(DLAR) film 412. Bread and flour are a single line item in these ledgers. Quebec wheat exports to Southern Europe 
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Exports of wheat from Quebec to southern Europe and in the coastal trade increased 
notably in 1771 and 1772, market connections that were broadly similar to other wheat exporting 
regions in the thirteen colonies in these years.  Externally, Quebec exports focused on the 
southern European market and Ireland in addition to the coastal trade.  Coastal trade is not 
defined within the ledgers by destination, and there is no record of what markets within British 
North America are designated by this label. Wheat exports to southern Europe increased to 
103,269 bushels in 1771 and 121,856 bushels in 1772, overwhelmingly the major destination.  
Coastwise exports increased to over 62,000 bushels in the two-year period, and in an interesting 
development almost 50,000 bushels of wheat (approximately 40% of the colonial total) were 
exported to Ireland.29  Historian James Lydon confirms that the grain trade between Quebec 
province and the rest of the Atlantic world expanded between 1770 and 1775, with almost half a 
million bushels of Canadian wheat to the port of Barcelona alone.30 
Combining CO 16 data with the findings of Lydon and Ouellet reveal a number of 
important features of the grain export trade in the late 1760s and early 1770s.  First, although the 
overall volume of grain exports from Quebec was increasing in the early 1770s, the volatility of 
the 1760s was not found in more established colonial wheat exporting regions.  Further, the 
volume of exports paled in comparison with the mid-Atlantic breadbasket that drew to embrace 
much of the Chesapeake.  Ouellet cites the arrival of new British merchants as the causal factor 
for increased production and, of course, exports.31  Even if his summation is correct, significant 
challenges remained before Quebec could regularly provide a marketable surplus on a substantial 
scale. 
                                                          
29 CO 16, January 1770-January 1773. DLAR film 412.   
30 James Lydon, Fish and Flour for Gold, 1600-1800: Southern Europe in the Colonial Balance of Payments  
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Second, the market orientation of Quebec’s grain exports to southern Europe, rather than 
the West Indies, is striking. A functioning trade system required both exports and imports.  The 
commodities received from southern Europe, such as wine and salt, had markets throughout 
Canada, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland, where the demand for salt for the fisheries was nearly 
insatiable.  By contrast, exchange goods with the West Indies were limited to sugar and sugar by 
products (to be processed into rum), which could not be absorbed into the Canadian economy in 
the quantities required for a profitable trade relationship.  Quebec’s southern European trade 
complemented the production of the mid-Atlantic colonies in an expanding trans-Atlantic market 
rather than compete with the already established West Indian trade with the thirteen colonies.  
Table 3.2 outlines the net annual exports and imports of grain products from Halifax, a 
region that is neglected entirely by Ouellet and Lydon, perhaps for the good reason that its grain 
trade even makes the low levels in Quebec seem impressive.  Halifax never had a season of 
plenty for grain exports, unlike the port of Quebec.  Instead, Halifax remained dependent on 
external imports of provisions even 20 years after British governance solidified in Nova Scotia 
with the founding of the city.       
Table 3.2:  Net Exports and (Imports) from/to Halifax, 1768-177232 
Year Flour/Bread (Tons) Indian Corn (Bushels) Wheat (Bushels) 
1768 (637) (9081) NA 
1769 (831) (15,446), meal (4,150) (208) 
1770 (773) (7,811) NA 
1771 (570) (8,799) (890) 
1772 (620) (11,823) NA 
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While Quebec’s trade ratio in grain products varied significantly even within the five years for 
which data exist, Nova Scotia never enjoyed an annual net export of grain products from 1768 to 
1772.   
The sources for grain imports into Halifax are notable, and its subsistence was dependent 
on the coastal trade from other British colonies.  Ouellet states that part of this trade arrived from 
Quebec; however, the sheer volume of imports into Halifax and the small amount for Quebec’s 
coastal exports makes plain that Quebec was not a major supplier of grain for Nova Scotia.33  
Bread and flour imports into Halifax from 1768 to 1772 ranged between 637 tons and 831 tons 
per year in addition to quantities of other grain products.34  By definition, the coastwise trade 
involved trade connections between the various ports of British North America, excluding the 
West Indies, which was categorized as a separate regional unit in the CO 16 records.  The New 
England colonies were also net grain importers. Thus, the agricultural hinterland that supplied 
Halifax with grain stretched from New York to the Chesapeake Bay—the greater mid-Atlantic 
colonial breadbasket.  
The products imported focus on bread and flour (as one category) and indian corn rather 
than wheat, per se, which could indicate a lack of milling infrastructure in Halifax, or, 
potentially, a lack of baking capacity, depending on the ratio between imported flour and bread.  
Further, the disparity between imports and exports suggest that imported provisions were 
certainly consumed locally rather than re-exported to other markets.35        
The implications of this are twofold.  First, it indicates an under-appreciated link between 
Nova Scotia and the mid-Atlantic colonies via the grain trade prior to the War for American 
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Independence that extends far beyond the familiar historiographic emphasis on linkages between 
New England and Nova Scotia. As far as the grain trade is concerned, New England and Nova 
Scotia were both net importers who traded with the mid-Atlantic. This suggests that the colonial 
coastal trade was more expansive that previously thought.  Second, the war and termination of 
imperial connections between the thirteen colonies and Great Britain would have serious effects 
on the sustainability of settlement in Nova Scotia.  Local production remained inadequate and 
redirecting Quebec’s grain surplus to Halifax (even when available) lacked the scale that needed 
to be imported and lacked return trade goods essential for a sustainable and mutually beneficial 
trade.  In short, Nova Scotia was not viable as an expanding British settler colony, especially one 
with a major naval base at Halifax that further limited labor for internal agricultural production, 
without a major source for imported grain.  
The War for American Independence and Economic Reformulation 
The War for American Independence created new opportunities and challenges for all 
both major regions of British North America.  As a long settled colonial holding, agricultural 
development in Quebec was the most advanced.  The Maritime Provinces of Nova Scotia and 
post-1784 New Brunswick provided land for potential development.  However, the challenges of 
establishing tens of thousands of new immigrants into lands mostly untouched by European 
settlement presented challenges for both the immigrants and the colonial state that supported 
them.  Whether or not British North America could simultaneously support the influx of new 
royal subjects and increase agricultural output to adequately support them and to replace the US 
within the imperial economy remained unproven.      
In Quebec, according to Ouellet, grain exports declined almost 40% between 1775-79 
compared to 1770-75, but this was not caused by a decline in production.  Rather, provisioning 
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the British army created soaring local demand with a high capacity to pay for any available 
grain.  Much as during the Seven Years War, speculation rather than an actual agricultural 
scarcity, caused grain shortages.  Yet, in 1779, the situation changed when the surpluses of the 
previous decade turned to deficit during a series of poor harvests.36   
The export data for this period offers a mixed picture, allowing imperial observers to 
support any number of conclusions on the potential of Quebec agriculture.  The increasing 
volume of grain exports prior to the war and through at least its first two years did have one 
important and unforeseen side effect. It raised the hope that there was an existing alternative to 
the mid-Atlantic as a source of grain within the empire.  Public figures such as Lord Sheffield 
seized upon the early 1770s data, and extrapolated it to imagine what was possible if agriculture 
in Quebec (and more speculatively) in Nova Scotia continued to flourish.  With waves of loyalist 
refugees flowing into both colonies, all that was (in theory) required was to provide the proper 
encouragement for an agricultural boom fueled by a prudent mix of labor, land, and a guaranteed 
market.  The loyalist provided the first, the land existed, and the markets could be guaranteed via 
a strict application of the Navigation Acts against the newly independent United States.            
How British North America could replace the thirteen rebellious colonies as a source of 
grain within the empire formed the second element of Lord Sheffield’s formulation for the post-
war imperial economy. The plan remained subject of intense debate between Sheffield and his 
critics in the 1780s.  Developing Canada and Nova Scotia into the new imperial breadbasket 
rested on decidedly shaky evidence.  In the CO 16 records, Canada fluctuated between a net 
importer and net exporter of grain depending on the state of each year’s harvest.  Nova Scotia 
had no record as a source for agricultural exports and was itself a significant imported foodstuffs.  
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Nonetheless, Sheffield projected in his Observations on the Commerce of the United States that 
further agricultural development not only could make British North American self-sufficient, but 
that an adequate surplus could also begin replacing US exports to the West Indies.  With the 
appropriate changes made in governance, Canada and Nova Scotia “will soon amply supply the 
principal articles wanted in the islands, except Indian corn and rice; and should there be 
difficulty in getting these articles, the cheapness of wheat and pease in Canada will soon afford a 
good substitute.”37 
Replacing the US in the West Indian market was only the beginning of Sheffield’s design 
for a reorganized British Atlantic economy.  Canadian surpluses would also displace US 
producers from their markets in Iberia and the Mediterranean.  Sheffield’s Observations noted 
that: 
There never was any market in Europe for the wheat and wheat-flour of America, 
except in Spain, Portugal, and the ports of the Mediterranean.  Before the war, the 
wheat from Canada began to be preferred in Spain…. the Spanish purchaser had the 
advantage of manufacturing it, and there being a demand in Canada for a low-priced, 
but strong red wine of Spain, for which there was none in the American states, the 
Canadian merchants had great advantages, and they may still be increased.38   
 
Sheffield held an optimistic view of existing commerce predicated on his understanding of 
mutually beneficial consumer desires in Iberia and Canada. The unspoken assumption underlying 
the theory was that migration of farmers to Canada and Nova Scotia would soon produce an 
agricultural surplus on a scale sufficient to replace the US in varied Atlantic markets.  Further, he 
expected producers and consumers to change their market behaviours to conform to a politically-
inspired economic program that favored a British imperial system.   
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Sheffield acknowledged that this new commercial geography would include notable 
transition costs for the slave societies of the West Indies colonies with their massive need for 
imported food until the agricultural base in Nova Scotia and Canada developed.  However, this 
small cost to one interest group within the empire was a necessary (and temporary) burden that 
could be offset by other changes.  Streamlining customs administration, curtailing smuggling, 
and encouraging a diversified agricultural economy in the Caribbean would effectively 
reformulate imperial trade shorn of the US and its past integral role in colonial trade.39          
Sheffield’s optimistic perspective on the potential of British North America was 
contested.  Brian Edwards, the Jamaican planter, historian, and (later) Member of Parliament, 
had an assessment that stretched beyond the immediate crisis of 1784, which made him skeptical 
of Sheffield’s projections about British North America as an imperial granary.  For Edwards, the 
provisions crisis in the Caribbean was not a temporary condition but rather a permanent reality 
that could not be overcome within the confines of a strict mercantile system. 
If any man of sense and character, acquainted with the soil, population, and 
resources of Canada and Nova Scotia, will publickly aver that those provinces 
can, for years to come, furnish the West India islands with one half the supplies 
which have hitherto been furnished by the United States, on any terms short of 
ruin to the purchasers, and at the same time take the rum of the islands in 
payment; I will, as publickly acknowledge that my arguments have been all along 
founded in error, and heartily agree with Lord Sheffield that, on every principle of 
honour, humanity, and justice, the unfortunate loyalists of Nova Scotia are 
entitled to the preference of our custom.40 
 
Edwards stressed several significant problems for the post-war imperial economic system.  
While acknowledging the benefits of supporting Nova Scotian loyalists as an abstract matter of 
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40 Brian Edwards, Thoughts on the late Proceedings of Government, respecting the trade of the West India Islands 
with the United States of North America. The second edition, corrected and enlarged, to which is not first added a 
postscript, addressed to the right honourable lord Sheffield (London: T Cadell, 1784), 67-8. 
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principle, two interrelated difficulties blocked that goal.  The first was geographical and 
environmental, could an adequate surplus be achieved in a timely fashion in the northernmost 
colonies, or at all?  Second, if an adequate level of agricultural production could be 
accomplished, how would enough demand for West Indian rum (and presumably other sugar-
based products) in British North American be created?  He concluded that a satisfactory solution 
could not be achieved.  The volume and expense of US provisions and lumber was such that it  
chiefly demonstrates the mockery of referring the disappointed [West Indian] 
planter to Canada and Nova Scotia.  Even if nature had not, as unfortunate as she 
has, shut up the navigation from the former of these provinces six months in the 
year, and devoted the latter to everlasting sterility; there is this plain reason in the 
nature of things that forbids the planter to look to those countries for effectual 
relief. “It is inconsistent with the nature of commerce, to furnish an adequate 
supply to so vast and so various a demand; immediately and unexpectedly.  The 
demand and supply must grow up together, mutually supporting, and supported 
by each other.”  It will require a long series of years to bring them to a level.41 
 
Edwards implies that given enough time for the supply and demand relationships to develop, 
Canada could offer some relief to the embattled West Indian planter, though not on a year-round 
basis.  Nova Scotia, unfortunately, was a hopeless case due to the environmental limits of 
agriculture there.  As a West Indian planter Edwards was obviously an interested observer in the 
post-war debate about imperial trade.  The lower costs and larger amounts associated with US 
imports were persuasive to him and others with similar needs.   
Observers in the United States were also intensely interested in these political and 
economic debates.  A pamphlet by “An American” in 1784 pithily noted that “the idea that 
Canada and Nova Scotia being soon a substitute for the commerce of the United States, 
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considering the coldness of the climate, barrenness of the soil, long winters, and harbours 
inaccessible for almost seven months in the year, appears to me too absurd to require a serious 
refutation.”42  According to Harris, grain was grown, but was constrained by soil and 
climatic conditions which rendered the region a net importer of wheat and flour.43   This 
environmental rationale is strikingly similar to that of Edwards, from a practical point of 
view the legal resumption of the US grain trade was imperative and faced no realistic 
rival.   
 Focusing on the geographic basis of agricultural production and trade provides an 
obvious critique to Sheffield’s theories.  Yet another crucial element underlies the basic 
assumptions of this debate.  Sheffield’s essay suggests that given time and appropriate 
encouragement British North America would become the new granary of the empire and produce 
enough surplus for foreign exchange.  Edwards and “An American” saw the Canadian landscape 
as an inherent stumbling block to this type of development that no amount of time, effort, or 
government policy could overcome. Each grappled with the new post-war political and economic 
landscape.  How changing political circumstances intersected with the continuity of long-
standing economic needs and trade patterns was not clear either in theory or in practical 
application.  Underlying the debate, however, was a common theme: what could Canada and 
Nova Scotia become, and what role would they play in the reconfigured empire? This carried 
significant consequences for imperial policy makers, West Indian planters, and US merchants 
and agricultural interests.  The debate about the role of British North American agriculture in the 
imperial and Atlantic economy, however, skipped over an even more basic matter. Could the 
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colonies in question even produce enough food to support themselves in the immediate post-war 
period?  
Upper and Lower Canadian Agriculture, 1783-1793 
 The pamphlet war sparked by Sheffield represents a policy debate about the state of trade 
and what it should become in the new political circumstances of the post-1783 empire.  These 
varied projections and their various incarnations depended upon agricultural development in 
newly expanding settler colonies.  What should ideally be done for the empire rested uneasily 
alongside what could practically be accomplished in agricultural fields.   
The most stable and heavily settled region of British North America in the wake of the 
war remained Quebec.  While the incoming settlers to the Maritimes and to Upper Canada 
sought to establish a basic level of subsistence and (potentially) an exportable surplus, the hopes 
for a closed imperial system that excluded US grain rested with Quebec.  Conclusive quantitative 
evidence on grain are elusive for the 1780s.  However, Ouellet offers valuable insights about 
exports from Quebec and Montreal.  Overall, the scale of trade was minor.  Moreover, his 
calculations do not include any data for the Maritimes, nor for grain traded across the US border 
until 1808.44 
Cross-border trade after the war was made especially complex by the independent status 
of Vermont until 1791, some of whose leaders clearly considered joining Canada due to “her 
nearness to the Canadian frontier and the St. Lawrence Valley.”  Negotiations between Governor 
Haldimand of Canada and Vermont settlers to establish the state as a royal colony were 
unsuccessful, but many Montreal merchants as well as many Vermont citizens openly advocated 
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for direct trade.  This advocacy was rewarded in 1786 when British governor Lord Dorchester 
allowed Vermont to export lumber, naval stores, agricultural goods, “or anything else of the 
growth and produce of Vermont” via the St. Lawrence and to “import the manufactures of Great 
Britain and East and West Indian products on the same terms as the Canadians.”45  This view 
emphasized Vermont’s use of Canada and the St. Lawrence as a conduit to Atlantic markets, yet 
the trade connection could also provide a source of provisions in times of need.      
 Ouellet’s analysis of the 1780s Quebec grain economy presents a mixed picture.  
Recovery from the war effort was not clear until 1786, when flour and other exports increased.  
The same agricultural disaster that struck the rest of British North America also effected Quebec.  
By summer 1788, it was clear that famine stalked the land.  Prices for flour, corn, and other 
necessities of life increased, while relief efforts by government officials fell far short of dire 
needs.46  The government of the late-eighteenth century, particularly in British North America, 
did not have robust institutional resources to respond swiftly to the crisis.  The primary tool for 
relieving famine conditions concerned regulating trade laws as well as basic forms of direct 
assistance.  For example, by 1790 Lord Dorchester prohibited grain exports from Quebec.47   
A ban on grain exports was not an unusual exercise of government power, and it drew on 
similar policies in Ireland and Guernsey during the same period.  However, the ban exports was 
not an adequate response.  Dorchester turned to the US for “temporary” relief by expanding the 
licit cross-border trade networks between Vermont and British North America to openly include 
non-British commerce.  A notice in the 12 February 1789 edition of the Quebec Gazette 
announced that imports of bread, flour, biscuit, and all other types of grain would be permitted 
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until the first of August.48  In justifying this course of action, Dorchester cited the rapidly 
increasing price of provisions and worsening local conditions as imperatives for bold action.49  
This brought little quick relief as the flow of supplies from the US into Canada by land proved 
inadequate.  With the specter of famine haunting his administration, Dorchester expanded his 
authorization for US trade to include seaborne trade in June.  Further, he requested the help of 
New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and the commanders of both the Newfoundland and Halifax naval 
establishments to facilitate this trade due to the “urgent necessity of the case.”50   
 The creation and development of Upper Canada as a separate province after 1791 caused 
another problem.  Historian Douglas McCalla argues that Upper Canadian production of wheat 
was substantive, but the exact amount produced and consumed there in its early years are 
conjectural.  By his estimate, approximately 80% of Upper Canadian production was required for 
local consumption, population growth and increased grain production, also caused growing local 
demand.51  The lack of infrastructure in newly-settled colonial spaces also limited agricultural 
production as well as long-distance trade.  The mills required to transform wheat into more 
lucrative and transportable flour did not exist until government investments in the late 1780s and 
1790s stimulated private investment into grist and saw mills.  Moreover, transporting wheat to 
the mills remained challenging for farmers.52  Manufacturing cornmeal remained easier for most 
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settlers, particularly those distant from the grist mills.53  Local consumption patterns favoured 
growing corn, and the low price for corn products made it uneconomical for export to distant 
markets even in the case of a surplus. 
Of course, the existence of surpluses was far from assured, especially in early years of 
colonial development, which the government recognized by offering early loyalists provisions 
for three years after settlement.  The end of government rations coincided with the ‘famine year’ 
of 1788-89, which reduced many settlers to poverty and starvation.  The limits of poor harvests 
could not be overcome by grants from the King’s Stores, which were distributed by the military 
as a type of social welfare effort.54  During better times, local military demand provided a nearby 
market to sell grain.  This thriving local trade served both an economic and a political purpose as 
military contracts for grain was a lucrative matter for patronage in Upper Canada’s House of 
Assembly.55  The military market included a further advantage for local farmers since military 
garrisons in the province paid higher than market prices for their supplies.56 Given strong local 
civilian and military demand, trade of surpluses to distant markets in the Maritimes, Great 
Britain, or even the lucrative West Indies was a distant dream.  
The case of the ‘famine year’ was extraordinary, yet underscores a familiar pattern.  As 
noted in the writings of French officials, like Bougainville in the 1750s, as well as British 
government records, like the CO 16 ledgers of the late-1760s and early-1770s, the agricultural 
economy was marginally self-sufficient in good times but subject to scarcity on regular intervals.  
The swift expansion of population by loyalist refugees only deepened this situation.  In this light, 
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Dorchester’s opening of trade by land with Vermont and with the mid-Atlantic via oceanic trade 
reflected a practical and urgent need to supply an expanding settler colonial society with external 
provisions for subsistence.  Given that the agricultural potential of Nova Scotia was more limited 
than that of Quebec and that the number of loyalist refugees to the Maritimes was far more 
massive relative to the pre-war population, there can be little optimism for the likelihood of its 
sustainability without external imports of grain and other provisions.    
Nova Scotia Agriculture, 1783-1793 
The thriving pamphlet war waged a trans-Atlantic debate about the imperial roles of 
Canada and Nova Scotia and their ability (or lack thereof) to adequately replace the now 
independent thirteen colonies as a source of provisions for the British West Indies, yet within 
Nova Scotia itself there was little question about its agricultural limitations.  Works by scholars 
such as Julian Gwyn, Neil MacKinnon, Maya Jasanoff, and James Walker have highlighted the 
challenges to settlers and, especially, the material and emotional difficulties of reconstructing a 
familiar society for the enormous number of loyalist refugees and decommissioned troops who 
moved there in the 1780s.57  The challenges were voluminous.  Beyond securing shelter and 
daily bread, fashioning coherent land claims via surveys for government-distributed land proved 
controversial.  The relations between loyalist refugees and earlier settlers was often strained.  
Whether, and to what degree, the promises made to the loyalists by the British government 
would, or could, be honoured was constantly tested.  Simply put, the colony was not prepared for 
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the influx of new inhabitants, and the legal and material infrastructure required to support 
colonial expansion did not exist.58 
By the end of 1783, the need for external provisions for Nova Scotia was clear.  The 
provincial government was not disinterested or hapless, merely overwhelmed by the crisis.  Few 
palatable solutions existed.  Writing to Lord North in December, John Campbell noted that with 
the introduction of disbanded regiments in the colony in need of assistance from the government, 
the colony required “a considerable supply of provisions….as early in the spring as possible.”59  
The need was two-fold.  Beyond the humanitarian motive, the supply of provisions was directly 
linked to the peace and stability of the province.  Fears of discontent among loyalist settlers and 
demobilized soldiers were noticed even in Whitehall.  Writing in June 1784, Lord Sydney 
assured Governor John Parr that the British government was aware of the crisis facing the 
colony, and that a continued flow of provisions from His Majesty’s government to the afflicted 
would relieve their distress and reassure them of the Crown’s continued interest in their 
welfare.60   
By September 1784, it was clear that food supplies from within the empire were 
inadequate.  Writing to Lord Sydney, Parr informed officials in Britain that due to dire scarcity 
and with the advice of the Council, he had declared that “no scruple or difficulty should be made 
of admitting the people of New England to import fresh provisions” into the colony.  Further, “it 
was agreed that any restriction on such an importation might be attended with bad 
consequences.”61  Parr’s identification of the people of New England in his letter to Sydney, 
rather than to Americans in general, is intriguing.  Parr had only been in the colonies since his 
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appointment as governor in 1782, and he may have simply associated all Americans with New 
Englanders who played such a prominent role in the coastal trade. New England itself was not an 
exporter of food products, and the links between the Mid-Atlantic States and Halifax are clearly 
outlined in the Naval Office records of the 1750s and 60s.  While New England could have been 
a shorthand term for all Americans, Parr probably strategically cast his policy to British officials 
as a regional accommodation as opposed to a broader opening for all US merchants and ships.       
The need for New England merchants to openly trade with Nova Scotia indicates the 
scope of the emergency faced by the colony, since it waived the privileged position in the 
Navigation Acts for imperial trade by British ships owned and manned by British subjects.  
Although this exemption did not last, it is noteworthy that even the proclamations forbidding US 
vessels from Nova Scotian harbors also contained permission for importing American 
agricultural products into the colony on British ships.62  This step toward a more stringent 
implementation of mercantile doctrine would certainly be open to corruption.  For example, 
Sydney complained to Parr of US merchants colluding with British revenue officers in the West 
Indies and Nova Scotia to acquire British ship registers to facilitate illicit commerce.63       
One of the key questions of integrating the newly arrived loyalists into Nova Scotia 
society was the reassurance that their past sufferings would receive compensation from the 
British government.  Provisions were a down payment upon that promise, and thus took on a 
political quality in addition to its importance for subsistence.  Sydney noted that British policy 
aimed to make Nova Scotia “the envy of the subjects of the neighboring states” through the 
gracious intervention of the government in “relieving the wants of those who have become 
settlers in Nova Scotia.”  Yet the distance between the intent of imperial policy and its 
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implementation was profound.  Immediately after recognizing the need for efforts on behalf of 
loyalist settlers, Sydney decried the “immense expense” of such work and that “issuing further 
supplies cannot now be a measure of necessity.” As early as March 1785, Sydney instructed Parr 
to ensure that “government in the future be put to the least possible expense.”64     
The need for practical frugality and political idealism uneasily coexisted.  A two-thirds 
provisions ration was promised until May 1786 to at least 15,000 loyalists spread throughout 
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.65 The scope of supplies required was immense.  Writing on 28 
May 1785, Sydney informed Parr that the government had reached an agreement with 
contractors to supply 3.8 million pounds of flour and 3.1 million pounds of pork to the colony for 
military use as well as to supply loyalist settlers for the next year.66  Although the source of these 
supplies was not specified, most would have to arrive as imports to the colony.        
These measures had little effect to curtail the thriving US grain trade with Nova Scotia.  
The December 1785 minutes of the Council and House of Assembly increased some trade 
restrictions yet exempted grain products from prohibition.67  This exemption persisted for the 
next several years. Each session of the Council would advise and consent to a proclamation by 
Parr allowing for the importation of US agricultural products for a specified period of time, 
which correlated to the timing of the sessions of the Assembly and Council.68  Not including 
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smuggling and trade collusion that thrived for several decades, the Provincial Assembly provided 
trade exemptions to sustain the flow of provisions into the colony.69      
Two interesting elements surface from Governor Parr’s interactions with his Council and 
the Provincial Assembly.  First, the power structure of the empire in the post-war period 
reconsidered the quasi-independent status of the colonial governments as one of the root causes 
of the American Revolution.  Nevertheless, the power to suspend imperial trade regulations still 
rested in the hands of colonial governors in emergency situations such as impending famine.  
Second, the United States was the only practical a source for needed provisions, especially given 
the enduring pattern of the colonial grain trade and expanding demand with the influx of settlers 
outpacing improvements in internal agricultural production. Perversely, the outcome of the War 
for American Independence rendered Nova Scotia more dependent on US provisions.   
The dream for Nova Scotia to be part of an imperial granary did not disappear even in the 
face of these difficulties.  Reforming pamphlets circulated through the 1780s to explain recent 
agricultural failures and how to solve them. For example, S. Hollingsworth in 1787 simply 
counseled patience about the slow development of Nova Scotian grain exports: 
In the present situation of the province, it cannot be supposed that, since her 
population has increased to six or seven times more than it was before the 
rebellion, there is any to spare, either one or the other [flour or grain], so as to 
become articles for exportation, as least for sometime to come.  The lands are, 
however, in most places, well adapted for the cultivation of wheat, barley, rye, 
oats, pease, and beans; they are already growing in large quantities in many 
places.70 
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Hollingsworth’s assessment hints at a crucial underlying limitation.  Even substantial increases 
in production might only meet growing local demand, rendering grain exportation in any 
substantive volume a distant dream. 
 Whether there was an adequate increase in production of wheat to meet the local demand 
cannot be directly proven, but it seems unlikely.  A memorial from settlers in Annapolis in April 
1787, part of the best farming region of the colony, for example, requested additional rations due 
to scarcity. Yet Lord Sydney informed Parr that the government must decline the application 
noting that  
any additional favour shown to them would consequently produce other 
applications, which considering the immense expense already brought upon this 
country for supplies of provisions, and other articles issued to these people, could 
not be attended to.  I must, therefore, desire you to inform the petitioners that their 
application in the present instance cannot be complied with.71    
While it is easy to dismiss Sydney’s orders as callous, it points to two significant issues.  First, 
eighteenth-century government was not designed to function as a welfare office.  Funds were 
limited, and social expenditures were minimal even in cases of the “deserving poor” such as the 
loyalists.  The allowance of provisions for new settlers and refugees was extraordinary and 
temporary rather than a new and ongoing standard.  Second, Sydney feared that the settlers of 
Annapolis were just the first of many similar cases.  If scarcity was a concern in Annapolis, one 
of the more agriculturally advantageous regions of Nova Scotia, then conditions in other portions 
of the colony might be disastrous and result in a flood of applications for relief that the British 
government could not provide.  Nova Scotia was far from becoming a grain exporting region as 
hoped for by Hollingsworth. The ability of the colony to even feed itself was questionable.   
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Much like Canada, Nova Scotia faced a serious famine in the late 1780s.  A case study of 
the Hessian and Waldeck settlements provides a clear picture of suffering as well as a remedy 
available to settlers if government relief was not forthcoming.  The community was unable to 
survive and warned that if outside assistance did not arrive soon the people would “fall under the 
unavoidable necessity to fly to some other country for the relief of their distressed families.”72  
An exodus out of Nova Scotia was no idle threat.  Parr had recognized the phenomena two years 
prior.  Writing to an unidentified correspondent in July 1787, he complained that once the bounty 
of provisions ceased, many loyalists had fled the province.73  The need to find a solution was 
essential, and the response was a variation on a familiar theme.  Drawing on the 1783 example of 
the province permitting US agricultural products into the colony, in July 1789 an Order-in-
Council permitted the importation of bread, corn, and flour into all the provinces of Atlantic 
Canada.74 
Superficially, admitting American produce into the colony was an emergency response to 
a specific crisis.  While true, in part, it reflects a much longer pattern of agricultural need and 
integrated Atlantic trade reaching back to the 1740s.  The political separation of the post-war era 
did not sunder these commercial and humanitarian connections.  Traditional trade patterns 
persisted after US independence.  If international agricultural trade was only legitimate during an 
emergency, then colonial Nova Scotia was fundamentally shaped by the management of a 
perpetual crisis or provisions that involved a dynamic commercial relationship the US, the 
Canadas, and the British and foreign West Indies.  
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According to historical geographer Andrew Clark’s landscape analysis, “Nova Scotia is 
not, and never has been, a very suitable area for growing wheat.”75 This is valid due to local 
environmental conditions that were made even more forceful due to dependency on cheap and 
plentiful external sources of wheat, above all from the mid-Atlantic colonies and states.  A 
strictly environmental analysis of the issue is incomplete. Graeme Wynn’s research on 
agriculture in the Bay of Fundy points to a richer understanding of the relationship between 
imported provisions, local production, and consumption within the colony.  In his analysis, 
“cheap, fine flour and other grains from the American states offered stiff competition to coarser 
Nova Scotian products, however, and marshland farmers soon concentrated on livestock for 
market production.”76  This adds another layer of complexity as it suggests that not only did 
temporary scarcity drive demand for American grain, but market-based decisions about the best 
mix of agricultural and cattle production deepened the local commitment to US imports. Such 
local imperatives in Nova Scotia forced the hand of Nova Scotia leaders to continue permitting 
agricultural trade with the US on a “temporary,” but perpetual, basis. 
The outbreak of war with Revolutionary France in 1793 caused a sudden reassessment of 
trade policy between the United States and the British Empire. War created enormous additional 
demand for provisions as contractors supplying British forces in the Caribbean required more 
than could be purchased within the empire.  A May 1794 letter from John Wentworth, the new 
governor of Nova Scotia, to Archibald Mitchell, a commissariat contractor, outlines the only 
practical solution to this problem in a familiar manner.  Although Mitchell’s contract favored 
fulfillment in the colonies, this was only operative if His Majesty’s colonies “were capable of 
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furnishing” the amount required.77  Wentworth allowed for the importation of provisions from 
Boston, “given that no other remedy existed.”78  The state of war also seemed likely to disrupt 
Nova Scotia’s agricultural supplies if (or when) its militia was need for defense.  By the end of 
the year a gloomy governor Wentworth sorrowfully reported to the Duke of Portland that “any 
diminution in cultivating lands would immediately cause such a scarcity of food as to induce 
numbers to remove to the U. States.” Still, he projected that a surplus in excess of local demand 
would undoubtedly exist in a few years and be available for export.79   
By 1794 it was clear that British North America could not produce the needed grain 
surpluses to sustain colonies in the British West Indies or to supply military needs in a time of 
war. Moreover, while Quebec and the Canadas had self-sufficiency within its grasp, Nova Scotia 
and the Maritimes more generally struggled to feed its own growing population.  In a perverse 
conclusion to the volatile revolutionary transition, the limitations of British North American 
agriculture helped make the ties between US agriculture and the empire as strong after the war as 
they had been before it.  In the absence of quantitative evidence, the changes in economic 
relations in the Jay Treaty sheds useful light on official perspectives about the status of North 
American agriculture in 1794.  The treaty formally reopened Britain’s West Indian possessions 
to trade with the United States, thereby legalizing a thriving clandestine trade.  This effectively 
terminated modest Canadian trade with the West Indies.80  While Jay’s Treaty was certainly 
shaped by multiple commercial and geopolitical factors, the trade concessions granted to the 
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United States was a pivotal plank that made plain that Canadian and Maritimes agricultural 
production was inadequate as of 1794. 
Three broad and neglected patterns are clear from this assessment of post-war agricultural 
development and trade policy in British North America.  First, there is a remarkable continuity of 
grain trade connections in spite of the political rupture and demographic growth after 1783.  The 
establishment of Halifax as a naval base in 1749 had made the city dependent on external sources 
of subsistence from its inception.  The lack of local production and infrastructure, in turn, created 
a distant agricultural hinterland mid-Atlantic states.  Then departure of thirteen colonies from the 
empire in 1783 (and eventually Vermont) did not change this pattern.  Direct support from the 
Crown for provisions to ease the suffering of the loyalist refugees and demobilized soldiers was 
planned as a temporary measure rather than a sustainable economic alternative.  A variety of 
machinations by provincial, imperial, and US interests conspired to restore the pre-war colonial 
trading relationship. 
Second, increases in British North American grain production were consumed by rapid 
increases in local population as well as demand heightened by British military forces in North 
America in peace and war.  Even ardent boosters of a strict mercantile system acknowledged this 
reality as something that needed to be overcome.  The particular nature of grain as both a market 
commodity and as a requirement for daily subsistence made any restructuring of the grain 
economy a pressing demand that could not take a backseat to imperial political ideals.  As a 
result a policy solution that liberalized the grain trade, either formally or informally, was 
required. As the West Indian planter and historian Brian Edwards noted, “trade will no doubt in 
such [a] case revert in a great degree to its ancient channels.”81  Even in the absence of liberal 
                                                          
81Edwards, Thoughts on the late Proceedings of Government, 3. 
108 
 
trade policies that favored the open exchange of goods, the imperatives of the grain trade (based 
on the brute facts of where it could be grown in large amounts, and where demand was most 
profitable or essential for survival) meant that it rarely varied from the accustomed patterns that 
it had taken by the mid-eighteenth century, if not before. The question remaining was whether or 
not government regulation would support or attempt to challenge the environmental and 
economic imperatives of the trans-Atlantic grain trade. 
Third, the overall state of British North American grain surpluses also retained the low 
(or non-existent) yields of the 1750s and 1760s.  Although self-sufficiency for local consumption 
usually could be met, occasional years of modest surplus remained interspersed with crisis 
shortages that required imports from the US.  Beyond the need for subsistence during those 
trying times, the uncertainty introduced into the grain market by these fluctuations between 
surplus and dearth made British North American grain supplies unreliable for consumers.  This is 
in marked contrast to the consistent availability of mid-Atlantic grain products throughout the 
eighteenth century. In the post-war era this provided a vital advantage for the presidential 
administration of George Washington as it entered negotiations to officially reintegrate the new 
US nation into the British Atlantic and the trade of other entangled Atlantic empires.              
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE OPPORTUNITIES AND COSTS OF NEUTRALITY, 1793-1809 
 
The changing geopolitical environment of the 1790s created both opportunity and danger 
for the new United States.  After over a decade of formal exile from the British Atlantic economy 
during and in the wake of the Revolutionary War, the outbreak of war in Europe officially 
reopened a number of colonial era trading routes to US merchants that had only been informally 
accessible since the American War for Independence.  The ‘normalcy’ of the colonial era trading 
relationship now reemerged legally, thereby bringing to a close the aberration of the 
Revolutionary period rupture.  The changing fortunes of war, however, would again cause 
temporary disruptions in Anglo-American trade. Yet these were ephemeral as the strength of the 
traditional economic relationship proved durable even under intense political strain.  The larger 
European struggle would shape American economic and foreign policy for the next two decades 
as the federal government struggled to protect domestic interests as the major European powers 
sought to deploy US commerce as part of their increasingly bitter ideological and military 
conflict.     
Changes in American politics also influenced US policy.  The transition from Federalist 
rule under George Washington and John Adams to the Democratic-Republican administrations 
of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison after the so-called ‘revolution of 1800’ was significant 
for varied reasons.  Nevertheless, foreign and economic policy remained remarkably consistent 
until the destruction of the Franco-Spanish fleet at Trafalgar in 1805 and the new French and 
British policies towards neutral traders that accompanied this martial turning point.  Starting in 
1806, the Jefferson administration attempted, with little success, to coerce European powers with 
the threat of US trade sanctions in order to gain concessions for American commerce that, by 
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extension, would raise the status of the US as a major force in the Atlantic economy.  Jefferson’s 
desperate embargo gamble in 1807 did not halt trade as it was openly evaded by Federalists and 
Republicans alike, and the experiment further revealed a profound division within Jeffersonian 
political economy.  Its grand vision of a yeoman republic with limited government and minimal 
internal taxation relied on foreign trade and customs revenue to fund the national government, 
which otherwise would collapse.  How these contending goals could be balanced reflected the 
uncertain place of the US in an Atlantic World at war.1  
  Because the outbreak of war in Europe in April 1792 did not involve the United States as 
a belligerent power, it opened rich possible rewards for neutral trade.  In theory, the US remained 
allied with France due to treaty obligations during the American Revolution.  However, in April 
1793 President Washington declared neutrality.  Historian Reginald Horsman has stressed that 
neutrality and the European conflict provided the US with the opportunity to expand west even 
as US trade in the Atlantic might be threatened.2  Another series of calculations were foremost 
for US merchants.  As a practical matter, the increasingly desperate war between Revolutionary 
(and later Napoleonic) France and Great Britain deployed naval power to interdict (or protect) 
Atlantic trade and even sought to govern what products were exchanged with Americans.  US 
commerce increasingly diversified over the war years from 1793 to 1807 to include-exports of 
colonial goods to continental Europe.   
                                                          
1 See Drew McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill: University of 
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The potential profits were vast. According to historian Douglass North’s now classic 
examination of the early republic economy, “the commercial and trade policies of England and 
France and the response of the American government to them were the source for every 
expansion and contraction.”3  The focus on exports and re-exports for European markets as the 
core vehicle for American prosperity has been dubbed the “Taylor-North” thesis. The European 
war placed most trans-Atlantic trade into the hands of neutral powers, particularly the United 
States.  For North, 1793-1808 marked “years of unparalleled prosperity” for the United States 
due to the importance of exports to the overall economy and the expansion of that sector during 
this timeframe, the increase of imports at favorable prices, and the expansion of domestic 
manufactures driven by the profits produced by the export sector.4   
The “Taylor-North” thesis has been challenged by historians such as Donald Adams, who 
provides a quantitative analysis that questions whether or not US trade connections during the 
early republic actually created prosperity for the American people, and, if so, did any particular 
interest group within society disproportionately benefit from external trade.  According to 
Adams, the North-Taylor theory places too much emphasis on export-led growth creating 
prosperity from 1793 to the start of Jefferson’s embargo in 1808.  Adams proposes an alternative 
based on a highly theoretical economic analysis that demonstrates that the benefits of US exports 
accrued to a narrow selection of merchants, while the public as a whole paid for those profits 
with increased prices and stunted domestic growth.  To support this conclusion, Adams 
differentiates between true domestic export production and the re-export of imported goods and 
demonstrates that there was no increase in per capita domestic exports prior to the embargo.5  
                                                          
3 Douglass North, The Economic Growth of the United States, 1790-1860 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1966), 36. 
4 Ibid, 53. 
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Major profits in US exports were chiefly within the carrying and re-export trade, and the profits 
of that trade were absorbed by the merchant class and shipbuilding interests.  Most average 
people paid for this profit through higher prices for consumption, diminished exports of domestic 
goods in favor of foreign ones, and higher shipping costs due to the diversion of merchant 
vessels away from the domestic coastal trade.  Adams is also critical of the North-Taylor thesis 
because it does not provide any means by which the profits of foreign trade were transferred 
throughout society.  This is particularly true when the export trade is examined from a regional 
perspective.  According to Adams, the northern states controlled 66% of exports in 1793, by 
1807 this increased to 71%.  The south only had 23% of exports in 1793 and 14% in 1807, and 
suffered further from higher shipping costs, insurance rates, and increased freight charges that 
transferred wealth from the southern agricultural interests to northern mercantile ones.6   
The carrying trade denoted the non-domestic products carried in US ships.  Tropical 
produce such as sugar, coffee, and tea could be safely carried to Europe under the protection of 
American neutrality.  As a neutral power, merchant vessels under the protection of the US flag 
were not subject to capture by belligerent powers.   However, this practice soon caused political 
difficulties for the Jefferson and Madison administrations. The balance of naval power in the 
Atlantic decisively favored the British after Trafalgar in October 1805, and Napoleon’s European 
empire turned inwards through the mercantilist-style Continental System in 1806.  As the 
European war expanded from armed conflict on land to an economic war with sweeping Atlantic 
implications, it ensnared the US and posed daunting challenges for the federal government. 
The fact that the US economy would be significantly affected by the European war was 
immediately clear in 1793.  Grain (and its related products) was a civilian necessity whose 
                                                          
6 Ibid, 722-732. 
113 
 
availability had a profound influence on social stability, and it was also the foundation of 
military provisioning.  As a result it was among the first commodities regulated as part of the war 
effort.  Great Britain passed a series of Orders-in-Council in 1793 and 1794 that formed the 
lasting basis for British maritime strategy throughout the war.  The order of June 8, 1793 
prohibited any neutral vessel from carrying grain to France.  Further regulations issued on 
November 6 expanded the prohibition to any trade with France or its colonies that had not been 
legal during peace time.  A third order in January 1794 mandated the capture of any vessel 
sailing to a blockaded port.7  Through these Orders-in-Council Britain hoped to isolate the 
teetering French regime that faced rebellion at home and a multi-front foreign war. 
This effort provoked complaints from early US analysts after the War of 1812 as being 
the key first step towards outright war.  Writing in 1815, Treasury Secretary Alexander Dallas 
complained that the Orders-in-Council amounted to “an avowed design, to inflict famine upon 
the whole of the French people” an action “at that time; properly estimated throughout the 
civilized world” to be “so glaring an infraction of neutral rights” that it “did not escape the 
severities of diplomatic animadversion and remonstrance.”8  Dallas’ statement reflects the 
sensibilities of 1815, rather than those of 1793, yet he correctly identified two important 
elements of British policy.  First, the nature of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars 
would witness the use of sea power to isolate France from external trade.  Second, that access to 
food supplies would be a key feature of that effort. The political protests that he cites, however, 
were not evident in 1793 as the policies of Washington, Adams, and the first Jefferson 
                                                          
7 Horsman, The Diplomacy of the New Republic, 53-54. 
8 Alexander Dallas, An Exposition of the Causes and Character of the War (Washington: Roger Chew Weightman, 
1815), 7. 
114 
 
administration emphasized peaceful trade with Great Britain rather than the protests that would 
come in Jefferson’s second administration and that of Madison.  
In an effort to protect American trade and to settle key issues remaining between the 
United States and Great Britain as a result of the American Revolution, President Washington 
dispatched John Jay to London for negotiations that failed to reach consensus on many key 
points. The British were able to avoid any clarification of neutral trading rights or resolving the 
practice of impressment.9  Despite those lingering issues, the negotiations protected Anglo-
American trade.  Under the terms of the Jay Treaty, the British government allowed US 
merchant vessels to trade with British possessions in the East and West Indies provided that 
those vessels landed their cargoes only in the US.  The United States was granted “reciprocal and 
perfect liberty of commerce and navigation” with British possessions in Europe.  The treaty, 
however, did not protect American merchantmen from inspection by the British Navy.  Other 
clauses allowed the British Navy to inspect American merchant ships and seize any property 
belonging to the enemies of Britain as contraband of war.  Contraband was defined as “all arms 
and implements serving for the purposes of war, by land or sea.”  British men-of-war were also 
authorized to “turn away” US merchants from any port under control of the enemy.10 
Historian Eliga Gould persuasively argues that there was another, deeper meaning hidden 
in the text of the Jay Treaty.  For the first time, the independent United States was regarded as a 
fully “treaty worthy” nation by Great Britain.  The Constitutional order provided for a national 
government that could negotiate international treaties and enforce the terms of those treaties on 
                                                          
9 Horsman, The Diplomacy of the New Republic, 62. 
10George Washington, “A Proclamation, Whereas a Treaty of Amity Done the 29th day of February” (Philadelphia, 
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the several states.11  Although the treaty was a milestone in foreign relations, it was domestically 
explosive and provoked strong reactions across the US political spectrum.  It is intriguing to note 
that this disagreement was fundamentally driven by partisan rancor.  Neither of the nascent 
parties proposed any alternative to trading with the British and its substantial benefits.  Rather, 
the conflict was over the terms of how US trade would reenter the British imperial economy.  
This domestic debate over US trade policy would explode again during Jefferson’s second 
administration, but the practical forces shaping trade remained stable for the next decade and 
generally benefitted the American economy.   
One of the primary beneficiaries of these structural conditions were grain farmers.  In her 
analysis of the early republican political economy, Joyce Appleby wrote that “the new European 
demand for American grains…..created an unusually favorable opportunity for ordinary men to 
produce for the Atlantic trade world.”12  The transition to grain as an export commodity in the 
Chesapeake region was well underway by the 1790s, which expanded the traditional Mid-
Atlantic granaries of New York and Pennsylvania.  However, Appleby’s analysis is incorrect in 
identifying Europe as a new market, as Iberia and southern Europe were already long-established 
consumers of American produce.  Consumption patterns in Great Britain did open some new 
markets, but variables within British customs regulations that attempted to balance the 
competing interests of British landowners and British consumers made this an uncertain 
market.13  
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An unintended benefit of the creation of the new US federal government under the 
Constitution was the more reliable quantitative data gathered by the United States Treasury 
Department concerning American exports and cargo destinations.  This data was compiled by 
Timothy Pitkin and published as A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States (1816).  
Pitkin’s analysis noted the growth of both American exports to the West Indies and the growth of 
the American carrying trade for Caribbean produce. Pitkin relied on unpublished statistics 
generated by the Treasury Department outlining the extent and value of American exports and 
re-exports, but it is unclear exactly what records he used.14  According to Pitkin, the outbreak of 
war in 1793 benefited the United States as a neutral power because the war threw the colonial 
trade of the East and West Indies into American hands.15   
This temporary gain was enhanced by a further modification of British law in January 
1794 that allowed any product carried from French colonies in the Caribbean to a neutral port to 
then be re-exported to Europe as the product of the neutral power rather than that of France.  
This became known as the “broken voyage” rule.16  The value of goods re-exported from the 
United States to Europe doubled between 1791 and 1795, growing from $2.8 million to $5.6 
million and would triple to over $18 million by 1799.17 The expansion of trade was aided by 
another British trade act in January 1798, which allowed for the direct importation of French 
colonial goods to a British port on neutral vessels or via a neutral port within Europe.  This 
legislation remained in place until 1802.18  The broken voyage rule allowed for an American 
“carrying trade” of non-US produced products (usually from the Caribbean) to be carried on 
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American ships to Britain or to neutral ports in continental Europe.  This practice became 
increasingly lucrative as well as increasingly controversial as Napoleon’s continental empire 
expanded and British sea power came to dominate the European coastline.  
 The geopolitical conflict of the 1790s also provided opportunities for American 
produced goods, particularly agricultural ones, to be exported on a larger scale than before.  
Pitkin’s statistics provide a quantitative assessment of US grain exports and highlight the 
fluctuating state of the export trade under the second Washington administration.  The 
quantitative data for 1793 represents American trade during the first year of the French 
revolutionary wars, 1794 the first year of trade under the Jay Treaty, and 1796 the conclusion of 
Washington’s presidency.  
Table 4.1:  US Grain Exports, 1793-179619 
Year Wheat (bushels) Flour (barrels) Corn (bushels) Meal (bushels) 
1793 1,450,575 1,074,639 1,233,768 189,715 
1794 696,797 846,010 1,505,977 241,570 
1796 31,226 725,194 1,173,552 540,286 
 
A number of trends can be deduced from this export data.  Unprocessed wheat exports virtually 
disappeared, while flour exports experienced a significant decline.  Corn exports are relatively 
stable, while corn meal exports more than doubled between 1793 and 1796.  Superficially, this 
would indicate the influence of wartime conditions on the demand for US grain products, but 
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environmental forces provide a more persuasive explanation for corn as a grain export 
substitution in these years.   
 The Hessian fly infestation affected the supply of American wheat and flour to foreign 
markets.  It first appeared in the northern US during the late 1770s.  By 1794, the valuable wheat 
crops of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Delaware suffered its ravages that then expanded its range 
to Virginia by 1795.20  Geopolitical considerations could influence grain markets, however, the 
dual nature of grain as both a trade commodity and a natural product subject to fluctuating 
growing conditions could complicate even the most open of markets.  With the overall decline of 
wheat and flour, corn, and in particular corn meal, became more important.          
 The overall export statistics provide an overview of the scope and scale of grain exports 
during Washington’s administration.  Tracing the consumption patterns of exported US grain 
provides a key marker to analyze changing trade in the 1790s and to compare to the CO 16 
statistics of the late 1760s and early 1770s.  The American State Papers outline the markets for 
US grain products during the 1790s.  A regional approach is utilized here that follows the 
categories in the CO 16 records (see chapter 2) to allow for a more telling comparison and 
assessment of change over time.      
Table 4.2:  Commodities exported to West Indies, 1793-96 by Total and Percentage of Total US Exports.21 
Year Flour (Barrels) Wheat (Bushels) Corn (Bushels) Corn Meal 
(Bushels) 
Bread 
(Barrels) 
1793 567,767 (53%) 25,017 (2%) 640,878 (52%) 36,843 (97%) 64,992 
(85%) 
1794 322,606 (39%) 2,396 (>1%) 473,173 (32%) 45,433 (93%) 50,033 
(73%) 
1795 274,431 (40%) NA 683,553 (35%) 79,271 (77%) 65,828 
(91%) 
                                                          
20 Brooke Hunter, “Rage for Grain: flour Milling in the Mid-Atlantic, 1750-1815” Ph.D diss, University of 
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1796 524,540 (72%) 1,082 (3%) 793,467 (68%) 427,655 (79%) 128,174 
(71%) 
 
The West Indies remained the most important market for mainland produce, consuming a 
majority of all corn meal and bread exports from 1793-1796 and the majority of flour and corn in 
1793 and 1796.  Within this broad statistical outline, there are some significant trends.  The 
French West Indies and British West Indies remained the most important markets, with the 
Spanish colonies lagging behind.  Demand for flour in the French West Indies remained stable 
after 1793, however, demand for corn and corn meal products collapsed in 1794.  The British 
West Indies demand for wheat and corn products remained relatively stable, with a 
preponderance of imports in the form of corn or corn meal.  The cheaper price of corn products 
shaped this trading pattern.  
 The second major market for US produce was Iberia and southern Europe.  In the State 
papers, this region encapsulated Spain, Portugal, the various Atlantic islands of these two 
powers, and (much less importantly) Italian ports.     
Table 4.3:  Commodities exported to Iberia and southern Europe, 1793-1796 by Total and Percentage of Total US Exports22 
Year Flour (Barrels) Wheat 
(Bushels) 
Corn (Bushels) Corn Meal 
(Bushels) 
Bread 
(Barrels) 
1793 191,905 (18%) 750,805 (52%) 492,335 (40%) 87 (>1%) 767 (1%) 
1794 161,891 (20%) 552,021 (79%) 682,542 (46%) 182 (>1%) 2,621 (4%) 
1795 42,881 (6%) 99,344 (70%) 511,194 (26%) 446 (>1%) 1005 (>1%) 
1796 23,020 (3%) 1,650 (5%) 50,211 (4%) 8,244 (1.5%) 832 (>1%) 
 
In a departure from the West Indies, unmilled wheat and unground corn are the significant export 
commodities, likely the result of the more robust milling capacity in Europe.  The decline in 
wheat and flour can be explained as another manifestation of the Hessian fly crisis, however, the 
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precipitous decline of corn imports requires more explanation.  Unlike the case in the West 
Indies, the progress of the French Revolutionary wars represented both an opportunity and a 
barrier to American commerce.            
 The War of the First Coalition against France encompassed a number of nations 
including Spain.  The collapse of the Toulon campaign (1793), the occupation of San Sebastian 
by French forces, and increasing fears of British designs on Spain’s American empire led to 
Spain’s withdrawal from the Coalition.  In consequence, Great Britain and Spain declared war on 
one another, thereby imperiling Spanish seaborne trade.23  Sir John Jervis’ victory over the 
Spanish fleet at St. Vincent (February 1797) made plain the consequences for Spain’s changed 
alliance.  The introduction of the Royal Navy as a hindrance to US-Spanish trade counteracted 
the political efforts of Spanish and US diplomats to encourage trade between the two nations.           
The Pinckney Treaty of 1795 regularized trade relations between the US and Spain.  
Under articles 15 and 16 of the treaty, liberty and security of trade was guaranteed to merchants 
of both nations.  Included within this guarantee was a provisions that “free ships shall also give 
freedom to goods” with the exception of weapons and other contraband.  Excluded from the 
definition of contraband were “all provisions which were for the sustenance of life.”24  These 
regulations contained two important elements for US trade.  First, the carrying trade with Spain 
was now protected by law.  Second, the definition of contraband explicitly protected American 
agricultural exports to Spain.  Superficially, this should have encouraged trade, but the statistical 
analysis demonstrates that the diplomatic unity was less important that British naval superiority.  
                                                          
23 Charles J. Esdaile, The French Wars, 1792-1815 (London: Routledge, 2001),10-12. 
24 Treaty of Friendship, Limits, and Navigation between Spain and the United States, October 27, 1795. 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/sp1795.asp.  Accessed 24 February 2019.   
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As a result Spain disappeared from the list of the primary trading partners for US grain products, 
and would not return through 1800.25         
The reason for Portugal’s disappearance as a major trading destination in 1796 and 1797 
is less clear given the ongoing alliance between Great Britain and Portugal.  As Spain changed 
sides in the European conflict, Lisbon became an even more important strategic partner for the 
Royal Navy, which included victualing facilities.  Complaints from Admiral Jervis and other 
British naval officers lamenting the lack of provisions available at Lisbon correlates with the 
decline in American grain imports during that time period.26  Reconciling the discrepancy 
between supply and high demand remains elusive. 
Great Britain and Ireland form the third key marketplace for US grain exports.  This trade 
underwent changes in British import duties in 1773 (see chapter 2) that now made direct trade in 
grain products profitable for American merchants.  The 1773 law set tariffs for imported grain 
based on the market price for grain products.  This basic structure remained in place during the 
1790s, introducing a degree of volatility to the marketplace.           
Table 4.4:  Commodities exported to Great Britain and Ireland, 1793-1796 by Total and Percentage of Total US Exports27 
Year Flour (Barrels) Wheat 
(Bushels) 
Corn (Bushels) Corn Meal 
(Bushels) 
Bread 
(Barrels) 
1793 191,947(18%) 539,603 (37%) 1,730 (>1%) 2 (>1%) 679 (>1%) 
1794 77,580 (9%) 46,896 (7%) 15,814 (1%) 56 (>1%) 404 (>1%) 
1795 34,599 (4%) NA 147,727 (8%) 4,488 (4%) 552 (>1%) 
1796 53,622 (7%) 19,720 (63%) 237,504 (20%) 37,913 (7%) 75 (>1%) 
 
                                                          
25 American State Papers, Senate, 2nd-6th Congress, 1st-2nd Sessions, Commerce and Navigation, Vol. 1 (1791-1799). 
26 Martin Robson, “‘A Considerable Portion of the Defence of Empire’: Lisbon and Victualing the Royal Navy 
During the French Revolutionary War, 1793-1802,” Historical Research, Vol. 87, No. 237 (May 2014), 466-490, 
471-72, 477-78.  
27 American State Papers, Senate, 2nd-6th Congress, 1st-2nd Sessions, Commerce and Navigation, Vol. 1. (1791-
1799). 
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The trading pattern from 1793-1796 offers a mixed picture.  Wheat imports are significant in 
1793, and the relative decline of wheat and flour can again be attributed to the Hessian fly 
problem. 
 The fourth primary market for grain during the Washington administration was Europe.  
Although the State papers include a number of European ports stretching from Russia to Iberia, 
the only ports to record any imports of US grain during the period were France and the Hanse 
towns of Hamburg and Bremen.  One of the benefits of independence was that US merchants 
could now take advantage of opportunities closed to them during the colonial period.       
Table 4.5:  Commodities exported to Europe (other) 1793-1796 by Total and Percentage of Total US Exports.28 
Year Flour (Barrels) Wheat 
(Bushels) 
Corn (Bushels) Corn Meal 
(Bushels) 
Bread 
(barrels) 
1793 2,052 (>1%) 117,485 (8%) 6,251 (>1%) NA 128 (1%) 
1794 88,368 (11%) 69,150 (10%) 9,400 (>1%) 348 (>1%) 588 (>1%) 
1795 174,064 (25%) 41,929 (30%) 513,351 (27%) 16,951 (17%) 6153 (8%) 
1796 88,696 (12%) 3,350 (10%) 107,637 (9%) 62,103 (11%) 904 (>1%) 
 
Despite Washington’s neutrality proclamation and the threat of the Royal Navy, opportunities 
outweighed the risks for US grain merchants trading with France in 1794.  Racked by famine and 
misgovernment, France faced starvation.  Under protection of the French fleet, an American 
convoy delivered 24 million pounds of grain to the embattled nation.  Threatened by recent bread 
riots, this crucial import provided an important measure of internal stability though at an 
extraordinary cost to French naval forces.  The increasing superiority of the Royal Navy, 
however, soon curtailed further large merchant convoys from reaching France.  By mid-1795 it 
was clear that the French navy could not secure safe passage through the blockade.   
                                                          
28 American State Papers, Senate, 2nd-6th Congress, 1st-2nd Sessions, Commerce and Navigation, Vol. 1. (1791-1799). 
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Fortunately for France, victory on land provided other sources of grain and diminished 
the immediate need for grain imports.29  Other economic considerations intervened into this new 
trading relationship.  The value of US grain and tobacco entering France far exceeded the value 
of French products sold in return.  The resulting trade imbalance was covered by specie, thereby 
making American grain an expense on the French treasury.  Exacerbating this injury, Americans 
used the specie from France to cover their own imbalance of trade with Great Britain.  Indirectly, 
the ultimate beneficiary of US-French trade was Great Britain, even though at war with France.30  
Even at this early stage of the long war, it was clear that US grain exports would benefit the 
British Empire in one way or another and could only cross the Atlantic with some British 
acquiescence. 
 By the end of Washington’s presidency in 1796, the US had avoided directly 
participating in the war that embroiled Europe.  However, isolationism was not a possibly for the 
US as the strong links between the American economy, Europe, and the European empires could 
not be severed.  In parting, Washington offered a few words of sage advice that had guided his 
administration through a perilous time:      
The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending our 
commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as 
possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled 
with perfect good faith. Here let us stop. Europe has a set of primary interests 
which to us have none; or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged 
in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our 
concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by 
artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary 
combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.31  
  
                                                          
29 Peter P. Hill, “Prologue to the Quasi-War:  Stresses in Franco-American Commercial Relations, 1793-96,” The 
Journal of Modern History, Vol. 49, No. 1 (March 1977), D1039-D1069, D1040-43. 
30 Hill, “Prologue to the Quasi-War”, D1046. 
31 George Washington, Farewell Address, 1796.  http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp. Accessed 24 
February 2019. 
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Washington’s address was predicated on a seemingly simple principle.  By remaining politically 
neutral but economically engaged with other nations, the US could reap the benefits of economic 
development without the costs associated with conflict. Underlying this assertion, however, was 
the unexamined assumption that the various European powers would continue to view commerce 
and politics as distinct from one another.  The world of 1796 had a place for neutral trade, but 
whether or not those circumstances could survive the changes wrought by an increasingly 
desperate war remained unclear.  
The incoming administration of John Adams followed the theory espoused in 
Washington’s Farewell Address.  In his inaugural address in 1797, President Adams noted that  
Indeed, whatever may be the issue of the negotiation with France, and whether 
the war in Europe is or is not to continue, I hold it most certain that permanent 
tranquillity and order will not soon be obtained.  The commerce of the United 
States is essential, if not to their existence, at least to their comfort, their 
growth, prosperity, and happiness. The genius, character, and habits of the 
people are highly commercial. Their cities have been formed and exist upon 
commerce. Our agriculture, fisheries, arts, and manufactures are connected 
with and depend upon it. In short, commerce has made this country what it is, 
and it can not be destroyed or neglected without involving the people in 
poverty and distress.32 
 Adams closely echoed Washington.  Political engagement and economic relations must remain 
distinct.  This is particularly important as the wars sparked by the French Revolution continued 
to expand across Europe and to the West Indies.  As the war spread, more American commercial 
interests would inevitably be affected.  Adams elaborates on the rationale for preserving the 
status quo as a matter of mutual advantage and interdependence.  In his formulation, each nation 
had a vested interest in supporting American neutrality and by extension American trade.       
                                                          
32 John Adams, First Annual Message of John Adams, 22 November 1797. 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/adamsme1.asp. Accessed 24 February 2019.   
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 Adams’ framework can be directly applied to the grain trade.  The statistics for the first 
and concluding year of his administration follow.    
 
 
Table 4.6:  American Grain Exports by Year, 1797-180033 
Year Wheat (Bushels) Flour (Barrels) Corn (Bushels) Meal (Bushels) 
1797 15,655 515,633 804,922 234,799 
1800 26,853 653,052 1,694,327 338,103 
 
In overall volume, 1797 and 1800 are consistent with the returns from Washington’s 
administration in the wake of the Hessian fly crisis of 1795.  Wheat and flour exports remained 
depressed, while those for corn and corn meal continued to be robust.   
The overall data, however, conceals a significant shift in the US grain trade during the 
Adams administration.  When analyzed by market, a new and somewhat unusual pattern 
emerges.    
Table 4.7:  US Exports by Market, 1797-179934 
Year Exported 
to/Amount Wheat 
(bushels) 
Flour (barrels) Corn (bushels) Meal (bushels) 
1797 Spain: 6,400 
Portugal: 5,246 
BNA: 3,340 
Madeira: 583 
 
FWI: 148,774 
BWI: 79,870 
Danish WI: 
72,682 
Spanish WI: 
65,966 
Dutch WI: 
26,870 
BWI: 245,975 
Danish WI: 
140,976 
FWI: 129,678 
SWI: 89,465 
Madeira: 56,658 
Danish WI: 
131,758 
BWI: 45,544 
SWI: 36,776 
FWI: 10,701 
WI (general): 
9,297 
                                                          
33 Pitkin, A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States, 91, 100. 
34 American State Papers, Senate, 2nd-6th Congress, 1st-2nd Sessions, Commerce and Navigation, Vol. 1. (1791-1799). 
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1799 BNA:  7,703 
Madeira: 2,353 
BWI: 198,958 
Spanish WI: 
99,107 
Danish WI: 
64,561 
Dutch WI: 
50,883 
FWI: 39,560 
BWI: 495,721 
Portugal: 
350,192 
WI (general): 
90,000 
BNA: 77,957 
Madeira: 65,945 
BWI: 100,000 
Danish WI: 
97,527 
SWI: 15,695 
Dutch WI: 
13,532 
 
The West Indies had long been a significant market for American agricultural exports.  The State 
Papers hint that this relationship represents almost the entirety of American exports for these two 
sample years.  Beyond the corn trade with Portugal, British North America, and Madeira in 
1799, every entry of any quantitative significance is from the West Indies. The reasons for this 
change are many.  The trade with France had collapsed due to the expansion of French-occupied 
territory in Europe that could supply grain, and the expense of American provisions in relation to 
French exports to the US.  The Spanish trade was interdicted by the British Royal Navy, and 
trade with Britain itself competed with increasing imports from Ireland.35    
 Overall, the 1790s under the Federalist administrations of Washington and Adams saw 
the continuation of a grain export economy that retained most features of the colonial era. The 
war in Europe fueled slight variations, but the theme remained familiar.  With the exception of 
exports to continental France between 1793 and 1795 (as a result of wartime increased demand) 
and a collapse in exports to the French West Indies in 1799 (due to the tensions of the Quasi-
War), the pattern remained largely consistent with the CO 16 era of 1768-1772.     
The election of 1800 ushered in a new political party, and, in theory, a new combination 
of domestic and international interests that would affect trade relations with the rest of the 
                                                          
35 “Account of the quantity of Grain, Meal, and Flour Imported and Exported from Great Britain, 1792-1814”  
House of Commons Papers, Vol. 10. https://parlipapers-proquest-
com.prxy4.ursus.maine.edu/parlipapers/result/pqpdocumentview?accountid=14583&groupid=95895&pgId=121d6b
c4-48a9-4756-b466-30ab4f507c9a&rsId=1688BA45E09     
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Atlantic world.  The revolution of 1800 was momentous as a peaceful transfer of political power 
from one rival faction to another for the first time under the Constitution, yet it did not loom 
significant in terms of commercial policy.  According to historian Drew McCoy, the political 
economy of Thomas Jefferson’s yeoman republic depended on three factors:  “a national 
government free from any taint of corruption, an unobstructed access to an ample supply of open 
land, and a relatively liberal international commercial order that would offer adequate foreign 
markets for America’s flourishing agricultural surplus.”36  
Despite significant disagreements between Federalists and Democratic-Republicans on 
the existence of corruption within the federal government, these last two elements of the yeoman 
ideal suggests continuity between the two parties as both believed in westward expansion and 
continued engagement in the Atlantic economy.  In isolation, this would have resulted in a 
reasonably stable political economy for the early republic.  Jefferson’s inaugural address closely 
echoed the themes already noted by Washington and Adams:   
The assurances, indeed, of friendly disposition, received from all the powers with 
whom we have principal relations, had inspired a confidence that our peace with 
them would not have been disturbed. But a cessation of the irregularities which 
had effected the commerce of neutral nations, and of the irritations and injuries 
produced by them, cannot but add to this confidence; and strengthens, at the same 
time, the hope, that wrongs committed on offending friends, under a pressure of 
circumstances, will now be reviewed with candor, and will be considered as 
founding just claims of retribution for the past and new assurances for the future 
…We cannot, indeed, but all feel an anxious solicitude for the difficulties under 
which our carrying trade will soon be placed. How far it can be relieved, 
otherwise than by time, is a subject of important consideration.37 
 
Jefferson’s oblique reference to the Quasi-War with France was an implicit criticism of 
Adams and recast those circumstances as a temporary deviation from the correct 
                                                          
36 McCoy, The Elusive Republic, 186. 
37 Thomas Jefferson, First Annual Message to Congress, 8 December 1801.  
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jeffmes1.asp. Accessed 24 February 2019.   
128 
 
principles of US diplomacy.  At a deeper level, Jefferson connects his proposed foreign 
policy to Washington’s farewell and Adams’ first inaugural address.  Philosophically, 
each of them are promoting neutral American economic intercourse without the 
encumbrance of any political connection.  Despite the similar goals for encouraging US 
commerce, the two political parties differed on how that goal should be pursued.  
Jefferson and the Democratic-Republicans were ideologically favorable to France and 
less accepting of Adams’ and the Federalist closer relationship with Britain.   
According to Eliga Gould, this transition in attitude toward Great Britain meant 
that “there was bound to be trouble.”38  His analysis is correct in part.  The potential 
sources for trouble stretched beyond the bilateral relations between the US and Great 
Britain, which represented only one part of a multi-sided puzzle.  In his 1922 work The 
Continental System:  An Economic Interpretation, Eli Heckscher uncovered evidence 
from as early as 1801 that indicated that Napoleon’s general economic strategy in the war 
was to impoverish Britain by denying it access to continental markets.39  Thus, 
Jefferson’s adherence to American neutral trade, the seeds of the Continental System, and 
the British responses to the system as manifested in the Orders-in-Council also have their 
roots in 1801.   
Although the multi-national framework supporting neutral trade had begun its decline, 
the actual practice of the grain trade remained robust.   
The quantitative data for wheat and flour exports during the first Jefferson administration 
follow.  
 
                                                          
38 Gould, Among the Powers of the Earth, 142. 
39 Heckscher, The Continental System, 78. 
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Table 4.8:  US Flour Exports (Barrels), 1800-180340 
Region 1800 1801 1802 1803 
Great Britain 172,815 479,720 208,744 203,127 
Iberia 21,067 74,182 173,398 291,944 
West Indies 411,611 497,021 558,316 592,488 
Europe Other  0 0 24,683 26,740 
 
The table illustrates four key points.  First, the West Indian market remained the most important 
destination for US flour exports by volume and consistency.  Moreover, the British West Indies 
remained its most important component during this period.  Trade with the French West Indies 
was also robust, while the Spanish, Dutch, and Danish islands represented lesser markets.  
Second, demand for Iberia was variable but increased over time.  This reflected the broader 
patterns of war.  Spain was allied to France until the peace of Amiens in 1802, and peace 
increased the availability of seaborne trade by removing the Royal Navy as a barrier.   
Third, the flour trade with Great Britain was significant and increasing.  This represents a 
change in trading patterns as Great Britain was not a traditionally significant market for 
American flour exports.  Historian W. Freeman Galpin’s research on the British grain trade does 
present insight into this branch of American trade.  The harvests of 1800 and 1801 in Britain 
suffered from heavy rain, frost, and wind damage.  In order to preserve domestic peace, 
                                                          
40 Pitkin, A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States, 126. Great Britain was the only significant market 
for unprocessed wheat during this period: 216,977 bushels (1801), 201,250 (1802), 234,386 (1803). See Pitkin, 125. 
Changes in the format of US Treasury reports to Congress after 1800 result in data that does not consistently itemize 
exports of these commodities or link them to their recipients.  Rather, the returns provide an aggregated value of all 
exports to a given trading partner and an aggregated total amount of each exported item to all trading partners.    
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Parliament undertook a remarkably vigorous system of public relief measures including 
forbidding the distillation of grain, subscriptions to provide grain at cost to the less fortunate, and 
direct charity.  A bounty was established until October 1800 to subsidize the importation of 
foreign grain.41  Despite these measures, the price of grain continued to rise, which threatened 
social stability and compelled the government to allow imports from anywhere without regard to 
its source or the nation of the ships carrying it.  Thus a combination of environmental factors 
limiting domestic production and political concerns provided a broader market for US producers. 
The fourth important lesson here is the absence of exports to the rest of Europe (other 
than the famine years of 1794-96, associated with the French Revolution).  While not surprising 
in and of itself, its significance arises when these statistics are considered in light of the growing 
conflict between Great Britain and the US over the carrying trade.  The carrying trade 
complicated the US trading pattern by conflating domestically produced goods with foreign 
products being transported under the neutral American flag.  The carrying trade denoted the use 
of neutral American ships to transport the produce of European overseas colonies to the 
continent of Europe.  This protected the colonial goods from capture by the British navy and 
provided a new source of profits for US merchant interests.  There is a distinct difference 
between American trade patterns with Great Britain and French-influenced continental Europe 
revealed here. These profits came at a political cost. By combining American domestic produce 
with the carrying trade, British officials suspected that all American trade subverted the 
European blockade, and US official documents could not abate this suspicion since the export 
                                                          
41 Galpin, Grain Supply of England, 10, 14.    
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value of domestic produce and the broader carrying trade was not differentiated in government 
statistics until 1803.42  
Thomas Jefferson provided the most cogent outline of his political and economic 
philosophy in his second inaugural address in March 1805. The address clearly voiced the 
principles of his first administration and provided a guideline for his remaining time in office as 
well as for the Madison administration that would follow.  He noted with satisfaction that the 
United States “endeavored to cultivate the friendship of all nations...and cherished mutual 
interests and intercourse on fair and equal terms.”43 Peace and trade abroad supported Jefferson’s 
domestic agenda as well. The scourge of internal taxes could be avoided through a combination 
of frugality and revenuebs derived from taxes placed on imports, which were “paid cheerfully by 
those who can afford to add foreign luxuries to domestic comforts.”44  The happy coalescence 
betwrokeneen Jeffersonian political ideology and fiscal policy was based on maintaining peace 
and trade relations between the United States and as much of Europe as possible.  Without this 
source of income from imports, the contradiction within Jeffersonian political economy—that a 
frugal national government could have the funds to operate, pay the national debt, and resist 
internal taxation—could not be sustained.  This imperative informed the deep and long-standing 
economic priorities for US government leaders that persisted from the colonial period to the 
early national one and defied easy modification. 
The grain trade in Jefferson’s second administration remained robust.  Grain represented 
a significant portion of American domestic exports.  The pattern of where the grain trade went, 
                                                          
42 Timothy Pitkin, A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States, 2nd edition (New York: Hamlen and 
Newton, 1817), 35. 
43 Thomas Jefferson, “Second Inaugural Address” (Washington, DC, 4 March 1805), 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau2.asp.  . 
44 Thomas Jefferson, “Second Inaugural Address.” http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau2.asp. Accessed 
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however, is mixed.  As Table 4.9 shows, the West Indies markets remained the most important, 
while the Iberia and continental Europe were relatively flat from the previous four years.  Trade 
with Great Britain plunged in 1804 and did not recover until 1807. 
Table 4.9:  US Flour Exports (Barrels), 1805-0745 
Region 1804 1805 1806 1807 
Great Britain 7,140 36,752 127,619 323,968 
Iberia 205,807 149,406 136,699 157,156 
West Indies 511,950 528,130 410,201 640,758 
Europe Other  4,115 4,395 23,217 20,255 
 
The comparative statistics for exports to Great Britain between Jefferson’s first and second 
administrations declined.  This was not, however, due to growing political tensions between the 
two governments.  Improved harvests in 1804 and 1805 and peace between Prussia and Great 
Britain provided both an increased domestic supply and an alternative source.  Napoleon’s 
dismantling of Prussia at Jena and Auerstadt  in October 1806 stimulated Anglo-American trade 
for the final year above.46       
The financially beneficial situation for the US as a neutral player in foreign affairs began 
to end in 1805.  In the decade following Jay’s Treaty with Great Britain, as historian Eliga Gould 
notes, “the United States became, with Britain’s tacit consent, the most important neutral carrier 
in the Western hemisphere…..during which US merchants engrossed the carrying trade of 
France, Spain, and eventually, Britain.”47  Whether this trade existed as a matter of right under 
international law (as Jefferson proposed) or by British sufferance (and thereby subject to 
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46 Galpin, Grain Supply of England, 142-145. 
47 Gould, Among the Powers of the Earth, 142. 
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unilateral reinterpretation) was undefined.  The primary point of conflict between the United 
States and Great Britain in 1805 was not over American exports, but rather the carrying trade. 
The carrying trade doctrine stipulated that if the goods were first landed in the United States, 
they would be ‘naturalized’ as American goods. This is known as the “broken voyage” rule. As 
French power expanded in continental Europe and British naval power destroyed the capacity of 
France to maintain a presence at sea, economic warfare between the two powers was inevitable.  
In July 1805, a British court ruled in the Essex decision that the “broken voyage” rule 
was illegal.48  In essence, under British law the carrying trade was reinterpreted to constitute a 
breach of the Royal Navy’s blockade of Europe.  The Jefferson administration protested this 
change without success.  The Essex case was the first manifestation of a rapidly escalating 
economic conflict between France and Great Britain that would virtually eliminate neutral trade 
and placed the US in a difficult (if not impossible) commercial situation.               
For James Stephens, a British writer with extensive connections to the British 
government and Admiralty, US neutral trade with France denied Britain’s rights as a belligerent 
power.  Particularly, Stephens argued that American trade between France and French colonies 
in the Caribbean violated Britain’s blockade because it was illegal for US ships to conduct that 
trade in peacetime.  Known as “the rule of ’56,” this unilateral policy attempted to manage 
neutral trade based on a broad application of policy rather than the actual content of each ship’s 
cargo.  
This more stringent interpretation of neutral trade redefined the carrying trade as illegal 
commerce which could rightfully be interdicted by force.  American trade was really French 
trade hidden behind the neutral flag of the United States.  In Stephens’ analysis, in earlier wars 
                                                          
48 Perkins, Prologue to War, 97.  
134 
 
British sea power transferred French colonial holdings from an asset into an expensive liability. 
US interference allowed France to enjoy the benefits of a colonial empire without paying to 
sustain a navy or merchant marine to conduct colonial trade.  Therefore, according to Stephens, 
Britain was justified in interdicting neutral trade with France as a means of prosecuting the war 
and starving the French treasury of funds.49  Thus, the Polly case in 1800 did not prejudice the 
question of any future restrictions by the Royal Navy as the case did not set a binding precedent 
under international law.    
Not surprisingly, the US government and American popular opinion rejected Stephens’ 
interpretation of international law.  Moreover, the Jefferson administration was much less 
flexible towards British demands than that of Washington had been. In a response to War in 
Disguise, Secretary of State James Madison wrote that neutral trade should not be interfered with 
because neutrals form “a trade auxiliary to his prosperity and his revenue” by “liberating his 
naval facilities for war.”  Not only was American trade beneficial for Great Britain, international 
law did not allow for a belligerent power to interdict neutral trade, unless the vessel was carrying 
“instruments of war” or was entering a blockaded port.  Any further control of trade between a 
neutral and a belligerent power was illegal, and British efforts to redefine belligerent and neutral 
rights to constrain the US carrying trade were illegitimate.50  In essence, the Polly case was a 
binding precedent, and the Essex decision abrogated settled international law.     
Madison was correct that US trade benefitted Great Britain, whose imports of American 
goods included significant amounts of cotton, provisions, and other imports.  However, Madison 
disregarded two important variables.  The British merchant marine could still trade under its own 
flag through the protection of the Royal Navy. Napoleonic Europe faced opposition from the 
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Royal Navy, which posed an increasingly effective barrier against seaborne trade.  Simply stated, 
Great Britain could protect its merchant marine, while Napoleon could not.   
At its roots, the argument between Stephens and Madison rested on two factors.  First, the 
expansion of Napoleon’s European empire left the US as the only major neutral trading power.  
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the legal protection for foreign produce ‘naturalized’ by 
American carriage in addition to the bona fide export of grain, lumber, and other commodities 
raised in the US were the same in Jefferson and Madison’s conception of trade. Both should be 
protected under the rules of neutrality regardless of what the product was or its point of origin. 
International law protected all trade except in cases of a strict blockade of individual enemy ports 
and provided a narrow definition of contraband. Trade interdiction should be a case-by-case 
system of management rather than a broad statement of general policy as advocated by Stephens. 
Responses to the growing conflict reflect the complicated and intertwined nature of trade.  
The place of American produce within the broader carrying trade provoked criticism in the 
United States as well as in Great Britain. The carrying trade, according to the American 
pamphleteer “Columella,” was positively dangerous to Americans. Writing in 1806, Columella 
wrote, “there are foul vices growing and flourishing among us, and they deserve to be vigorously 
struck at. Those who, by their unlawful procedures… have implicated their country in a dispute 
with which the community in general has not immediate concern, except the dread that its 
consequences may be generally ruinous.”51 In essence, tying together domestic and foreign-
sourced commerce threatened to embroil the entire United States into a conflict for the benefit of 
a small handful of merchants. 
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Prominent Jeffersonian political figures echoed Columella’s critique. In an 1806 speech 
before Congress, the arch-conservative Democratic-Republican Representative John Randolph of 
Virginia forcefully noted that the debates over foreign trade was not just about the relationship 
between nations, but also about the relationship between factions within the United States.  To 
him, the carrying trade only “covers enemy’s property” rather than the “fair, the honest, the 
useful trade that is engaged in when carrying our own productions to foreign markets, and 
bringing back their productions in exchange.”  He regarded any potential conflict with Britain 
over the carrying trade as a “fungus of war” that would promote the urban-merchant interest over 
the true agricultural interests of America.52  Randolph represented an older strand of Democratic-
Republican political theory that was waning, but his reaction towards federal use of economic 
restrictions as policy encapsulated a key strand of the domestic debate in sharply divided 
American political opinion.   
Conversely, some British observers criticized the British stance on the carrying trade.  
Alexander Baring, a merchant with close ties to Philadelphia’s banking community noted  
By assuming that rule to be law [law of ’56], and that our not enforcing it was the 
effect of our indulgence, all the privileges which the neutral held, as he thought by 
right, were considered by us to be held by sufferance; a doctrine which enables us 
to establish the most inconsistent practice under the mask of the most consistent 
theory.53  
 
Baring’s criticism rests on two grounds.  First, the law was inconsistently enforced and created 
an uncertain legal climate that introduced more risk into an international economic system 
already brimming over with geopolitical uncertainty.    
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Second, the authority for the rule of ’56 rested on the British government’s interpretation 
of maritime law rather than under a generally accepted international interpretation.  This hints at 
another, more fundamental debate on the place of the US in the Atlantic World.  Although Jay’s 
Treaty did recognize the US as a treaty-worthy partner for the nations of Europe, the real power 
disparity between the new republic and the European empires remained.  In the absence of clear 
international law, Britain could, and did, interpret the existing norms of international customs to 
its own advantage.  By 1805, the calculation between allowing Americans freer access to 
continental markets and restricting that access changed due to wartime policy.      
The pamphlet conflict reflected an underlying reality.  From 1803 to the embargo in 1807, 
American exports remain relatively steady, while the carrying trade (re-exports) dramatically 
increased in value.54  Pitkin’s statistics demonstrate the increasing importance of these 
philosophical debates.  While domestic produce of grain and other products remained important, 
an increasing percentage of American trade was in re-exports.  There is a strong correlation in 
these trades.  British imports from the US consisted primarily of domestic produce.  Trade with 
continental Europe consisted primarily of carrying trade re-exports. Separating the two strands 
was not possible for US trade without ruinous consequences, but the clearly bifurcated trading 
pattern provided a rationale for British efforts to reinstitute the rule of ’56. In an unhappy 
coincidence, the increasingly desperate war in Europe and British efforts to weaken Napoleon 
economically through naval power collided with the increasing importance of the carrying trade 
to the US and had dramatic consequences. 
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President Jefferson’s hostility towards British trade policies and desire to promote US 
economic interests resulted in the first of several laws in 1806 that attempted to use economic 
policy to influence British treatment of the US.  In that year, Congress passed a limited non-
importation act prohibiting a few British goods of little consequence that did not take effect until 
November 1807.  In addition, imports from British colonies were excluded from the act.55  
Despite the ineffective nature of the Non-Importation Act of 1806, it implemented the Jefferson 
administration’s interpretation of international trade law as presented in Madison’s War Without 
Disguise.  The loopholes within the law that permitted the most profitable sectors of British trade 
to proceed unhindered were also a precursor to the problems that would plague future 
Democratic-Republican economic policies.  In short, it proved impossible to meaningfully 
restrict British trade without harming US economic interests at the same time.  
Napoleon’s Berlin Decree in November 1806 marked the beginning of systemic 
economic warfare between France and Great Britain through the implementation of the 
Continental System.  From 1793 to 1806, the relative balance of naval power between Britain 
and France as well as the existence of other neutral trading partners limited interference with US 
trade; however, the intensifying war left the United States and its trade interests vulnerable to the 
larger powers even as the federal government attempted to assert US commercial rights.   
The declaration of economic warfare inaugurated reciprocal measures by Britain and 
France designed to bankrupt their enemy and thus destroy their fiscal capacity to conduct war.  
Similar and less systemic measures of this sort already existed, however, the new measures 
eliminated neutral trade.  Under the terms of the decree, Great Britain was declared blockaded, 
all ships and goods from Britain or its colonies were subject to seizure, and any trading vessel 
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that called on any port within the British Empire was refused access to any continental market 
under French control.56  In response and reprisal, the British government issued the Orders-in- 
Council of January 1807, under which the whole of Europe was declared blockaded unless legal 
trade was allowed to British merchant ships.  Further, the coasting trade in Europe was also 
barred.  Taken together, neutral trade was officially illegal in the eyes both superpowers.   
National interests, perceived national interests, and pride also factored in to economic 
choices.  Outside of economic regulations that affected American commerce, Britain also 
asserted the right to stop and inspect United States merchant ship to search for deserters from the 
Royal Navy, which caused consternation in the United States and cast British efforts to 
reconfigure trade patterns in a dark light.  A memorial from the New Haven Chamber of 
Commerce to President Jefferson outlines the basic complaints against the over-exertion of 
British power and its impingement on American independence.  The chamber expressed outrage 
at British interference with American trade and “the unwarrantable impressment of seamen” and 
expressed the willingness of the Chamber to support “every measure of government calculated to 
accomplish this important object.”57 
Impressment almost resulted in war in 1807; removing sailors from private vessels may 
create indignation but firing on a vessel of the US navy could have been considered an overt act 
of war.  In June 1807, the HMS Leopard caused an international scandal by firing on the USS 
Chesapeake in an effort to recover four British deserters sailing on that ship.  Three men were 
killed and sixteen wounded; all four alleged deserters were taken aboard the Leopard.58  Britain 
did disavow the action and returned the three surviving sailors, but the incident soured Anglo-
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American relations.  President Jefferson concluded that the limited non-importation law was 
ineffective, and the Leopard incident gave him the political capital to advance a more aggressive 
policy.   
 Addressing Congress in October 1807, Jefferson outlined a series of British abuses of 
American trading rights.  Beyond the problem of impressment and the particular case of the 
Leopard and Chesapeake, British interference in American trade was unsustainable both 
politically and economically.  
The Government of that nation [Great Britain] has issued an order interdicting all 
trade by neutrals between ports not in amity with them; and being now at war 
with nearly every nation on the Atlantic and Mediterranean seas, our vessels are 
required to sacrifice their cargos at the first port they touch or to return home 
without the benefit of going to any other market. Under this new law of the ocean 
our trade on the Mediterranean has been swept away by seizures and 
condemnations, and that in other seas is threatened with the same fate.59 
 
Without an effective means of resisting British incursions by force, and with negotiations 
seemingly fruitless, a new approach was required.   
A new policy proposed by Jefferson took a form that the New Haven Chamber would not 
have expected or supported.  While the Chamber had argued that “our citizens have already 
formed commercial habits, which are too firmly established to yield to a different policy,” it also 
believed that “the commerce of the country will amply reimburse the necessary expenses of 
protection.”60  New Haven’s opposition to trade restrictions was typical for New England port 
cities that relied on foreign trade for economic survival. However, Jefferson paid little heed to 
the merchant interests.  Instead, Jefferson called for a complete embargo on all US foreign trade. 
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Previous experience suggested that denying Europe access to American consumers would 
succeed in securing political concessions.  Jefferson’s policy built on memories of boycotts 
against British colonial trade management in the 1760s and 1770s, when popular action against 
colonial taxation policies such as the Stamp and Townsend Acts caused changes in British policy 
based on the real or perceived effects of American market closures on the British economy. This 
view of the past success of economic coercion shaped Jefferson’s economic policies.  As the 
historian Doron Ben-Atar notes, the embargo was the “culmination of Jefferson’s long-held 
commercial views” that “American commerce could be used as an instrument for forcing the 
belligerent nations to do American justice and to respect the republic’s honor.” In this 
assessment the Embargo Act was the product of a genuine ideological stance that saw little value 
in merchants, in general, and of British merchants, in particular.61 
Under the terms of the embargo, the United States would not engage in foreign trade until 
its rights as a neutral power were respected by Britain and France. The possibility of war in 1807 
over the Leopard incident drew into question the ability of the United States government to pay 
for war for the first time under Jefferson. In his 1807 Report on the State of Finances, Treasury 
Secretary Albert Gallatin proposed a basic principal of Jeffersonian-Republican fiscal policy in 
the case of war.  In all circumstances, sufficient revenue must be collected to fund the peace time 
establishment, pay interest on existing debt, and the interest on any debt sustained as a result of 
war expenses.  Further, loans were preferable to increased taxation to meet extraordinary 
expenses as loans were the product of accumulated capital rather than a burden on citizens.62  In 
the fall of 1807, Gallatin informed Congress that the only way that a war could be funded 
                                                          
61 Ben-Atar, The Origins of Jeffersonian Commercial Policy and Diplomacy, 165–67. 
62 Albert Gallatin, “State of the Finances” 7 November 1807. American State Papers:  Finance 2: 248-49. 
142 
 
through loans and investment in government securities would be by capitalists whose money was 
idle under the embargo law.63  The US lacked an adequate system of internal taxation to fund a 
war in the absence of substantial private investments into the war effort.   
The American Embargo Act was only one of several trade restriction measures passed in 
winter 1807. British Orders-in-Council in November and December 1807 prohibited all neutral 
trade with Europe unless the vessel first entered a British port.64  Napoleon’s first Milan Decree 
of November 1807 further stipulated that any British goods on any vessel, or the cargo of any 
vessel that stopped at a British port trading with Europe, should be confiscated as contraband.65  
The second Milan Decree the next month stipulated that any trading vessel that submitted to 
British inspection on the high seas, visited Britain, or paid any British duties were declared 
British property for purposes of French law.66  This was a perverse reapplication of earlier 
policies governing Anglo-American trade under the Polly doctrine of 1800.  Landing in a British 
port naturalized the imported products as British goods. These decrees transferred what had been 
an ad hoc arrangement into the official economic and political policy of all European territory 
under the control of Napoleonic France, which by 1807 included all of Europe outside of Russia 
and Portugal.   
 Taken together, the embargo, Orders-in-Council, and the Milan Decrees created multi-
sided political and practical difficulties.  By the dawn of 1808, foreign diplomacy, domestic 
politics, and the very real problems of enforcement combined to complicate Jefferson’s designs.  
The effort was not automatically doomed to failure, as it did create a series of conversations in 
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the British press about the role of American neutral trade.  Interested parties on both sides of the 
Atlantic sought to manage the situation to gain advantage from the morass.         
Some British merchants stressed the public benefits of accommodating American 
demands. Alexander Baring noted that the true beneficiary of increased US trade with Europe 
was actually Great Britain. The trade surplus Britain had with the United States covered the trade 
deficit with other trading partners. Even more importantly, the trade surplus enabled Great 
Britain to sustain the war effort against Napoleon:  
I [Baring] have shewn, that, even supposing the cordial co-operation of America 
in the execution of the Orders in council, there would be a diminution of our 
receipts from the continent of four or five millions sterling.  The moderate state of 
our foreign exchanges for some time past, shews how much we want this large 
aid, which our American connection indirectly afforded….In this manner we have 
paid to a considerable extent, for the support of our fleets and armies in the 
Mediterranean and the Baltic, and by sending our manufactures to America; a 
circumstance which must be easily understood by those who know the effect of 
the general circulation of exchanges, and that bills are frequently drawn in Paris, 
or Madrid, whilst the real transaction in merchandize, which gave rise to them 
may have taken place in Russia or in India.67  
  
Other British commentators offered a more systemic examination of the crisis.  Citing the 
existence of immutable economic laws, “A Merchant of the Old School” noted that    
It was, no doubt, the speculation of that consistent Christian character, the author 
of “War in Disguise,” and of the other ingenious persons who devised these 
measures, that they will curb the enemy’s trade, and get rid also of every rival, by 
destroying the traffic of our friends.  Unhappily for the speculation, there is a 
contradiction involved with this fine plan.  It happens unluckily, that in every 
description of trade there must be a buyer as well as a seller.  We must have some 
customer able to pay for our goods, otherwise we need not manufacture them, for 
we cannot sell them.68    
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This exchange presents a series of familiar arguments.  Whether wealth could be gained via the 
control of trade or through allowing trade to proceed unhindered echoed the arguments set forth 
by Adam Smith and the debates of the 1780s on the place of post-war American trade with Great 
Britain.  Both emphasized the benefits of accommodation, but not necessarily for the reasons that 
Jefferson or Madison would have embraced.  Rather than presenting an argument supporting the 
political rights of the US as a neutral power, both see concessions to the US as a matter of self-
interest for Great Britain.  Providing money for the struggle against Napoleon by drawing wealth 
out of his own dominions was the key goal, and US interests were incidental to pursuing British 
goals.   
While British merchants did criticize British policies, some Americans reacted with 
striking outrage toward Jefferson. The Boston Chamber of Commerce had supported protests 
against impressment by the Royal Navy, but also warned that “the habits of the country, so long 
and firmly established could not be suddenly changed, without producing consequences the most 
distressing and destructive.”69 Boston’s opposition to trade restrictions was typical for New 
England port cities that relied on foreign trade for economic survival. The goal was the 
protection for trade, not an embargo of undefined duration.  American farmers and grain 
merchants also suffered without dependable foreign markets.  In his travels through the US, John 
Lambert discovered in his visit to New York City that “after the embargo took place, the price of 
provisions fell to nearly half… and European commodities rose in proportion.”70    
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Ineffective enforcement, domestic opposition, and the lack of apparent effect on British 
or French policies created three difficulties for Jefferson’s embargo. Even more serious was the 
effect of the law on the nation’s fiscal condition. Income from customs duties provided 
approximately 96% of federal revenue in fiscal year 1807.71   Treasury Secretary Albert 
Gallatin’s December 1808 report to Congress noted that “if the embargo and suspension of 
commerce shall be continued, the revenue arising from commerce will, in a short time, entirely 
disappear.”72 From fiscal year 1808 to 1809, federal tax revenues fell by over 50%, and a budget 
surplus of $7 million became a deficit of $2.5 million.73  This loss would be unsustainable unless 
a radically new and politically unsustainable program of internal taxation was created to fund 
government operations.   
President Jefferson’s eighth annual address to Congress in November 1808 signaled the 
end of the embargo. Although neither Great Britain nor France rescinded the trade regulations 
that led to the embargo, Jefferson attempted to claim the benefits of the law outweighed the 
costs. The experiment failed in extracting concessions from foreign powers, but the protection 
offered to American seamen from impressment and property from seizure was an adequate 
repayment for the privations caused by the law.74 In essence, this protection was bought at the 
price of idling a lucrative sector of the American economy, capital resources, and widespread 
unemployment for laborers in a multitude of trade-related occupations. Historians have been 
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severe in their assessment of Jefferson for good reason. The embargo’s actual impact on France 
and Great Britain was negligible. As a practical matter, the Royal Navy already succeeded in 
interdicting direct trade between France and its colonies.  According to historian Bradford 
Perkins, Napoleon saw little value in the produce of the few remaining colonies. In Britain, the 
embargo caused a rise in the price of grain and disrupted a few minor elements of the economy 
such as linen production, but the ultimate victim of the American embargo was the United 
States.75 According to Douglass North, the embargo caused a “collapse in domestic prices and 
widespread unemployment.”76 
The period from Jay’s Treaty in 1794 to the Embargo Act of 1807 represents the norm for 
American grain exports as a crucial Atlantic trade good in the late-eighteenth and early-
nineteenth century. The importance of this trans-national trade has been missed due to 
historiographic priorities that favor an overly political analysis that presumes economic rupture 
with the start of US independence.  For grain exports, however, both Federalists and Democratic-
Republicans supported farmers and promoted access for their products in foreign markets.  It 
could be argued that Federalist policies were actually more successful in this pursuit.  The 
historiographic implications of this are significant, as it questions the conventional wisdom that 
links Democratic Republicans and the image of Jefferson’s beloved yeoman farmer. As historian 
Bradford Perkins and others persuasively argue, the embargo was an economic disaster for the 
United States.  However, why it was such as disaster has been insufficiently examined.  The 
embargo failed because the continuity of economic interests and trading patterns from the 
colonial era, the Federalist administrations of Washington and Adams, and the first six years of 
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Jefferson’s regime could not be undone—even temporarily—without a tremendous blow to the 
US economy. 
 It was not until 1806, and the start of economic warfare between Great Britain and 
France, that the geopolitical protection for neutral trade across the Atlantic shifted.  Jefferson’s 
conflation of domestic exports with the carrying trade of goods from the West Indies under the 
banner of neutral trade rights collided with British and French conceptions of imperial control, 
leaving the US in an increasingly untenable position.  The second Jefferson administration’s 
management of foreign policy, domestic interests, and trade struggled to reconcile multiple 
competing pressures with few obvious answers and no easy solutions. The United States was 
trapped as a neutral trading power between France and Great Britain as the Napoleonic Wars 
transitioned to a long-reaching system of economic warfare between contending world powers. 
One must concede that the Embargo of 1807 did succeed in preserving peace at a time when war 
was a very possible outcome of the Chesapeake-Leopard incident. The potential costs of that 
conflict are unknowable. The policy attempted to create an ideal solution for multiple problems, 
however, the law was hamstrung by popular resistance and the need for federal customs revenues 
to sustain Jefferson’s view of a limited federal government and his conception of the domestic 
political economy. The moderate policy extracted its own costs, not only in lost revenue and 
private profits but also in internal dissent and the lesson that trade legislation was not an effective 
tool of international diplomacy.   
 British North America played a two-fold and unappreciated role in the geopolitics of the 
grain trade from the 1790s to 1809.  If Jay’s Treaty represented a confession of Canadian 
inability to assume the role of the US as a granary within the empire, it did not surrender ongoing 
efforts to do so.  Efforts to promote agricultural development and trade in the Canadas as well as 
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the Maritime Provinces continued throughout this period with varying degrees of success.  
Geography played an important role as well.  The policy failed because Americans had options 
other than obedience.  Thus, the embargo is  also an inherently Canadian story.  The existence of 
British North America as both a consumer of US grain products but also a conduit for illegal 
American trade during the embargo presented Jefferson and other American officials with a 
series of law enforcement challenges.  The legally flexible attitudes of British colonial officials 
encouraged open defiance of unpopular trade prohibitions and further exacerbated the already 
contentious relations between the governments of Great Britain and the United States even as the 
goods of each side were much sought after.    
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CHAPTER 5 
GROWING, TRADING, AND SMUGGLING GRAIN: 
FEEDING BRITISH NORTH AMERICA, 1794-1809 
 
The state of British North American agriculture directly led to Jay’s Treaty in 1794 and 
had significant lasting consequences for Anglo-American relations from the mid-1790s to the 
Embargo of 1807.  Agricultural development in this period was modest and reflected ongoing 
continuity with earlier colonial conditions.  Despite continued population growth and 
immigration, British North America remained incapable of replacing the US as the primary 
source of agricultural products in the Atlantic economy.  The pattern of fluctuating export 
volumes and occasional local shortages present in the 1760s remained the norm to the start of the 
nineteenth century, and starting in 1802 a gradual decline in agricultural surpluses is clear.  Thus, 
when Anglo-American relations collapsed in 1807, the revival of agriculture in the North 
American British colonies was important.  In a perverse set of circumstances, it was not only 
local production that contributed to the importance of British North America to the grain 
economy.  The colonies also provided a means for disenchanted US producers to utilize long-
standing trade routes by land to the Canadas and by sea to the Maritime colonies to circumvent 
the embargo and remain integrated with the larger Atlantic economy. 
The Canadas, 1794-1807      
Much of the scholarly literature about Canadian agriculture during this time focuses on 
the agricultural crisis in Lower Canada after 1802. This has been the subject of numerous 
contentious volumes debating alternative interpretations about the reasons for the decline in grain 
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exports due to some combination of production failure and/or increasing local consumption.1  
Assessing early agriculture production in the Canadas is difficult due to the lack of quantitative 
data, as Robert Armstrong’s Structure and Change:  An Economic History of Quebec notes, no 
agricultural census was conducted there prior to 1827.2   
Historical assessments of Lower Canadian agricultural development has produced a 
significant and emotive, yet somewhat misdirected, series of inquires between two major 
contending interpretations. In essence, the conflict between Fernand Ouellet and the Laval 
School and their opponents in the Montreal School are not based on evidence.  Lacking any 
broad agricultural census data, both the Laval and Montreal schools rely on export records and 
the question of whether the export data can be used as a proxy for production is hotly disputed.  
The inability of Quebec grain production to serve as a replacement for US imports is agreed 
upon.3   
Agricultural production became a proxy to assess the overall state of the French-
Canadian economy (and even society) in these debates.  Both sides agreed that grain exports 
from Quebec declined after 1802.  Conclusive quantitative evidence about grain exports from the 
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United States, Canada, or the Maritimes remain elusive for the 1780s.  Ouellet’s work does offer 
some insight about exports from Quebec and Montreal, the scale of trade is relatively minor and 
in some cases is incomplete; this also does not include any data for the Maritimes or for grain 
traded across the US border until 1808.4  Whether the decline in exports and the inability of 
Canada to take the place of the US as an imperial granary was due to increasing domestic 
demand (as proposed by the Montreal School, thus indicating a productive but not export 
oriented agricultural economy) or as a sign of declining production (as proposed by the Laval 
School, thus indicating an agricultural society in crisis) is not important to this study.  Export 
statistics remain the most applicable quantitative resource to assess the state of Canadian 
agriculture, yet the critical issue here is to assess the consequences (rather than the causes) of 
that decline.   
Demand for grain in Britain stimulated Canadian production throughout the 1790s.  
According to Ouellet, “during the decade 1793 to 1802, Quebec’s agriculture finally knew 
prosperity.”  1802 was the high point of wheat exports from Quebec.  Yet, he also notes that 
production failures resulted in the export volume diminishing by half in 1803.  The 1804 and 
1805 harvests were also mediocre.  A short recovery in 1807 briefly concealed a general decline 
in export surpluses that effectively eliminated Quebec as a substantive actor in the imperial grain 
trade.   Declining production was accompanied by grain speculation and monetary inflation.  
Combined, these factors further suppressed exports and fueled a rise in prices for Quebecois 
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consumers.5  Given the new settlement of “late loyalists” in Upper Canada, the new province 
provided little to spur grain export. Even in the banner year of 1802, only about 4 percent of 
grain exports from the Canadas originated in Upper Canada.6  
Conflating what was theoretically possible for Canadian agricultural development versus 
what was actually possible was a long-standing problem related to utopian colonial hopes (see 
chapters 2 and 3).  Writing in February 1808 to Lord Bathurst, John Caldwell’s report on the 
state of Canadian agricultural potential was reminiscent of Lord Sheffield’s optimism 30 years 
prior. In Caldwell’s opinion, the prosperity of the colony depended on the development of 
agricultural markets beyond Great Britain.  In particular, he advocated for US exclusion from the 
grain markets of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia.  Beyond the fisheries, if the British military 
and the West Indies drew on Canadian suppliers, rather than US ones, both the colonies and the 
crown would benefit.  However, he also favored continuing grain imports into the Canadas from 
Vermont and New York as a practical necessity.7 
Caldwell’s report illustrates a number of significant elements of the British North 
American grain economy in early 1808, and its timing is especially valuable in the wake of the 
embargo declaration, even though reconciling his observations with Ouellet’s account of Quebec 
agriculture is not possible beyond 1802.  The continued trade across the international border is 
well supported.  Caldwell, once again, reopened the idea of the Canadas as a replacement source 
of grain instead of the US.  However, the text also hints at a significant problem with this goal as 
the military forces of Great Britain in Atlantic Canada and the vital Newfoundland fisheries 
depended, at least in part, on US supplies.  Combined with the continued trade across the land 
                                                          
5 Ouellet, Economic and Social History of Quebec, 187-94. 
6Ibid, 156-7.  
7 John Caldwell to Lord Bathurst, 5 February 1808. Library and Archives of Canada (hereafter LAC), roll H-2961. 
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border between British North America and the US, Caldwell’s critique of the state of the grain 
trade also serves as evidence of its continuity.  Continuity, in this case, meaning a direct 
acknowledgement of the continued role of US producers and traders in the British Atlantic grain 
economy.   
In his travels through the US and Canada, John Lambert also commented on Canadian 
agricultural development.  Writing in 1810, he hinted at problems for grain exports beyond the 
lack of supply proposed by Ouellet and the competition of US producers suggested by Caldwell.  
There was demand for grain in Great Britain that did provide a certain stimulus to production, 
but the increased demand did not amount to a reliable or permanent market for Canadian 
surpluses.  
Within the last twenty years, great quantities of wheat have been raised in Canada, 
and exported to Great Britain.  The temporary scarcity experienced in England, at 
certain periods, increased demand for that article, and encouraged the Canadians to 
cultivate with more spirit than, till then, they had been accustomed to.  The demand 
did not always answer their expectations, and has been for some years in a 
decreasing state.8 
 
Parliamentary statistics further suggest that Lambert overstated the market for Canadian 
grain in Great Britain.  Only starting in 1801 is there any record of imported Canadian 
grain into the home country and that was a relatively paltry 6,433 hundredweight.  This 
increased to 41,870 in 1802, and from that peak declined into insignificance.  With the 
exception of a brief aberration in 1807, Canadian flour exports to Great Britain remained 
minimal.  For unprocessed wheat, the statistics are slightly more hopeful.  1795 saw a 
significant export crop, however, it was not until 1800 that yearly exports again 
                                                          
8 John Lambert, Travels through Lower Canada, and the United States of North America in the years 1806, 1807, 
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approached 20,000 quarters.  After four years of exceptional export volumes, wheat 
exports also declined until a brief revival starting in 1807.9      
Nova Scotia 1793-1807 
Jay’s Treaty provided a commentary on the state of agriculture in Nova Scotia.  The 
waves of loyalist migration had not resulted in a new imperial granary.  The best case estimate is 
that population increase and growing grain production were roughly equal, but even this is likely 
an optimistic assessment of actual economic behavior.  The important tie to US grain imports, 
both for local consumption as well as to support the British military and for re-export remained 
strong.    
The war in the West Indies between revolutionary France and Great Britain provided a 
real opportunity for Nova Scotian agriculture, but whether or not the opportunity could be seized 
was less certain.  In response to a letter form Archibald Mitchell, a commissariat officer with 
contracts to supply British forces in the Caribbean, Lieutenant Governor John Wentworth noted 
that although the contract specified that the supplies should be drawn from British colonies, there 
was no prohibition on purchases in the US provided that the British colonies could not provide 
the quantity of produce required.  Soon after, Wentworth noted that he had authorized importing 
provisions from Boston as “no other possible remedy existed.”  He expressed hope that local 
production would one day support both consumption and export, but at the present time this was 
not the case.10   In an April 1795 memorial to Wentworth, the provincial assembly lamented the 
                                                          
9 “An Account of the Quantity of Grain, Meal, and Flour imported into Great Britain from Foreign countries; and 
also from Ireland, in each year, from 1792 to 1814, both inclusive; distinguishing the Countries from which 
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10 Wentworth to Archibald Mitchell, 11 May 1794; Wentworth to Captain Vaughan, 10 June 1794; Wentworth to the 
Duke of Portland, 20 December 1794. Provincial Archives Nova Scotia (hereafter PANS), roll 15238.  
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presence of many US imports in the colonial economy.  They limited domestic production and 
interfered with Nova Scotian efforts to compete in the lucrative West Indian markets.  Yet, the 
memorial made a significant exception to this complaint by specifically excluding US imports of 
wheat, flour, corn, and bread from prohibition.11  
 Five years later, conditions had not improved.  In 1800 US exports of corn to Great 
Britain interfered with colonial imports.  As a result, Wentworth dispatched local merchants and 
military contractors Lawrence Hartshone and Jonathan Tremain to Canada for supplies of flour.  
This flour was intended for both military and civilian needs as “scarcity is already commanded 
and we apprehend will seriously increase from the great diminution of our crops last year.”12  
This situation illustrates two important elements of the grain trade.  First, the important 
intersection of military and civilian demand in the Nova Scotian economy.  Grain was a local 
subsistence concern as well as with notable imperial military interests that facilitated long-
distance markets.  Second, it underscores the fragility of Nova Scotian crop yields.  A poor 
harvest in 1799 created scarcity only a few months later that could only be fulfilled by external 
resources. 
Wentworth assured Lord Hobart in 1803 that no Parliamentary restriction on trade with 
the United States due to fears of smuggling was required as “the value of corn, flour, provisions, 
and other legally imported articles necessary for this country [Nova Scotia]” was such that any 
smuggled goods would be “a very insignificant trifling amo’t [sic].”13  Wentworth’s letter 
provides an intriguing insight into the expent of foreign resource dependency.  The need for US 
                                                          
11 Nova Scotia House of Assembly to Wentworth, 9 April 1795. PANS, roll 15371.  
12 Wentworth to Lt. Governor Milnes, 3 May 1800. PANS, roll 15238. 
13 Wentworth to Lord Hobart, 10 May 1803. PANS, roll 15239.  
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grain imports was so lucrative and consistent that legal trade in produce was more profitable than 
any potential returns from illicit commerce.   
The long-promised surplus for domestic Nova Scotian production remained in the future.  
An April 1804 memorial from the merchants of Halifax lamented that the province “is not yet so 
far advanced in agriculture as to produce sufficient for the inhabitants and trade.”14  Wentworth 
was also obligated to write to contractor George Harrison, that although “Nova Scotia and New 
Brunswick do not produce more flour or bread corn than necessary for the consumption of their 
own inhabitants….the large purchases unavoidably made for His Majesty’s service from the 
United States of America” could be used at least until wheat exports from the Canadas could be 
procured.15  The formulaic nature of this correspondence stretching over two decades is telling.   
A declaration of grain shortages in the province is followed by a temporary admission of US 
grain due to extenuating circumstances.  This is followed by a statement of a pious hope that 
soon a locally produced surplus would render these measures unnecessary.  The protests of 
Halifax’s merchants are also formulaic as they remonstrated against US trade with the West 
Indies as a detriment to local interests but also exclude US grain imports from that protest.  The 
relationship between grain production, consumption, and trade patterns linking the colony to the 
resources of the United States remained a basic and persistent need that was essentially 
unchanged from before the War for American Independence.   
There were public and private efforts undertaken to encourage wheat production in Nova 
Scotia, and thereby reduce the influence of US imports on the colony.  The provincial 
government attempted to increase grain production through economic incentives, including a 
bounty placed on wheat grown on new lands in 1806, but such measures failed to adequately 
                                                          
14 Wentworth to Hobart, 14 April 1804. PANS, roll 13869.   
15 Wentworth to George Harrison, 27 October 1807. PANS, roll 15239 
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encourage the expansion of wheat farming.16  Beyond more acreage devoted to wheat, private 
interests also encouraged agricultural intensification.  A circular pamphlet distributed by The 
Board of Agriculture offered prizes specifically for Nova Scotian farmers.  Among others, the 
board offered a gold medal for ascertaining the most effective use of seed and soil preparation 
for wheat growth, 50 guineas for the best essay on the culture of wheat in the province, and a 
piece of plate for the most satisfactory experiment on the planting of spring wheat.17  These 
efforts held potential promise for the future even as the deep connection to US agriculture 
persisted.   
The Embargo, Enforcement, and Smuggling to the Canadas 
In theory, the Embargo Act of 1807 withdrew the US from all economic contact with the 
outside world.  The philosophical arguments for and against the Act were outlined in chapter 4, 
yet there were additional difficulties to severing the long-standing trade relationships between 
the US and foreign consumers.  Most obviously, elusive effective law enforcement challenged 
the ability of Jefferson’s government to implement the embargo on a citizenry that maintained 
close economic connections with the outside world. 
The fact that the embargo reduced American exports of both domestic products and the 
re-export of foreign goods is clear (see chapter 4).  One of the unforeseen effects of the total 
embargo was the transfiguration of what had been a question of seaborne commerce and neutral 
trading rights into a national economic crisis that affected every corner of the country including 
regions far from the sea.  The experiment in isolationism also affected the cross-border trading 
routes between the United States and the Canadas and New Brunswick. Originally, it was unclear 
                                                          
16 RG 103, PANS. 
17 Board of Agriculture to the Earl of Camden, 25 June 1805. PANS, roll 13870. 
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if the embargo included land trade or only ocean-borne trade.  A prohibition on trade across the 
Canadian land border was included in a supplementary embargo act passed in March 1808.18 
The Canadas had a long cross-border trading relationship with Vermont and New York.  
Negotiations between British governor Lord Dorchester and Vermont resulted in an 1786 
agreement to allow Vermonters to export lumber, naval stores, agricultural goods, “or anything 
else of the growth and produce of Vermont” via the St. Lawrence and to “import the 
manufactures of Great Britain and East and West Indian products on the same terms as the 
Canadians.”19 Canadian merchants convinced the British government to allow free trade between 
the United States and Canada.  In addition, American goods exported through Canada would be 
considered Canadian for purposes of imperial trade legislation.20  By 1791, the artificial 
boundary between the United States and British North America established by the Treaty of Paris 
that separated the Empire of the St. Lawrence ceased to exist insofar as British trade regulations 
were concerned.  According to historian Chilton Williamson, by 1798 “the boundary had all but 
disappeared from the consciousness of Vermonters and Canadians…..the sense of American 
nationality was so weak and the commercial connections with Canadians so numerous that the 
Vermonters’ feeling at this time towards the Canadas was almost as it had been before the 
American Revolution.”21  
                                                          
18 Reginald C. Stuart, United States Expansionism and British North America, 1775-1871 (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1988), 48-49. 
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20 Donald Creighton, The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence, 1760-1850 (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1937), 105. 
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The long-standing pattern of cross-border trade survived in the political climate of the post-
US independence period.  Writing from Lewistown, New York, on his return journey to Canada, 
John Melish made a careful note on the influence of smuggling between the two countries.   
A very considerable portion of the trade of the river, and these towns, is derived from 
Upper Canada and the United States; and exports, chiefly grain, flour, provisions, 
potash, timber, naval stores, furs, & c. have late been very great.  The imports are 
chiefly British goods, with which the inhabitants contrive to supply a considerable 
part of the United States, by smuggling and the Americans, in return, smuggle tea, 
coffee, & c. to the Canadians.22  
 
Melish’s account reflects a well-developed system of exchange based on supply and 
demand of various commodities.  Local citizens paid little heed to legal prohibitions and 
formal political denunciations of open trade policies were accompanied by outright evasion 
of the law.  The embargo, then, merely added a variation on the familiar theme of local 
defiance towards unpopular trade regulation.    
As a precautionary measure in April 1808, President Jefferson authorized Treasury 
Secretary Albert Gallatin to arm and man customs enforcement vessels and instructed 
Vermont governor Israel Smith to use the militia in support of the embargo, if necessary.23  
Jefferson’s proclamation charged that “sundry persons are combined, or combining and 
confederating together on Lake Champlain….for the purposes of fomenting insurrections 
against the authority of the laws of the United States.”  He further called for all civil and 
military officers, as well as all citizens, to “be aiding and assisting by all the means in their 
                                                          
22 John Melish, travels in the United States of America, in the years 1806&1807, and 1809, 1810, & 1811; including 
an account of passages betwixt America and Britain, and travels through various parts of Great Britain, Ireland, 
and Upper Canada.  Vol.  2 (Philadelphia: Thomas & George Palmer, 1812), 335-6. 
23 H.N. Muller, “Smuggling into Canada: How the Champlain Valley Defied Jefferson’s Embargo,” Vermont 
History, Vol 38, No. 1 (Winter 1970) 5-21, 7. 
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power by force of arms or otherwise to quell and subdue such insurrections or 
combinations.”24   
Lambert’s observations in the area found little popular support for Jefferson’s 
embargo measures, and active opposition to its subsequent enforcement mechanisms.   
The Vermontese were much enraged at the idea of being considered, and 
denounced as rebels, in consequence of a few frays between the Custom-house 
officers and smugglers; and many of them, as I passed through that state on my 
return to Canada, declared to me, that the disturbance existed only in the 
president’s brain.25 
 
Lambert’s allusion to Jefferson’s intellectual state is superficially a gratuitous personal 
quip based on policy differences.  On closer examination, it exemplifies a deep strain of 
popular opinion that rejected stringent federal law enforcement that transgressed a 
matter of local concern.   
Jefferson issued a similar proclamation for the Oswego region of New York with its 
parallel circumstances to those in Vermont.  The President again authorized the use of troops to 
protect customs collectors as “a virtual civil war erupted between local residents violating the 
embargo and customs officers trying to enforce it.”  Three months later Gallatin called for militia 
support to repress popular discontent and judicial obstruction.  Bands of armed smugglers openly 
menaced customs collectors, and in August 1808, 60 smugglers attacked the customs house.26  
New York governor Daniel Tompkins appealed to Gallatin and Jefferson for more help, by the 
end of the month three companies of regulars patrolled Oswego, Sackett’s Harbor, and 
Plattsburg.27  Not surprisingly, the soldiers tended to be unpopular with local civilians.  Joseph 
                                                          
24 Thomas Jefferson, “Message from the President of the United States Communicating a Copy of His Proclamation 
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(Washington: A. &W. Way, 1808), 4-7. 
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Rossell, an observer in Oswego, regarded them as “a banditti of rapscallions” and a public 
celebration was held upon their leaving the community.28      
Public meetings dispatched remonstrances to Congress demanding that the Canadian 
portion of the embargo be lifted on the practical consideration that the law would adversely 
impact the local economy.29  A more theoretically-minded commentator writing as “A Citizen of 
Vermont” regarded a close examination of the law as a matter of loyalty “to the whig principles 
of free-inquiry that we owe our revolution and our liberties.”  In his opinion, the government’s 
reaction to danger on the high seas did not justify a land embargo.  He continued that the 
embargo would destroy commerce, and thereby solve the foreign relations problems of the US, 
by disconnecting American prosperity from the European war.30  The federal government faced a 
stiff challenge to its authority as it attempted to enforce a law that was opposed by most people 
who lived on the northern borderlands with British North America.  US law enforcement efforts 
received no help from British officials in Canada and smuggled goods found easy markets on 
both sides of the border.31  
Efforts to enforce the embargo on Lake Champlain and along the St. Lawrence failed in 
spite of government efforts.  Many militia deployed to uphold the law deserted, and those that 
remained did little to stem the tide of US goods flowing north.  Sympathetic militiamen were 
corruptible, and international laws regulating privateering could be manipulated to support 
“collusive capture” of friendly vessels posing as “prizes.”  Many traders simply carried their 
cargos to towns near the border and waited for a favorable opportunity to cross.32  Even if 
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smugglers were caught by federal authorities, local judges and juries were reluctant to convict.33  
Other, bolder smugglers openly fought federal authorities if they attempted to enforce the 
embargo law.   
Although reliable statistics for the extent of smuggling during the embargo are elusive for 
obvious reasons, the increasingly stringent measures taken by the Jefferson administration to 
enforce the embargo clearly indicate that the volume of illegal trade was substantial.  Historian 
Alan Taylor noted that the embargo functioned as a stimulant to cross-border trade with farm 
produce from the states routed through the Canadas.  Further, the lack of American competition 
stimulated Canadian exports.34  Contemporary observer John Lambert emphasized both the 
efforts by US officials to curtail smuggling and the failure of these efforts. 
The facilities afforded to smuggling, between Canada and the United States, 
have been sufficiently exemplified since the promulgation of the Embargo-Act; 
for, in spite of the armed militia and customs-house-officers stationed along 
the American side of the line to enforce the laws, the timber, pot-ash, 
provisions, and almost every other article brought into the province in 1808, 
has more than doubled the quantity received from thence in 1807.35 
Parliamentary statistics for the export trade to the West Indies suggests that Lambert 
underestimated the effect of the embargo on cross-border trade relating to flour.  From 1800 to 
1806, total bread and flour exports from the Canadas vary between 1,336 and 4,226 
hundredweight with the maximum quantity in 1803.  1807 exports amount to 539 
hundredweight, but 1808 jumped to 47,782 and then plunged to 5,623 in 1809.36  1808 was the 
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only full calendar year of the US embargo, which explains why Canadian exports increased 
dramatically that year and then immediately dropped.  Combined with Ouellet’s assessment of 
the Quebec agricultural sector in this period, it seems clear that smuggled US produce represents 
the increase in exports.  That is, US agricultural goods were illegally imported into Canada and 
then re-exported at a considerable profit. Thus, the total volume of wheat and flour moving 
across the border far exceeded even Lambert’s already substantive estimate.    
Smuggling by Sea and the Maritime Provinces 
US officials received little help enforcing the embargo at sea from British authorities, who 
openly undermined the law.  Writing in 1815, Treasury Secretary Alexander Dallas complained  
No sooner had the American government imposed the restrictive system upon 
its citizens, to escape from the rage and depredation of the belligerent powers, 
than the British government, then professing amity towards the United States, 
issued an order, which was, in effect, an invitation to the American citizen to 
break the laws of their country, under a public promise of British protection 
and patronage, to all vessels, which should engaged in illicit trade, without 
bearing the customary ship’s documents and papers.37     
 
Dallas’ diatribe contained a great deal of truth, although why he supposed that British 
officials would help American ones curtail trade that operated to the advantage of Great 
Britain seems naïve, at the very least. The British rationale for aiding American smugglers 
and subverting US law was two-fold.  For British officials, the embargo was only one part 
of a broader geopolitical chess game between Britain and Napoleonic France.  Writing to 
his brother Sandy in October 1808, the Nova Scotian political leader Alexander Howe 
noted that the embargo represented “the American president’s unconditional submission to 
the will of the French government.”38  He understood counteracting Jefferson’s agenda to 
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advance the broader struggle against Napoleonic France.  Moreover, there was a material 
need for American produce in Nova Scotia, particularly grain as there were no available 
substitutes. These factors combined to create a pragmatic British response to the embargo 
that also infuriated US officials.       
The original incarnation of the law did not function as designed, so the Jefferson 
administration continuously modified it as shortcomings in the policy manifested themselves.  In 
one reform, Jefferson attempted to enforce the embargo by inserting a provision into the law 
requiring the masters of all vessels clearing US ports to post a bond equal to double the value of 
the vessel and cargo.  This January 1808 provision stipulated that all fishing vessels leaving port 
post a bond amounting to four times the value of the vessel and cargo to ensure that the ship 
would not enter a foreign harbor.39  These measures proved inadequate, and an April 1808 
addition to the law mandated that any vessel leaving an American harbor must load all cargo 
under the supervision of revenue officers.  A further requirement was imposed on all masters and 
mates of trading ships to provide proof to the customs service of the port where the cargo had 
been landed within four months.40  
 British and colonial merchants and officials spared no efforts to make the US embargo 
untenable.  The May 4, 1808 Nova Scotia Council meeting minutes record two superficially 
contradictory responses to the embargo.  A petition from Halifax merchants complained that the 
efforts to procure American produce prior to the implementation of the embargo had been so 
successful that the province could not absorb all of the imports.  Thus, the merchants pleaded for 
permission to export the excess to the West Indies and Newfoundland.  Sir George Prevost, 
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Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia, agreed to the request, and opened provincial ports to all 
British vessels trading with any port in the US.  This measure did not result in the desired 
volume of trade.  Thus, permission to freely trade in American produce in Nova Scotian ports 
was extended to neutral American ships carrying cargos of naval stores, specified lumber 
products, and all provisions including bread, biscuit, wheat, and flour under the same customs 
laws pertaining to British merchant ships due to a lack of available British merchant shipping.41   
Lord Castlereagh deemed Prevost’s actions “counteracting the effects of the American 
embargo by permission of the import of American produce into Halifax was judicious and well 
timed, and I am happy to find it is productive of corresponding effect.”42  Prevost’s actions show 
a canny imperial administrator attempting to reconcile a number of competing goals.  Local grain 
production remained inadequate to support the colonial population or the military base at 
Halifax.  The duration of the embargo was unknown, but the particular nature of grain products 
as perishable commodities prohibited the indefinite storage of surpluses within the province.  
The broader interests of the empire, especially demand for provisions in the slave societies of the 
Caribbean, further encouraged Halifax to operate as an entrepot for re-exported goods.  In 
essence, Prevost was required to balance both the needs of his own province as well as distant 
imperial holdings.  This balancing act created another problem.  The lack of British merchant 
shipping available to support the entrepot function of Halifax required Prevost to permit the use 
of US vessels in carrying British trade.  This represented a clear reinterpretation of British trade 
laws by a colonial administrator rather than the imperial government in the metropole.  The 
subsequent approval of London underlines the major demand for US provisions in the British 
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empire as well as the considerable authority wielded by colonial governors such as Prevost in 
Nova Scotia.  The response to the embargo and the reworking of British trade law was 
innovative, yet in practical terms it ensured continuity in the grain trade of the colonial era prior 
to the American Revolution. 
Prevost’s legal flexibility and its subsequent approval by British officials in London was 
recognized by US officials.  Provisions to the Embargo Act were added in January 1809 to allow 
the president to employ military force to uphold the embargo and to suppress any riots against 
the trade laws as well as to seize any ships and goods where “there is reason to believe that they 
are intended for exportation.”  Customs officials were empowered to refuse any goods to be 
loaded on a trading vessel if in his judgment “there is an intention to violate the embargo.”43 This 
power was extended to “any such person as he [the president] shall have empowered for that 
purpose, to employ such part of the land and naval forces or of the militia….which may be 
judged necessary” to compel obedience to the embargo.44   These increasingly aggressive terms 
represented an increase in executive power and sparked swift protests, above all in the New 
England borderlands.  The Massachusetts legislature typified the response by many in New 
England.  In a memorial to the US Congress, it called for a repeal of the embargo as it would 
“not only complete the destruction of commercial prosperity but prove highly dangerous to the 
public liberty, and domestic peace of this people.”45  A force consisting of six navy gunboats 
patrolled the harbors of New England; three small warships as well as the frigate Chesapeake 
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were assigned to cruise between Block Island Sound and Portland, Maine, in order to curtail 
illicit commerce.46  
This enforcement regime differed critically from previous systems of trade control, such 
as the colonial era boycotts.  Rather than using the authority of the federal government to 
manage international trade as a foreign affairs question and using diplomacy as a means of 
extracting concessions from foreign powers, the armed forces of the US now were deployed to 
manage the economic behavior of US citizens.  This trend would accelerate as life under the 
embargo wore on.  
New laws increased the bond requirements for American fishing and coastal vessels and 
mandated that all vessels be loaded and unloaded under the supervision of the Customs Service, 
most notably under the Force Bill added in January 1809.  This legislation allowed the president 
to employ military force to uphold the embargo and to suppress any riots against the trade laws, 
even permitting the seizure any ships, carts, and goods where “there is reason to believe that they 
are intended for exportation” and empowering customs officials to refuse to allow any goods to 
be loaded on a trading vessel if in his judgment “there is an intention to violate the embargo.”47  
This power was extended to “any such person as he [the president] shall have empowered for 
that purpose, to employ such part of the land and naval forces or of the militia….which may be 
judged necessary” to compel obedience to the embargo.48  
The embargo was, in theory, directed at all US commerce.  Both the domestic trade and 
the carrying trade were curtailed by the abolition of legal trade.  However, the increasing focus 
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on domestic trade management primarily affected US produce.  This particularly meant grain and 
other agricultural products that formed the plurality of American external trade during this era.49  
The use of customs enforcement to regulate domestic trade on the fear of embargo violations 
compounded difficulties for American farmers and grain merchants.    
The embargo proved unsustainable.  In Nova Scotia, the underlying economic 
motivations that favored allowing US merchants access to the province had not changed. 
Provisions remained a problem for the colony, both for local consumption but also as a potential 
source of supply for other imperial consumers and the military.  The regularly scheduled 1809 
Parliamentary proclamation on trade policy validated, rather than repudiated, Provost’s free trade 
policy, suggesting that such a generous policy remained a viable policy option and tacitly 
acknowledged the authority of the provincial government to modify grain trade laws based on 
local need and by local authority.  The new regulations still permitted trade between the US and 
British North America, however, this remained limited to certain enumerated articles including 
lumber products, livestock, and grain “of any sort,” all of which could be exchanged in 
provincial harbors for manufactures of Britain or its colonies.50   
Parliamentary export statistics document an increased volume of bread and flour in the 
Maritime Province’s trade as a result of the embargo.  For Nova Scotia, bread and flour exports 
to the West Indies from 1800-1807 did not exceed 1,000 hundredweight in any year, but 1808 
recorded exports of 12,376 hundredweight and in 1809 of 9,717 hundredweight.  New 
Brunswick reflects a similar pattern.  From 1800-1807, bread and flour exports exceeded 1,000 
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hundredweight only in 1806.  In 1808, exports exceeded 30,000 hundredweight and declined to 
8,912 in 1809.51      
Two main lessons can be drawn from the Parliamentary trade data.  First, much like the 
case with the cross-border trade with the Canadas, the embargo coincided with increased British 
North American trade in flour.  The correlation between the embargo years and export volumes 
suggests a causal relationship.  Second, the statistics illustrate the deep continuity in long-
standing agricultural trade networks and routes.  Even the serious exertion of the US federal 
government could not redirect the accustomed patterns of exchange that built on foundations of 
economic self-interest coupled with the urgent need to feed societies that were not self-sustaining 
agricultural colonies.    
Conclusion 
By March 1809 it was clear that the US embargo policy was a failure.  Internal dissent, 
the economic effects on the US, and British policies receptive to continuing trade in the absence 
of official American political sanctions combined to make the embargo unenforceable.  
According to historian Reginald Horsman, the Embargo Act “shattered American trade and 
finances, created bitter internal opposition, and left no possibility of stepping up the pressure on 
Great Britain by further escalation of the economic measures.”52  From the first debates in 
Congress, there was a healthy skepticism that the law could or should actually be enforced.  
Enforcement was almost impossible due to the lack of an internal road network and the reliance 
on sea communications to transport goods for the domestic market.  Outside of other 
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commodities, grain exports to British North America and through British North America to the 
rest of the British Atlantic economy multiplied.  Jefferson’s effort to interdict the grain trade 
through legislation and enforcement could not succeed in ending the well-established trade 
connections between US producers and British imperial consumers.     
  Repealing the embargo solved, at least temporarily, the political and economic 
conundrum of Jefferson’s second administration.  As President Madison entered office in spring 
1809, further geopolitical changes provided new opportunities and new dangers for US farmers 
and grain merchants.  These new conditions were primarily driven by the ongoing war in Europe, 
whose consequences reverberated across the Atlantic. British, Spanish, and Portuguese forces 
combined to resist Napoleon’s territorial ambitions in Iberia.  An unintended effect of this 
military alliance was its spur to vast new demands for provisions and a deeper connection among 
US agriculture, British capital, and the Napoleonic Wars.        
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CHAPTER 6   
THE UNITED STATES AND THE PENINSULAR WAR 
 
On the surface, the Peninsular War of 1808-1813 in Iberia has little to do with the United 
States or with American agriculture.  The US was not a belligerent power, nor did any of the 
belligerent powers seek to enlist direct American intervention in the struggle.  However, this 
apparent detachment is more a result of the subsequent historiography rather than an accurate 
reflection of the US role in Iberia.  The American connection to the conflict is obscured as a 
result of historiographic division on the study of the early nineteenth century.  Two articles focus 
directly on the United States and the Peninsular War; the first by W. Freeman Galpin in 1922 and 
the second by G.E. Watson in 1976.1  Beyond these two studies, histories of the period are 
generally divided between a domestically oriented examination of Jeffersonian political economy 
emphasizing the internal development of the Jeffersonian republic and the use of trade 
restrictions to claim international respect, or occasionally on the growing conflict with Great 
Britain that would culminate in war in June 1812.  Conversely, sources on the Peninsular War 
generally treat the conflict as a European event with little direct connection to American affairs 
outside of the context of the broader economic policies pursued by European powers.2 The 
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measures taken to sustain the triangular trade among Great Britain, Iberia, and the United States 
by British authorities, US merchants, and Iberian officials even in a time of war illustrates the 
interconnected nature of the early republican economy, the European grain markets, and the 
British imperial economy.  Importantly, these connections are consistent with pre-Napoleonic 
and indeed pre-American Revolution patterns of exchange, as suggested by the works of 
McCusker, Menard, and Lydon, even if wartime circumstances modified some of the nuances 
within the supply-and-demand relationship.  This situation also allows commentary on the state 
of agriculture in the Canadas and Maritime Provinces as there was little-to-no surplus to sell.  As 
a result, Great Britain was dependent on the United States to supply domestic consumption and 
to support military operations and allies.  The changing economic and political circumstances 
also provided a test for the divergent strands of Jeffersonian political economy with significant 
domestic consequences for the US.   
Napoleon’s invasion of the Iberian Peninsula in 1808 re-established some of the trading 
relationships of the United States to the Europe by altering the lager geo-political framework of 
the conflict. The opening of British trade with Spain, Portugal, and the colonial empires of those 
countries provided markets for British exports, while opening the peninsular markets created a 
gaping hole in Napoleon’s Continental System.  This expansion of trade counteracted any 
potential damage by the American embargo on the British economy.  Conversely, the 
introduction of a British army into Iberia and the war’s destruction stimulated both a potential 
market for American produce and a possible means for the United States to more effectively 
influence British policies through the restriction of trade.  This fact was not immediately 
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apparent or utilized by the United States, which still clung to Jefferson’s total embargo as official 
policy. By March 1809, however, it was clear even to President Jefferson that the embargo 
policy was a failure.  It was repealed and replaced by the Non-Intercourse Act, which prohibited 
trade only with France and Great Britain.3  The law mandated that all goods manufactured in 
Britain, France, or any of their possessions be banned from the United States.4  This policy 
transition provided the legal basis for American trade to Spain and Portugal.  Despite the very 
close connections with Great Britain, the kingdoms of Spain and Portugal remained independent 
nations, and therefore were not subject to these US trade restrictions.  This intentional loophole 
was sustained by every American law regarding external trade until 1814.  Even the declaration 
of war by the United States against Great Britain in June 1812 did not change this relationship as 
strong demand for American wheat and flour persisted.  It was not until the end of the peninsular 
campaign in late 1813 and the collapse of Napoleon’s empire that British demand collapsed.  The 
persistent and artificial divide between direct trade with Great Britain and trade with British-
dominated Iberia allowed for a continuation of the grain trade to support the war effort, which 
also sustained the significant integration of British capital and US agricultural exports.    
 Napoleon’s invasion of Portugal in November 1807 created a new front in the ongoing 
war between Great Britain and France.  With peace in central and eastern Europe secured 
through the defeat of Austria at Austerlitz, the Prussians at Jena, and the Treaty of Tilsit allying 
Czar Alexander with Napoleon, the only remaining territory in Europe in potentially unfriendly 
hands was Iberia.  Obedience to the Continental System was a requirement for all French 
controlled or allied states, and, in theory, the assault on Portugal and the increasing pressure 
levied against the tottering Spanish monarchy was an effort to perfect the continental system by 
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closing the last European ports open to British commerce.  Under terms of the Treaty of 
Fontainebleau signed between Napoleon and Charles IV of Spain in October 1807, the Kingdom 
of Portugal would be dissolved and a series of new independent principalities created.  Included 
in this was a provision that one principality would be given to Manuel Godoy, a favorite of the 
Queen of Spain and the most powerful minister in the kingdom.5  By November 29, as French 
General Junot’s troops entered Lisbon, the Portuguese Prince Regent, along with “the contents of 
the treasury, the bureaucratic infrastructure of the Portuguese state, and as many as 15,000 
individuals” fled under the protection of the British fleet.6  Popular rioting against Junot’s troops 
in December 1807 was crushed, leaving control of the country in the hands of the French 
military and a handful of subservient civilian officials. 
Peace in other parts of Europe allowed Napoleon to focus substantial attention and 
resources on Spain.  After a complex series of plots and counterplots between Godoy, King 
Charles, and Prince Ferdinand (later King Ferdinand VII) over the throne, an “impartial” 
Napoleon arbitrated the dispute.  Meeting with all parties in the French border town of Bayonne, 
Napoleon compelled Ferdinand to abdicate in favor of his father Charles.  Charles, in turn, 
abdicated in favor of Napoleon, as “the only person who in the state of things prevailing can 
reestablish order” when the Dos de Mayo uprising in Madrid threatened the stability of any 
centralized government despite its suppression by French troops under Marshal Murat.7    
Effectively, the throne was vacant until filled by order of Napoleon.8  By May 7,  Murat was in 
control of the central administration until such time as Joseph Bonaparte arrive to assume the 
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throne; this was accomplished by decree on June 6 as the edict was published throughout Spain.  
The passive Spain of Napoleon’s schemes and the Spain that actually greeted the arrival of King 
Joseph in early July were far different from one another.  Those parts of the nation not under the 
direct control of the French army had risen in open revolt against the Bonapartes.  Spurred by the 
ill-treatment of Ferdinand and the example of the Dos de Mayo, the provincial authorities and the 
people of Spain rejected the imposition of French authority.  As a result, the specter of a brutal 
war loomed over the land. 
 The collapse of central authority in Spain and Portugal devolved authority to local and 
provincial bodies which then sought military assistance in order to fight against Napoleon.  As 
early as June 6, a delegation from the principality of Asturias arrived in London to seek British 
assistance in exchange for reopening their ports to British trade.  An agreement between the 
British government and Spanish patriot forces promising support was announced on June 15 as 
the revolt spread through Aragon, Galicia, Leon, Catalonia, Andalusia, and the rest of Spain.9  
By the end of July, King Joseph had fled back to France in the wake of the battle of Bailen; 
defeat on the battlefield combined with the general uprising rendered Spain ungovernable 
without the interjection of more French forces.  The chaos provided a potential opportunity for 
Great Britain that had not existed since the early days of the French Revolution- the opportunity 
to commit a relatively small force of British soldiers to the continent to directly challenge France 
with the support of a militantly anti-French countryside that needed logistical and monetary 
support rather than a large number of British soldiers. 
 The first British expeditionary force to Iberia landed at Mondego Bay, Portugal, in 
August 1808.  Commanded by Sir Arthur Wellesley, this force was victorious at the battles of 
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Rolica (August 17) and Vimerio (August 21) against Junot’s isolated corps.  These victories, 
combined with the uprising of the Portuguese countryside and the supremacy of the Royal Navy 
compelled Junot to seek terms.10  Unfortunately for Wellesley, he was superseded in command 
on the evening of the 21st by Sir Henry Burrard and again on August 22nd by Sir Hew Dalrymple.  
Under the Convention of Cintra (August 22) negotiated by Dalrymple, Junot was allowed to 
evacuate Portugal.  Despite disagreeing with the terms of the convention, Wellesley signed the 
document.11  Domestic outrage over the convention resulted in the recall of all three officers to 
face a court of inquiry.  All three were exonerated, but Wellesley would not return to the 
peninsula until April 1809.  The temporary disgrace left command of the British forces in Iberia 
in the hands of Sir John Moore.  Misunderstanding the full complexity of the Spanish situation 
and underestimating the scale of French re-enforcements committed to re-establishing Joseph on 
the throne, Moore launched an invasion of Spain.  In theory, this was in conjunction with 
Spanish troops and logistical support.  By the time Moore’s forces arrived, most of the Spanish 
troops had been defeated and the promised logistical support never materialized.12  After a 
harrowing retreat, the desperate battle at Corunna resulted in the death of Moore. The evacuation 
of what remained of his army in January 1809, and the British presence in Iberia verged on 
collapse. 
 Despite the controversy of Cintra and the failure of Moore’s campaign, the events of the 
fall of 1808 and early winter 1809 contained many lessons that would shape the rest of the 
peninsular campaign.  The most important of these lessons was logistical.  The ability of an army 
to survive was directly linked to the ability of its commissariat to furnish the required supplies.  
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How this task was accomplished formed one of the fundamental differences between the French 
army and the system established by Wellesley upon his return in April 1809.  According to 
historian Jac Weller’s study on Peninsular War logistics, Napoleon “supplied his armies by a 
system of marauder, which amounted to forced requisition or worse.”13  Noting the link between 
the forced requisition of supplies and popular insurgency, Wellesley strictly forbade the practice 
thereby promoting local support but also obligating the construction of a more robust- and 
expensive- logistical system based on the purchase of local surpluses whenever possible but also 
on the importation of supplies from distant lands in order to fill the magazines.14     
  The relocation of the Portuguese monarchy to Brazil in 1807 had left a power vacuum in 
Portugal itself.  In theory, political control was invested in a regency council established in 
September 1808 that ruled in the name of and under the direction of King Dom Joao, who 
remained in Brazil in the wake of Junot’s invasion.  In practice, authority over economic and 
military affairs devolved upon British officers and British support systems.  William Carr 
Beresford (later Lord Beresford and a Portuguese marquis) was officially entrusted with the 
reformation of the Portuguese army.  In practice, wartime demands on labor, money, and food 
resources transfigured Beresford into “a de facto viceroy” who exerted a broader authority than 
his official title suggested.15  British financial aid became an increasing share of the Portuguese 
budget.  Part of the agreement between Great Britain and Portugal was a provision for the 
material support of the Portuguese forces operating under British command.  After April 1809, 
an amount determined by Wellesley was transferred from the British Army commissariat to the 
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British Aid Office, which in turn transferred the funds to the Portuguese treasury via the British 
minister in Lisbon.16  Although this direct subsidy often fell short of the amount desired, the total 
amount of aid was a substantial expense to Wellesley.17  These arrangements also provided an 
unusual set of formal duties for Wellesley.  In April 1809, in addition to his appointment as the 
commander of Britain’s army in Portugal and control of the Portuguese subsidy, he was also 
appointed “commander-in-chief of the Portuguese army and began to run that entire nation.  He 
controlled the enormous annual subsidy paid by Britain to Portugal and all Portuguese imports.  
He had primary legal authority over all males aged 16 to 60.”18  Although it is an 
oversimplification of a complex series of dynamics, by April 1809 Portugal effectively operated 
as a protectorate of Great Britain; a trade relationship with one was a de facto trade relationship 
with the other.    
The introduction of Wellesley and the British army commissariat into Portugal on an 
official basis connected the commissariat with the Portuguese merchant class.  Chief among 
these merchants was Henrique Teixeria de Sampayo (also spelled Sampaio in some sources).  An 
article published in Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine after his death outlined his political and 
economic significance.  As British troops entered into Portugal, supplies in enormous and 
increasing quantities for British forces and Portuguese military personnel was required.  Induced 
by a “liberal commission” in 1808, Sampayo contracted to supply 30,000 men, which amounted 
to “one hundred and fifty tons of bread, four hundred large oxen, and five hundred pipes of wine 
per week.”  Efforts to replace him with a British commissariat officer were unsuccessful as 
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Sampayo’s agents were already active in “all the productive districts to buy up or forestall, not 
only present stock, but the crops of the succeeding year.  The rich Beira, a fruitful province for 
grain and cattle, was already his own.  In every town, from the Tamego to the Tagus, there might 
be found an agent of the great contractor.”  His reach extended to Ireland, where his business 
connections provided wheat, flour, and barley; other brothers were dispatched to the United 
States and the empire of Morocco, for the same purpose.   
Upon his arrival in Lisbon in April 1809, Sir Arthur Wellesley retained Sampayo’s 
services as he was “in full possession of the confidence of the public authorities, Portuguese as 
well as British.”  Wellesley’s faith was amply repaid in the winter of 1810-1811.  Besieged 
within the lines of Torres Vedras, Sampayo’s planning and industry provided:  
magazines [that] were full, to overflow, of all the necessities of life.  Magnificent 
in extent and convenience, as were the public granaries and storehouses, they 
were found insufficient for the immense quantities of commissariat stores and 
provisions that were daily landed….while the Tagus bore on its ample bosom 
supplies of all the munitions of war to the amount of millions!  While the 
besiegers were eating their horses, the besieged were in possession of all the 
comforts enjoyed by the British soldier under a liberal government.19    
 
Sampayo provides a direct link between the British commissariat, Portugal, and the United 
States.  According to Historian Troy Bickham, the “dummy Portuguese merchant house of 
Henrique Teixeira de Sampaio [Sampayo] officially imported the flour so as to get around any 
potential American embargoes or non-intercourse acts.”20  The ability to skirt US governmental 
policy was a critical factor in the expansion of the direct Iberian trade as the region served as a 
valuable clearinghouse for Anglo-American trade.  Jefferson’s Embargo Act was replaced by the 
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Non-Intercourse Act in March 1809, which only abolished trade between the US and British or 
French ports.21   
In writing Levi Hollingsworth on April 24, Thomas Hollingsworth noted that opening 
this trade legally would cause a substantial rise in flour prices from $6.50-6.75 per barrel to 
$7.50-8.00 per barrel.  Two days later he relayed news from Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin 
confirming the legalization of English trade as of June 10.22  Direct access to the English market 
was especially important for US grain merchants as the state of the British harvest in 1809 
remained unknown.  The changing trade pattern was largely a result of negotiations in April 
1809 between David Erskine, the British Minister to the United States, and President James 
Madison, who reached an agreement to repeal the Orders-in-Council in exchange for the US 
ending the Non-Intercourse Act against Britain.23  In April 1809 Madison ordered the revocation 
of the Non-Intercourse Act.24  Unfortunately, Erskine had exceeded his instructions and the 
agreement was later repudiated by London.25  According to historian W. Freeman Galpin’s work 
The Grain Supply of England during the Napoleonic Period, imports of American grain directly 
into England during the spring and summer of 1809 were substantial, although later limited by 
constant changes in American foreign policy.26 This policy was overturned in June 1809 as the 
prospect of a commercial treaty with Great Britain prompted a change in policy.  A third change 
in US trade policy re-imposed restrictions between Great Britain and the United States in August 
1809.  Inconsistent policy and inconsistent enforcement of trade laws made legal subterfuges 
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such as Sampayo’s important not only for legitimate trade but also as a useful intermediary to 
enable indirect trade should the geopolitical circumstances require it.  According to Galpin, the 
indirect trade via Iberia was commonly used throughout the remainder of 1809:  “undoubtedly 
much of the export from America left for a port in the Spanish Peninsula, but was finally sold in 
Great Britain.”27   
Although the letter is vague as to the particular mechanism of continued trade, a 
September 21, 1809 letter from William Morewood to Levi Hollingsworth hints at this type of 
quasi-legal exchange.  Morewood, noted that trade could be continued by a “more circuitous 
route” if Hollingsworth did not object.28  The attraction of Lisbon as an intermediary market 
between the US and Great Britain was reinforced by American customs procedures.  Since Non-
Importation did not apply to that port, Treasury Secretary Gallatin frankly admitted that it was 
not known whether any smuggled British goods were involved because salt (Lisbon’s principal 
export) was untaxed and thus customs collectors did not actually examine the cargos.29        
The quality of the 1809 grain crop provided another challenge for American agriculture.  
A February 12, 1810 letter from John and George Morewood, business correspondents of Levi 
Hollingsworth in England, that “American flour is not gaining in estimation of the people of this 
country.  The importations of the last year were of an indifferent quality…. Fine flour will move 
freely where an inferior quality is altogether unsaleable.”30  Geopolitical circumstances would 
change in 1810, however, and the US grain trade to Britain itself dwindled to insignificance by 
1812.31           
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Given the unpredictability of the British market, US merchants eagerly assessed the 
possible opportunities from a series of circumstances in Iberia.  Wartime destruction, the 
foraging practices of the French army, the introduction of the British army, and the virtual 
collapse of civil government combined to severely limit local agricultural production, thus 
creating a need for imports to provide basic subsistence not to mention the surpluses required to 
sustain the armed forces.  Combined with the repeal of the embargo and confusion throughout 
1809 on trading policy with Britain itself, Iberia became a lucrative market, provided, of course, 
that entanglement with actual fighting was avoided.  The firms of Levi Hollingsworth and Son in 
Philadelphia, a related family firm of Worthington and Hollingsworth in Baltimore, and the firm 
of Robert Ogden in New York City all recognized the potential as well as the inherent dangers of 
expanding their trade with Iberia during the war.   
A letter from William Cooch to Levi Hollingsworth on April 11 indicates both the 
confusion of the time as well as the potential.  Cooch inquired as to what effect the recent 
disasters of Moore’s Expedition in Spain might have on the markets, and asked that 
Hollingsworth inform him “should any occurrence take place that in your opinion will rise the 
price of flour.”32  The reopening of foreign trade contributed to the rapid increase of demand for 
exports due to the state of Portugal and Spain.  A May 9 letter from American merchant Charles 
Wilson in Cadiz to Levi Hollingsworth noted that recent intelligence from Lisbon reported that 
there was no knowledge of the end of the embargo, and there was currently no flour in the 
Lisbon markets.  This would change in Wilson’s judgement. The surplus of American flour 
merchants in Madeira would inevitably flood that market leading those traders to shift to Cadiz 
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or Lisbon to dispose of their cargos.  However, this was a temporary and limited market as 
10,000 barrels of flour would be sufficient to glut the Lisbon market as well.33   
The progress of the war demanded caution.  A June 3 letter from John Hollingsworth to 
his father Levi suggested that any ship voyaging to Spain or Portugal should “touch at some 
intermediate port to enquire the state of those countries.”34  The advance of French forces would 
limit potential markets for American grain; however, fear of a second US embargo act in the 
wake of the collapse of the Erskine agreement was a more immediate threat for Wilson,  On June 
7, Wilson informed Levi Hollingsworth  that information from Lisbon indicated that the markets 
were “very dull” for American produce, but Robert Meade, a fellow US merchant in that city 
requested the dispatch of more flour as it may be sold “to advantage about September or 
October; he has about 10,000 barrels on hand and conceives it would be folly to attempt forcing 
a sale at present, there is no flour in the port besides what he holds.”35  Writing directly to 
Hollingsworth on July 21, Meade repeated the assessment that the markets were currently dull, 
but also noted that the local harvest was indifferent, and the retreating French destroyed all of the 
fields of wheat in the local provinces.  The introduction of large bodies of English troops and this 
destruction “have induced the gov’t [sic] to take off all duties on future importation of flour, rice, 
corn, grain, and dried vegetables.”  More hopefully, Meade reported that it would be possible to 
sell 10,000 barrels of middling flour to the army as “superfine flour is found too good for the 
soldiers.”36  A letter the following day from Charles Wilson to Levi Hollingsworth noted that 
Meade had been offered $12 per barrel by the “government” for 50,000 barrels of flour and 
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50,000 quintals of rice at $7 per quintal; he declined the offer in preference for chancing the open 
market.37   
Wilson does not directly state which government made the offer; Wilson’s location in 
Cadiz and the context of the letter on the question of quarantines for American vessels suggests 
that the Supreme Junta in Cadiz, which functioned as the central Spanish government during this 
period, made this offer.  Another letter from William Jarvis, another US Merchant in Lisbon  
July 26 noted that the Portuguese harvest was “middling” and that “little grain could be obtained 
from any country other than the United States, we are persuaded that flour and grain must keep 
up, unless large shipments are made from thence.”38  A later missive dated September 11  noted 
the arrival of 18 American vessels laden with about 100,000 bushels of wheat, corn, and rice in 
Lisbon harbor; this caused a temporary decline in prices, however, more imports would be 
needed as “there is but a very small quantity of grain in the country.”39    
 What accounts for the dramatic change in tone from the letters of May and June to those 
of July is unclear as none explains a new crisis to cause a rapid change in market conditions.  
Wellesley’s advance towards Spain was underway; however, the battle of Talevera that ended 
this advance was not fought until July 27-28.40 It is possible that all three merchants anticipated 
local harvests as sufficiently dire to create the real possibility of famine, thereby providing an 
opportunity for US grain merchants.  It is also possible that each had sources of information that 
they did not fully disclose.  Whatever the cause, the letters proved remarkably accurate as 
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wartime demand, large government contracts, and robust American exports characterized 
commercial interactions for the next four years.        
Wellington’s retreat from Talavera was only one of the defeats suffered by the anti-
France alliance in 1809.  The failure of the Walchern expedition against the Low Countries and 
the collapse of Austria in the wake of the battles of Aspern-Essling and Wagram (July 9, 1809) 
left Wellington’s forces in Portugal as the only British army in action against Napoleon’s empire, 
and Iberia as the only open rebellion in Europe against his authority.41  The progress of the war 
was mixed for Spanish forces.  Victory at Tamames (October 18, 1809) matched defeats at 
Ocana (November 19, 1809) and Alba (November 28, 1809).42  Peace in central Europe allowed 
Napoleon to provide re-enforcements for Spain; stung by the continued presence of Wellington’s 
forces in Portugal and suspecting that the continued Spanish resistance was linked to the fate of 
Wellington, Napoleon committed tens of thousands of re-enforcements to the peninsula in early 
1810 to eliminate both threats once and for all.                
The events of 1809 and early 1810 introduced three vital elements that shaped US grain 
trade for the remainder of the peninsular campaign.  French occupation and the destruction of 
local production increased demand for imported grain.  Moreover, the introduction of British 
forces to the peninsula and subsidies paid to local allies connected Iberia to the British economy, 
on one hand, and to American grain, on the other.  Second, the re-imposition by the US of the 
Non-Intercourse Act prohibited its direct trade with Great Britain, but did not interfere with trade 
to Spain and Portugal.  The introduction of a new policy by Napoleon on trade with Great Britain 
provided another significant change in the geo-political dynamic.   
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A new licensed trade scheme in March 1809 allowed for a limited trade between France 
and Great Britain in certain enumerated commodities. Bountiful crops in France and Holland, 
along with poor harvests in Britain, created an opportunity for a trade in grain between Europe 
and Britain.  A limited licensed trade in 1809 and 1810 transferred approximately 1.5 million 
quarters of wheat between the two empires even while at war.  Other agricultural products such 
as wine and brandy were also included under the licenses.43  Subsequent expansions of the 
number of licenses in circulation in France in December 1809 and February 1810 combined with 
a spike in grain exports to Britain from Germany, Prussia, Holland, and Flanders filled the need 
caused by the failed 1810 harvest.44   
The licensed trade created another problem for Great Britain.  In 1810 Napoleon 
mandated that all grain exports to Britain be paid for in gold or silver; the specie reserves of the 
Bank of England had been reduced by £4.5 million between 1808 and 1811 with almost £1.4 
million of this reduction paid directly to Napoleon’s treasury.45  Other provisions of the license 
system included a demand that part of the cargos traded to Britain would contain a percentage of 
French wine and brandy in addition to grain products; it was feared that a failure to comply 
would result in Napoleon banning grain exports from France as well the grain regions of the 
Baltic under his influence.46  Although Napoleon’s licensed trade was not technically related to 
the Anglo-American grain trade, this import substitution reduced the demand for US grain in 
Britain, thereby limiting the potential effects of the Non-Intercourse Act.  As a net importer of 
grain for this period, Britain and Ireland could not supply grain for Wellington and the peninsular 
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effort during the 1810 campaign and the winter of 1810-11, thereby compelling him to seek 
supplies elsewhere.  The need for specie to sustain consumption at home exacerbated the 
shortage of gold and silver available to support Wellington’s army in the peninsula. 
Conspicuous by its absence is the lack of grain exports from the Canadas and the 
Maritime Provinces during a time of famine in the metropole and strong demand for provisions 
to sustain the war effort.  According to Galpin’s statistics, only slightly more than 24,000 
quarters of grain entered into the United Kingdom from British North America in 1810 out of 
total imports of over 1.5 million quarters.  This amounts to slightly more than 25% of the amount 
imported from the United States in spite of the fact that direct trade was illegal under American 
law that year.47  Statistics for British North American grain exports to Iberia were equally 
modest in 1810.  According to the accounting of Parliament, only 16 total ships cleared Canadian 
or Maritime harbors for any port south of Cape Finisterre. The volume of trade was not 
substantive.  Clearances from Newfoundland to southern Europe, undoubtedly carrying fish, 
remained far more common.48  The US was Britain’s only major and reliable source of grain to 
forestall famine.  The immediate urgency of the trade had changed, but the fundamental 
economic relationship begun in the colonial period had not.  The peninsular trade allowed a 
profound integration among US farmers, millers, merchants and British capital and consumers 
(including the military), who used the larger geo-political situation to satisfy local needs and 
interests.                  
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By March 1810, the only remaining part of Spain under the direct authority of the anti-
Bonaparte Junta was the city of Cadiz.49  Besieged within the port city and without access to the 
hinterland, its defenders required outside sources of grain.  Dependency on the United States 
raised fears of disruption for British officials in the peninsula.  General Thomas Graham, senior 
British military officer in Cadiz, complained to Wellington that US traders effectively controlled 
the Cadiz grain market, thereby granting an unwarrantable influence over the city.  Any 
interruption of the neutral American grain trade could transform the defending army into a half-
starved mob, much as the lack of logistical support had done to the besieging French forces.50  
The value of the exchange was not lost on US merchants even though it came with notable risks.  
In March 1810, the London merchant firm of Morewood wrote to Levi Hollingsworth relaying 
news from Charles Wilson of the saga of the American ship Apollo, which ran aground in a gale 
outside Cadiz harbor.  The ship and cargo were burnt by the French. The Morewoods expressed 
the hope that Hollingsworth’s investment in the vessel was insured.51  It is intriguing that news 
of this disaster in Cadiz reached Philadelphia via business correspondence with London at a time 
when direct trade between the two ports was technically illegal, further highlighting  the 
persistent connections between American and British interests via Iberia.      
Outside of the war’s direct impact on Iberian agriculture, 1810 proved to be a difficult 
year for production in Portugal and Spain due to the weather.  In April and May, Jervis wrote a 
series of letters to Hollingsworth advising him that scarcity- and therefore rising prices- would 
continue for the foreseeable future as “there has not been known for several years a greater 
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scarcity of flour and grain than now exists.”52 An uncommonly wet spring “nearly destroyed the 
lowlands wheat crop, and the early grains on the uplands were of a very unfavourable 
appearance.”  Therefore, Jarvis was persuaded that “a favourable prospect offers for 
advantageous speculations to this country in those articles [flour, wheat, and corn] as well as 
rice, and we recommend your engaging in them unless large quantities have been shipped.”53  A 
subsequent message in June reinforced that the harvest “proves but ordinary,” and that it would 
“make little to no impression on the market.”54  
The journal of August Ludolf Friedrich Schaumann, a Deputy Assistant Commissary-
General serving with Wellington’s army, demonstrates the effort required to supply the army.  
Schaumann’s adventures as one of Wellington’s commissaries started in August 1810 during the 
British retreat through Portugal to Lisbon, during which civilians were subjected to “a reign of 
terror” by the contending armies. All citizens were evacuated as the French army advanced, 
however, there was not adequate warning to salvage the grain harvest from the fields or the filled 
barns of northern Portugal.55  The surviving crop was seized or destroyed by the French, which 
exacerbated an already tenuous supply situation. It is interesting to note that Jarvis’ observations 
date from June 1810; this suggests that the necessity for imported American grain predated the 
French invasion of the country and Wellington’s later orders to evacuate the countryside.  A 
subsequent letter from Jarvis suggests that the market was subject to certain fluctuations 
however.  Writing Hollingsworth on September 1, he noted that the price of rice and Indian corn 
was in decline due to the volume of imports from the US as well as from the Mediterranean.  It is 
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curious that Jarvis did not mention wheat or flour here.56  Three weeks later he observed that 
“our market continues favourable for flour and grain, and from the scarcity of wheat in the 
country those articles must command good prices during the winter and ensuing spring unless 
very large shipments are made from the United States.”57   
The 1810 campaign saw the advance of French forces throughout the peninsula.  The 
capture of Ciuidad Rodrigo in July and Almeida in August removed the two fortresses guarding 
the Spanish-Portuguese border and allowed for the advance of Marshal Andre Massena’s forces 
into Portugal.  Temporarily checked at Bussaco (September 27), Massena’s advance only ground 
to a halt on the outskirts of Lisbon. 58  In retreating towards his seaborne lines of communication, 
Wellington eased his logistical burdens and increased those of his enemy.  However, this strategy 
could only be successful under very specific circumstances. Local supplies must be denied to the 
French army, and, second, an alternative supply of foodstuffs sufficient to support Wellington’s 
troops, the Portuguese army, civilian refugees, and Lisbon’s entire population had to be found.  
This hinged on the availability of American grain imports, as local production was already not 
adequate to the demand prior to wartime disruption.   
This became Wellington’s official policy by the winter of 1810-11, when the British 
army was besieged on the lines of Torres Vedras, outside of Lisbon.  The strategic withdrawal 
towards Lisbon reflected the difficulty of travel over rugged terrain and poor roads.  According 
to Sir George Cockburn’s observations of the country,   
the defense of Portugal had most to rely on, is the extreme barrenness and poverty 
of the country, and the difficult of feeding an army.  The defending army may, if 
pressed, fall back on its resources, whereas the invading one must bring 
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everything with it; add to this the badness of the roads and the steepness of the 
mountains.59   
 
The retreat on Lisbon was more than just a military strategy, despoiling the countryside was also 
civil policy that increased the burden on Wellington’s supplies as Lisbon and the surrounding 
countryside closely resembled an armed camp with an estimated 420,000 people including 
civilians and refugees.60  The human cost of this could be appalling.  British commissariat officer 
Schaumann noted in spring 1811 that “even the most appalling scenes of the Thirty Years 
War…are nothing compared with the horrors, the misery, and the devastation that I have 
witnessed.”61  If Lisbon suffered, the French soldiers outside the lines suffered more.  Writing 
home in 1812, William Stothert noted that French “deserters are continually coming in, who 
report that the enemy is destitute of bread and the troops have neither wine nor spirits.”62  
Despite the costs, Wellington’s strategy was working.      
In May 1810 the US Congress repealed the Non-Intercourse Act and replaced it with a 
new policy known as Macon’s Bill #2.  It repealed all previous trade restrictions against Great 
Britain and France, but threatened that non-importation would be re-imposed if either France or 
Britain repealed their restrictions on neutral trade and the other power did not follow suit.63  In 
August 1810, Napoleon issued the Cadore Letter that purportedly repealed the Berlin and Milan 
decrees against American trade but only on the condition that the United States enforce a non-
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intercourse policy with Britain.  There was well-founded skepticism in the US and Britain that 
Napoleon really intended to end trade restrictions.  US Ambassador John Armstrong and most 
Federalist newspapers regarded it as an effort to divide the United States and Great Britain.64  
The one believer in the Cadore Letter was President Madison, who hoped French revocation of 
the Berlin and Milan Decrees would be followed by the revocation of the Orders-in-Council by 
Britain.65  This was not the case; the British government regarded the offer as spurious therefore 
Madison re-instated trade restrictions with Britain.66 The president also called for Congress to 
ban the use of British trade licenses, to redouble efforts to prevent smuggling, and to begin 
raising an army.67  The re-established Non-importation Act of 1811 did not restrict the supply of 
American grain to the peninsula as the polite fiction of neutral trade with Spain and Portugal 
covered such trading relationships.  
A more complete quantitative record for American trade can be found in Congressman 
Timothy Pitkin’s A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States.  Pitkin draws on 
Treasury Department and congressional records to assess both trading partners and the exact 
commodity of exchange.  His research from 1816 and 1817 clarifies and expands on the overall 
contours of the link between US grain and the Peninsular War and provides context for the 
activities of Hollingsworth and his business associates.  Although the Hollingsworth operation 
was significant, it fits within the broader pattern of exchange suggesting that other merchants 
also saw opportunity.   
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Table 6.1:  US Grain Exports to Iberia, 1809-181168 
Year Wheat 
(Bushels)-
Portugal 
Flour (Barrels)-
Portugal 
Wheat 
(Bushels)-
Spain 
Flour 
(Barrels)- 
Spain 
1809 43,214 65,149 Nil 40,047 
1810 45,588 88,696 13,125 144,436 
1811 55,033 529,105 21,199 306,074 
   
Pitkin’s statistics substantiate US merchants’ enthusiasm for the Iberian trade during war; there 
were certain risks, however, to the explosive rate of growth.  The statistics also reflect on the 
success of Wellington’s gamble of abandoning the Portuguese and Spanish countryside and 
depending on imported provisions as an essential part of his strategy.  This happy correlation 
between British military policy, British capital resources, and US merchant suppliers, however, 
could be subject to disruption.  The trading relationship between the US and Great Britain 
perversely controlled both the fate of the British campaign and the American economy.  
One of the more serious effects of Non-Importation was on Wellington’s dwindling 
supply of specie. Prior to the enactment of non-importation laws, American imports could be 
purchased with bills of exchange that could be used in Britain to buy goods for export to the 
United States or to transfer funds to British merchant firms through a triangular trading 
relationship linking American producers and British consumers via Iberia.  British Treasury 
Department bills became a common medium of exchange, as a number of letters between 
Hollingsworth and his business associates illustrate.  A September 17, 1810 letter from 
Morewood to Hollingsworth notes that their mutual business associate Francis Elbing had 
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enclosed a draft upon “His Majesty’s Treasury” due in 30 days for the purchase of a cargo of 
flour from the ship Hope.  An October bill of exchange to Morewood, drawn on the British 
government for £1,000 sterling, was endorsed in favor of William Bell of Pennsylvania, another 
partner of Morewood and Hollingsworth. Morewood confirmed to Levi Hollingsworth a similar 
transaction for £520 drawn on the merchant firm of Bulkeley’s of London.  Trade in British 
treasury bills remained as an April 13, 1811 letter reported another draft of £1,000 sterling 
received by Morewood from Elbing in Lisbon. A confirmation letter to Elbing specified that this 
draft upon the treasury was part of the proceeds of Levi Hollingsworth and Sons’ “half interest in 
the cargo of wheat and flour” carried by the American brig Factor from Baltimore to the 
Tagus.69   
 The significant feature of this correspondence is the direct connection it shows between 
the British government and US farmers and grain merchants using British treasury drafts rather 
than specie as the means of payment.  The use of treasury bills implies the acceptance of a fiat 
currency in anticipation of further trading relations either in Britain itself or with other merchants 
that would accept British treasury notes as currency.  Non-Importation potentially limited this 
exchange since future trading relationship could be disrupted by government intervention into 
these economic relationships.  Specie, as a universal store of value in its own right, was, of 
course, still acceptable as a currency; unfortunately, the availability of specie is limited, 
generally, and especially so on the peninsula as the demand for gold and silver to support the 
military effort and in local expenditures far exceeded the supply.          
Under Non-Importation payment via bills of exchange or treasury notes became more 
difficult.  Wellington was compelled to allow the export of specie by US traders “to the great 
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distress of the army and the ruin of the country [Portugal],” as they were delivering “articles of 
the first necessity.”70  Wellington allocated £400,000 for provisions from the US.  According to 
historian Roger Knight, these funds were funneled through Sampayo’s Lisbon trading house to 
facilitate the acquisition of flour, biscuit, and maize “transported to [to Lisbon] in neutral ships 
and using British licenses.”71  Demand remained stiff through early 1811; a February 21 letter 
from Thomas and Samuel Hollingsworth to their father Levi on the flour trade through Baltimore 
noted that “much [is] coming in daily and is bot [sic] and shipped as fast as it as it arrives, 
chiefly for Spain and Portugal.”72  The key figure connecting the Portuguese government, the 
British army, and US merchants was the same Sampayo, who was noted in a March 1811 letter 
to Levi Hollingsworth from a Baltimore firm, as “a contractor for the army in Portugal” who was 
purchasing “immense” quantities of flour from Gilman and Sons.  They hoped that their business 
with Sampayo via the Gilmans would increase in time, though the present order was only 4,000 
barrels.73  
Unable to break through the Torres Vedras lines and unable to sustain a siege due to the 
lack of supplies, French forces under Massena retreated into Spain by March 1811.74  Guarding 
the two major roads over the border against an allied incursion were the fortress cities of 
Badajoz, Almeida, and Ciuidad Rodrigo, which became the focus of the campaign.  The first 
allied siege of Badajoz commenced on May 6.  The desperate fighting at Fuentes de Onoro (May 
3-5) and Albeuera (May 16) resulted in the repulse of Massena’s counterattack into Portugal, 
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however, Wellington’s attempts to storm Badajoz failed.75  After refitting, Wellington then 
besieged Ciuidad Rodrigo in August, which would only be taken on January 19, 1812.  Badajoz 
suffered the same fate on April 6, leaving control of the frontier in the hands of Wellington.76             
The sieges of early 1812 were only possible due to the logistical support structure 
constructed in 1810 and 1811.  This permitted Wellington to operate with a secure supply 
system, which was dependent on the United States.  Overall, American cargos amounted to 
nearly half of the total supplies issued by the British army commissariat in 1810 and 1811.77  The 
strategy of depending on imported foodstuffs worked.  A June 7, 1811 letter from Richard 
Garwood, a business correspondent in Lisbon, to Levi Hollingsworth reported that cargos of 
grain were arriving in Lisbon daily; the volume of imports was such that the city had run out of 
storage.78  His letter also touched upon an unforeseen side effect of the American Non-
Importation Act.  Unable to acquire British goods for re-export and concerned about the price of 
a return cargo of salt, Garwood attempted to sell one of Hollingsworth’s grain ships.  Unable to 
sell the ship, he purchased a return cargo of salt “sufficient to ballast with.”79  
By July 1811, immediate starvation was not a concern of Wellington; in a July 4 letter to 
Admiral George Berkeley Wellington noted that the store of provisions in Lisbon was much 
improved due to recent imports from the United States purchased by the Portuguese 
government.80  The glut within the market did not slow imports however as market surpluses 
proved temporary in the face of increasing demands.  A letter from the partnership of 
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Hollingsworth and Worthington in Baltimore to Levi Hollingsworth in Philadelphia noted the 
appearance of Mr. Sampayo in Baltimore, the expectation was that he would offer $8 per barrel 
for flour, and that “he seemed anxious to purchase.”  The US trade restrictions, however, added 
risk to this transaction.  The correspondents noted that “were we sure that his [Sampayo’s] bills 
on London would do, we think we would make a profitable sale- we wod [would] however, 
prefer selling 25 cents lower to get Gilmor’s endorsement or acceptance.”81  The letter does not 
state whether the bills in question were drawn directly on the British treasury, on British banks, 
or on British merchant firms, but as this correspondence suggests the mechanism of exchange 
was itself complex and risky.  
A letter to Levi Hollingsworth from Jonathan Ogden in New York raised the same issue.  
Ogden wrote that in anticipation of encountering “difficulties in procuring specie in Lisbon, I 
will be content to have my share of the proceeds remitted to Rob’t [Robert] Ogden of Leeds, 
Eng. [land] in good bills of exchange.”82   Whatever the difficulties, the potential market was 
vast and expanding.  Intelligence received from the firm of Bulkeley and Son in Lisbon noted 
that re-enforcements arriving for Wellington’s army had driven demand and prices even higher.  
Quoting the prices in Lisbon for September 9, 1811, Bulkeley wrote that flour now sold for $10 
to $12 per barrel in the Lisbon marketplace.83  That price quote is an interesting contrast to the 
$8 per barrel offered in the Baltimore market, and the $15 per barrel quoted by Eck only three 
weeks prior.  A September 25 letter from Hollingsworth and Worthington outlined the terms of 
an offer to sell 2,000 barrels of flour to Gilmor and Sons at $8 per barrel for resell to Sampayo.84    
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The price of flour in Lisbon continued to fluctuate based on the volume of arrivals.  Less 
than one month after Bulkeley’s offer, Francis Elbling reported to Levi Hollingworth that the 
1,200 barrels of flour delivered by the ship Jane safely arrived and was sold for $16 per barrel.  
More arrivals, however, would likely cause a price decline in the near future.85  This fear was not 
realized.  A November 29 letter noted that “the nominal price of flour [in the Lisbon market] is 
$15; Sampayo is very sanguine on his expectation of getting more than the price quoted.”86  Two 
December letters from Wellington to Charles Stuart outline the possibilities and difficulties of 
the persistent trade for British officials.  Stuart lamented that the Portuguese people as well as the 
British army would need to be supplied by the United States at least until the next harvest.87  The 
increasing shortage of specie in the military chest made bills of exchange the preferred medium 
of payment, but Stuart was authorized to send specie if that was not possible.88  
  The statistical analysis provided by Secretary of the Treasury Gallatin and Congressman 
Timothy Pitkin lend support for General Graham’s and Lord Wellington’s observations on the 
importance of US grain imports even if the impact of the trade was not always apparent.  
Secretary Gallatin presented a series of statistics on the Spanish trade that showed US exports to 
exceed 380,000 barrels of flour to Spain’s Atlantic ports for the year starting September 1811.89  
Gallatin estimated that the value of exports to those ports alone amounted to over $4.5 million.  
HIs figures do not identify purchasers, though historian W. Freeman Galpin claims that “the 
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greater share of these supplies was intended for the English armies” is persuasive in light of the 
business activities of Sampayo as a provisions contractor with US merchants.90   
By April 1812, Congress passed an embargo and non-importation act for 90 days.91  
Wellington noted this in a May 8, 1812 letter to Thomas Graham in which he observed that the 
news of the embargo is of the highest importance as “all this part of the peninsula had been 
living this year on American flour.”92  Although Wellington’s comment suggests that a more 
permanent embargo could have given a great deal of leverage to the United States by holding the 
grain trade hostage, the die was already cast.  The dependency of Wellington’s army, and the 
interests of American farmers, millers, and merchants combined to sustain a British licensing 
system. The peaceful exchange of US grain to Iberia and the British forces in the peninsula 
would continue despite the state of war between the United States and Great Britain. 
Wellington’s writings indicate the importance of continuing the grain trade for the British army, 
however, the effects on the US economy were significant as well.   
Gallatin’s earlier report to congress outlined both the effect of trade disruption for 
revenues and the potential danger of a war to the American economy.  Gallatin reported that with 
the help of loans it would be possible to fund a potential war, but only if customs duties were 
increased and “a proper selection of internal taxes” raised to encourage domestic loans, as 
foreign ones would be “nearly unobtainable” due to the conflict in Europe.93  A January 1812 
letter from Gallatin to Congress estimated that war would cause customs revenue to decline by 
over half.94  Declines in revenue and increases in expenditures would be met by borrowing; 
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however, Gallatin warned that “as the ability to borrow is diminished, the necessity of resorting 
to taxation is increased.”95 
Gallatin’s warning represents a significant statement of Jeffersonian political economy, 
the role of external trade in the national economy, and the dangers posed to the Jeffersonian ideal 
posed by the disconnect between his economic ideas and his foreign policy.  Minimal internal 
taxation was a hallmark of Jeffersonian policy. In theory customs revenues derived from the 
consumption of luxuries provided an adequate substitute for potentially divisive direct taxation.  
These two articles of domestic faith collided with Jeffersonian foreign relations, with significant 
consequences as the unresolved contradiction between the two reached an inevitable reckoning. 
The need for revenue from licensed trade and for external markets to sell agricultural 
surpluses denied the United States an important opportunity to hamstring the British war effort in 
Europe.  Whether this is a missed opportunity, or a foresworn opportunity is not clear.  In Donald 
Hickey’s “American Trade Restrictions during the War of 1812,” he argues that the British 
blockade and trade restrictions were not designed to stop American trade with Canada nor could 
American laws designed to end trade with the enemy be enforced.96  Brian Arthur’s How Britain 
Won the War of 1812 disagrees with this premise.  According to Arthur, over the course of the 
war Britain’s blockade limited American tax revenues from customs, thereby eroding political 
support for the war and the ability of the federal government to sustain the war.97  Both 
viewpoints can be reconciled through a more nuanced application of both premises.  British 
authorities used the blockade to sustain politically and materially beneficial exchanges while 
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denying market access to less beneficial trading relationships.  The provisions for a licensed 
trade combined with a geographically selective implementation of the blockade rendered British 
interdiction of trade more a “gate” under British control rather than a solid “wall” hemming 
Americans in.98 
Licensed trade during war had been discussed by key flour merchants as early as January 
2, 1812, six months prior to the actual declaration of war.  Jonathan Ogden was certain that a 
wartime license could be obtained from the British Consul for the ship Amazon, then loading 
grain for Lisbon on the account of H.J. Sampayo.99  Subsequently, two flour ships with 8,000 
barrels of flour departed Baltimore for Lisbon on Sampayo’s account.100  As the possibility of 
war shifted from rumor to near certainty, the British necessity for licensed trade was evident.  As 
one US merchant explained to another, “the present situation of the British troops in Spain & 
Portugal” mean that “American vessels will be permitted to carry commodities by British 
cruziers [sic] even tho letters of marque and reprisal be issued.”101       
The existence of a license system was confirmed by subsequent events.  Prior to leaving 
Washington in June 1812, the recently promoted British Ambassador Foster issued explicit 
licenses for US merchantmen to continue the grain trade with the Peninsula.  Additional trade 
licenses were issued by Admiral Sawyer of the Halifax squadron, Consul Allen in Boston, and 
Consul Stewart in New London.  By August 1812, over 500 licenses had been issued and they 
were openly bought and sold in US ports.  The licenses were validated by London and included 
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the return voyage from Spain to the United States.102  As John Melish noted in his 1812 
travelogue of his journey through the United States:   
The foreign commerce of the United States has suffered severely by the 
restrictions of foreign powers; and it will now be materially affected, no doubt, by 
the present war; but such is the profusion of provisions and raw materials in the 
United States, which some of the belligerent powers cannot do very well without, 
that there must be a considerable export trade under any circumstances.103  
 
The potential of licensed wartime trade created a quandary for many Americans.  In an 
April 1812 letter to President Madison, Jefferson advised “that commerce under certain 
restrictions and licenses may be indulged between enemies, mutually advantageous to the 
individuals, and not to their injury as belligerents.”104  In private letters to Jefferson, Madison 
expressed dismay over the use of British licenses to trade with neutral Iberian ports since the 
licensed trade was “pregnant with abuses of the worst sort.”  His opposition to British licenses 
did not extend to ending all trade with Portugal and Spain, however.  Madison believed that in 
the event of war, Spanish and Portuguese “flags and papers real or counterfeit, will afford neutral 
cover to our produce as far as wanted” since “the scarcity all over Europe, and the dependence of 
the W. Indies on our supplies” would inevitably create profits for wheat and grain merchants.105  
Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin reconciled war and trade on the narrow grounds that Lisbon 
and Cadiz remained under Portuguese and Spanish governance, therefore they “are not enemy 
ports, altho’ there are enemy troops in both.”106  In essence, Gallatin’s interpretation of trade 
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policy was to officially ignore the British presence. In a long American tradition dating back to 
the colonies, Madison’s solution to the conundrum was outright smuggling! 
 An examination of US Treasury reports to Congress during the war years and the 
Historical Statistics of the United States paints an interesting picture of the deepening crisis 
facing the US economy as the war progressed.  Although the exact figures in these sources vary, 
there is a consistent pattern of rising expenditures, a continued reliance on customs for federal 
revenue, and the lack of internal taxation.107  This combination of factors increased the 
government’s dependence on loans.  Ironically, the ability of the United States Treasury to 
borrow was underwritten by continued trade with Great Britain in spite of the declaration of war. 
This connection is illustrated by the effect that the unexpected declaration of war in June 1812 
created for US merchants in Britain. A misunderstanding arose; many merchants believed that 
with the repeal of the Orders-in-Council by Britain that the US Non-Intercourse law was also 
repealed.  This misunderstanding was perpetuated by Jonathon Russell, American charge 
d’affairs in Britain, who advised American merchants to ship their goods home based on his 
understanding of Madison’s Non-importation Act.  After the declaration of war, he still advised 
American merchantmen to return home with their goods because “if the property remained in 
England during the war, it would be ruinous to the holders.”108   
In a November 4, 1812 letter to Congress, President Madison hoped that the Congress 
would resolve this situation in an equitable manner in the public interest as “it did not seem 
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proper to exercise….the ordinary powers vested in the Treasury Department to mitigate 
forfeitures without affording to Congress an opportunity of making on the subject such provision 
as they may think proper.”  Later in the same letter, however, he also expressed the cheerful 
observation that “the duties on the late unexpected importations of British manufactures will 
render the revenue of the ensuing year more productive than could be anticipated.”109 The 
surprisingly resilient nature of the American economy for the first 12 to 18 months of the war 
can be accounted for due to accommodations like licenses and impromptu reinterpretations of 
trade law.  
 This success can be traced through the performance of government loan drives over the 
course of the war.  Gallatin reported to Congress in May 1812 that in two days lenders had 
subscribed $6.1 million of a proposed $11 million loan to the government, of which $4.2 million 
was subscribed by banks and $1.9 million by individuals.  Books for accepting subscriptions 
were opened in banks stretching from Boston, Hartford, New York, Philadelphia, and other 
major American cities, and interest rates were not to exceed 6 per cent.110  The expense of the 
war caused an increase in the amount of money loaned to the United States Treasury.  By 
December 1812, Gallatin reported that a total of $13.1 million had been received, of which $9.1 
million was loaned by banks and $3.9 million by individuals at 6 per cent or in exchange for 
treasury notes.111   Although the treasury report provides a breakdown for each back, the record 
is silent on who the individual lenders were, or what the origins of the funds for those 
institutional investments were.112     
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Timothy Pitkin’s studies estimated the value of flour and wheat exports to Spain and 
Portugal at approximately $12 million for 1812 and $15 million in 1813, with additional earnings 
from other agricultural commodities.  In a slight revision in the 1817 second edition, Pitkin 
increased the total exports of the US for the fiscal year ending October 1813 at $25 million; of 
which $23 million consisted of agricultural exports “principally of flour and provisions sent to 
the peninsula.”113  The value of exports and customs revenues are linked because customs 
revenues fluctuate with the volume of trade.  Increased trade between the United States and 
Iberia illustrates the crucial intersection of private and government US economic interests and 
British private and military ones in permitting this trade to thrive.   
If the debate in political circles on the propriety of trading with the enemy with a license 
was inconclusive, the actual means by which the system worked was murky.  Fears that political 
intervention to stop the license system were ever-present in the minds of US merchants.  Levi 
Hollingsworth noted in a September 16 letter to Vincent Stubbs that “after November, trade may 
be stopped again, to please Bonaparte as all our late shipments have been to Spain and Portugal 
to feed his enemies, which neither he, or we fear Mr. Madison approves of.”114  A more 
optimistic Thomas Hollingsworth in Baltimore wrote to his father on the same day with the 
opinion that “we do not think that congress will interfere with the exportations of flour to the 
Peninsula.”115  It was unclear, however, how long the license system would last.  Upon a rumor 
that no more licenses would be issued, existing licenses became a valuable commodity 
themselves.  Prices for a license for Lisbon reached $1,000 and a Cadiz license $1,250 by the end 
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of October 1812.  Fear of the end of the licenses was confirmed by Jonathon Ogden in November 
1812; although existing licenses would be honored no more would be printed.116  By January 
1813, the price of licenses had increased to as much as $2,000 for Lisbon and $2,500 for 
Cadiz.117  A letter from H.J. Sampayo in Lisbon, however, informed Hollingsworth and 
Worthington that all American grain ships, with or without a license, were guaranteed safe 
passage to Lisbon and Cadiz by order of the British admiral commanding the Lisbon station.118  
Trusting in his correspondent, Ogden dispatched three vessels for Lisbon, since “Sampayo has 
the means of getting the vessels away without much risk of capture.”119      
Legal sanction, or, at least, US official acquiescence, to trade did not guarantee profit.  
The voyage of the ship Thalia from Philadelphia to Lisbon with a cargo of grain in December 
1812 illustrates the potential benefits- and difficulties- of conducting trade under these uncertain 
terms.  In the 38-day voyage, the Thalia was boarded by an American privateer (and released), 
and an English brig of war (and allowed to proceed).  On the return voyage, it was stopped again 
by two British warships, “treated politely,” and allowed to proceed.120  Of far greater concern to 
Charles Baker, the ship’s supercargo of the Thalia, was the depressed state of the Lisbon market.  
Due to the great number of grain ships from America arriving in Lisbon harbor, there was now 
an eight-month supply of grain in store, and further trade was restricted by the lack of hard 
currency.  In a January 17, 1813 letter, Baker lamented that the number of American grain ships 
offloading in the harbor were of such number that there was a shortage of lighters.121  It took two 
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weeks until he could report the sale of Thalia’s cargo for bills of exchange drawn on the London 
firm of John Bulkeley and Sons.122         
A motion was proposed in Congress in March 1813 to outlaw the use of British licenses, 
but it was defeated in the House of Representatives by the single vote of Speaker of the House 
and war hawk Henry Clay.123  In justifying this vote, Clay noted that continued grain exports to 
the British army in the peninsula would be paid for in specie, thereby weakening the British 
economy and providing injections of capital into the wartime American economy.124  Clay’s vote 
is particularly ironic given his support for the war in Canada, however, there is a deeper 
significance as the vote of the House demonstrates both the confused nature of the conflict with 
Great Britain as well as collective recognition of the importance of British markets for US 
agriculture.  Timothy Pitkin’s statistical analysis paints a rosy picture for the American export 
trade even through the first 18 months of the war that suggests the value of US trade to the 
peninsula not only exceeded Treasury Department estimates, but increased in volume after the 
declaration of war. 125        
Table 6.2:  US Grain Exports to Iberia, 1812-14126 
Year Wheat 
(Bushels)- 
Portugal 
Flour (Barrels)- 
Portugal 
Wheat 
(Bushels)- Spain 
Flour (Barrels)- 
Spain 
1812 33,591 557,218 8,865 381,726 
1813 214,126 542,399 74,709 430,101 
1814 Nil 4,141 Nil 221 
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The combined statistics from Pitkin and the Treasury Department are significant, and reflect the 
sweeping parameters of trade.    The totals of grain exports are significant, and represents an 
increase in exports due both to the demand in Iberia as well as the need for American merchants 
to export their product under almost any circumstances.  One variation is the dramatic increase in 
wheat exports rather than flour in the 1813, which may indicate the desperation felt by American 
merchants that trade would soon be closed.  One potential explanation for this changed pattern is 
the milling requirements for converting wheat into flour.  Although harvest occupied a relatively 
short period of time in the fall, the mills required waterpower that increased during the spring 
run-off.  The statistics suggest that wheat was not a replacement for flour exports and the 
aberration of this volume can only be explained as a function of a desperate effort to sell as much 
grain as possible- processed or not- while it was possible.      
Pitkin’s statistics also provide an interesting insight for the export of Indian corn.  There 
was a substantial volume of exported Indian corn from 1811 to 1813 from the United States to 
the West-Indies, Spain, and Portugal.  In 1811, the United States exported 2.8 million bushels of 
corn and 147,426 bushels of corn meal at a total value of almost $2.9 million.  Exports dipped 
slightly in 1812 and 1813, totaling only $1.9 million in 1812 and $1.8 million in 1813.127  Corn 
was another significant trade item for provisioning the peninsula.  According to S.D. 
Broughton’s observations on local cuisine during his service in Iberia, “indian corn is the most 
abundant, form its’ answering so great a variety of purposes.  It is made into meal for bread and 
cakes, and in other respects forms a considerable article of the diet.  The horses and mules are 
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also fed upon it, while the stalks and leaves maintain the oxen.”128  The cumulative nature of the 
accounts, however, conceals a gradual decreasing demand for American imports that is reflected 
in the correspondence of the merchants engaged in the practical business of trade.  This was the 
reply of British and US officials to the seemingly irreconcilable nature of wartime trade:  
licenses permitting continuance of trade due to the mutual benefits would be treated as a form of 
neutral trade between the US, Spain, and Portugal despite the role of British money in the 
exchange, consumption by British soldiers, and the role of imported provisions to sustain the 
civilians of Spain and Portugal, which was a key British military goal.      
Congressional sanction and economic interest combined with British permission allowed 
the market to exist, but the experience of the Thalia was becoming the norm. As the market 
shifted and the demand for continuous imports declined, the profit motive and military necessity 
for continuing trade became less compelling.   In a March 14, 1813 letter to Levi Hollingsworth, 
Jonathon Ogden relayed an extract of a letter he received from H.J. Sampayo in Lisbon.  
Sampayo’s news was that although all ships with licenses had safely departed Lisbon, the market 
was so glutted with American produce that he “confidently hope no further shipments will arrive 
from you.”  Four days later, Ogden was slightly more hopeful as Sampayo’s brother had just left 
his company in New York with the suggestion that prices might improve given a little time.129  
This optimism was misplaced; by September Ogden received word that the already existing 
surplus of 257,000 barrels of flour in the Lisbon market would not be needed by Wellington’s 
army.130  
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H.J. Sampayo directly informed Levi Hollingsworth that the flour stocks on hand “were 
very considerable, equal to nine months consumption provided there are no further arrivals from 
any quarter and as the supply of the combined armies is now drawn altogether from England & 
Ireland, any improvement [in price] would only be temporary.”131  As the war progressed into 
1813 the necessity of imported grain declined as the battlefield advanced and other sources of 
grain became available.  The shortage of grain had been replaced by a surplus with catastrophic 
consequences for American exports.    
The declining profits from the Iberian licensed trade, and thus lower customs revenue, 
necessitated a strong US government loan drive in 1813.  Although the war was not successful at 
this point for the US, the only material economic change between 1812 and 1813 was access to 
international markets, which, in turn, were directly linked to US agricultural exports.  The June 
1813 Treasury Department report to congress by Acting Treasury Secretary William Jones noted 
that “capitalists will advance with greater readiness, and at a lower rate of interests, the funds 
necessary for the prosecution of the war” only if taxes could be raised in order to guarantee the 
payment of interest and principal on government debt.  Dramatically increasing wartime 
expenditures, a federal revenue system dependent on customs, and minor efforts at internal 
taxation resulted in an estimated deficit for 1813 of approximately $17 million.132  
To secure loan funding, the treasury was compelled to offer a significant discount on 
government debt in order to entice investors to lend to the government.  In addition to the 6 
percent interest rate, the treasury also offered securities at 88 percent of par, which (by treasury 
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calculations) gave each investor a premium of $13.63 7/11 cents for each $100 lent.  The terms 
reopened the debate on imposing internal taxes; Jones argued to Congress that the loans for the 
upcoming campaign would require support from internal taxes in order to “facilitate the 
obtaining of the loan, and secondly, for procuring it on favorable terms.”133 In May 1813, 
Congress levied a series of internal taxes, however, the stated goals for revenue remained minor 
compared to the looming deficit and tax receipts and “could not be expected to aid the treasury 
until 1814.”134   
The implementation of internal taxation to support a foreign war represents a break with 
classical Jeffersonian political economy.  Indeed, the action adopts the very practices for which 
Jefferson and other leaders of the Democratic-Republican party criticized the Federalists for in 
the 1790s.  To support a rapidly collapsing war effort, the Jeffersonians sacrificed an important 
ideological principle driven by the foreseeable economic catastrophe that would ensue with the 
end of licensed trade.   
In Iberia, the supplies provided by the United States aided Wellington’s unsuccessful 
1812 Iberian campaign.  However this reverse in fortune was temporary.  Wellington advanced 
into Spain, won the battle of Salamanca, and temporarily liberated Madrid.  Despite the 
importation of provisions from the United States, the army could not be sustained due to poor 
communications with British controlled bases in Portugal and the inability of the commissariat 
department to transport supplies to the front.  The retreat to the coast began in October.  
According to A.L.F. Schaumann, the army was reduced to looting as the weather and a lack of 
                                                          
133 American State Papers: Finance 2:623-624. 
134 American State Papers: Finance 3: 3. Taxes were imposed on carriages, distilling licenses, auctions, and bank 
notes, in addition to additional duties on imported salt with the goal of raising $5 million. Many of these taxes were 
to expire one year after the end of the war. Wallis’ “Federal Government Finances – Revenue, Expenditure, and 
Debt: 1789–1939.” suggests the temporary nature of internal taxes:  revenue in 1814: $1.3 million, 1815: $4.7 
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victuals created deplorable conditions.  In November, the army returned to Portugal to refit and 
re-provision for the 1813 campaign. Shortening the lines of communications made provisioning 
easier; he noted that “his well-stocked kitchen hampers” made him a welcome guest in the 
officer’s mess.135   
The 1813 campaign saw the effective end of the Peninsular War.  Wellington advanced 
from his bases in Portugal into central Spain.  For Schaumann, the advance into the more 
agriculturally developed portion of the country made procuring local grain much easier, as he 
was able to find entire fields of corn that had not been pillaged by the French army.136  The battle 
of Vittoria on June 21, 1813 destroyed the French army and ended the occupation of Spain.  
Ferdinand VII of Spain was restored to his throne, and the French army retreated to the Pyrenees.  
By the end of December, Schaumann found himself stationed at Bardos, France, with plentiful 
provisions such as capons, eggs, milk, and rice available for purchase.137  
 The end of the Peninsular War eliminated both the markets provided by the war and the 
leverage that US grain exports held during Great Britain’s prosecution of the campaign.  The 
inability-or unwillingness- to effectively manipulate the Iberian grain trade testifies to the 
persistence of trade and the dysfunctional nature of US economic policy under Madison. Only in 
July 1813 was licensed trade outlawed by the United States, and even this did not prohibit the 
grain trade between the peninsula and the US under the cover of neutral flags.  Enforcement of 
the ban on licenses was uneven at best.  A US embargo of American shipping, long feared by 
American merchants, was not passed until December 1813.138  Military events in an even more 
distant theater of war further influenced US grain exports when Napoleon’s retreat from the grain 
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producing regions of Poland and Germany reopened European grain exports to Great Britain.139  
This diminished the markets available for US grain exports.   
Pitkin’s statistical data reflects the collapse of American foreign trade to the peninsula in 
1814 (see Table 5.2 above).  As the war moved to Southern France, the license system collapsed, 
and the British blockade of the United States expanded.  Total proceeds from the export of 
agricultural products amounted to $19 million in 1813, this declined to $2.1 million in 1814.  
Overall, total exports in 1814 declined to $7 million from $61 million in 1811, imports declined 
to $13 million from $53 million prior to the war, and customs revenue fell from $13 million in 
1811 to $6 million in 1814.140   
The December 1813 embargo was repealed in March 1814 at the request of President 
Madison claiming favorable changes had occurred in the international situation to reopen trade 
with all nations except Great Britain.141  This political change of heart did not reverse the rapidly 
declining fortunes of the US economy.  The collapse of Napoleonic France re-opened the 
continent of Europe to American trade, and Madison intended for the United States to take 
advantage.  The bill was passed, but the problem of how to evade the British blockade remained 
unresolved.  Another unaccounted-for problem was the increased influence of Great Britain in 
Europe because of the Napoleonic War.  A crucial factor in this situation was the severing US 
farmers and merchants from British capital and overseas markets.  According to Arthur’s How 
Britain Won the War of 1812, the collapse of American finances in 1814 was the culmination of 
British strategy for the war.  Using the blockade to limit foreign trade was one element of the 
plan.  The second was to cut off the US from European capital markets by making the 
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government a poor credit risk.  This lesson learned from the American Revolution was ruthlessly 
applied during the second war.  By fall 1814, the US government could not find a willing lender 
anywhere in Europe.142  Few European nations could risk souring relations with Britain over 
American trade.  Perversely, Napoleon’s fear of excessive British control over the continent’s 
seaborne trade was the exact result of his fall.    
Without British demand, or at least the acquiescence of British authorities, US seaborne 
trade all but ceased.  This reflects directly on the ability of the US government to attract loans.  
In his January 1814 State of Finances report to Congress, Treasury Secretary Jones estimated 
that for 1814 almost 75% of expected receipts to the treasury would be in the form of loans.143  
This level of borrowing was unlikely to be sustained, and in April 1814, G.W. Campbell, the 
new Treasury Secretary, reported to Congress that loans authorized for the remainder of the year 
could not be raised.144   
The end of licensed trade and a tightening blockade is the cause for this decline in 
fortunes.  Early 1814 represents the transition from the blockade as a British controlled “gate” 
into a wall.  The end Wellington’s campaign also eliminated any motivation to allow continued 
American foreign trade.  The naval resources dedicated to the blockade increased.  In April 1814, 
the blockade was extended to include New England for the first time.145  Now, the US was 
severed from external trade and the treasury could only depend on internal resources.     
The collapse of an important government bond syndicate consisting of John Jacob Astor, 
David Parish, and Stephen Girard was a contributing factor to the embarrassment of the United 
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States Treasury.  If the United States continued to rely on loans, Campbell advocated for 
“establishing an adequate revenue and pledging the same” to repaying principal and interest on 
the public debt as a means to attract renewed investments in government loans.146 In October 
1814, yet another new Treasury Secretary, A.J. Dallas, reported to Congress that the state of 
public credit was “so depressed, that no hope of adequate succor, on moderate terms, can safely 
rest upon it.”147  Simply stated, by the fall of 1814 the United States Treasury no longer had the 
capacity to attract lenders due to the unstable financial condition of the wartime government.148   
 The basis of Jeffersonian political economy rested on one central premise.  Under a 
frugal and well managed government, customs revenues were adequate to meet federal 
expenditures without resort to internal taxation.  This premise depended on access to foreign 
markets, particularly for excess agricultural products.  Above all, Jeffersonian political economy 
required peace to function.  Untouched by the lessons learned under the embargo, Madison’s 
combative foreign policy rendered the Democratic-Republican domestic platform inoperable.  To 
conduct war, the Jeffersonians became what they had accused the Federalists of being only 20 
years prior- an oppressive and over active central government with an insatiable appetite for 
invasive taxation schemes designed to support an undesired military establishment.  Gaps in the 
blockade and the licensed trade allowed the day of reckoning to be delayed, but by the end of 
1814 judgement day finally arrived.      
Iberia represented one element of continuity in US agricultural exports and integration 
with the trans-Atlantic British economy.  As Jefferson’s embargo concluded in 1809, official US 
trade with British North America also increased.  Dependency on US agriculture remained 
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particularly acute in the Maritimes, which represented both colonial continuity as well as another 
potential opportunity for US lawmakers to use economic policy to influence the British.  The 
experience of the embargo discussed above, however, draws this theory into question.  Although 
the broad characteristic that Iberia and British North America both sought US grain are similar, 
the particular dynamics of the cross-border trade and its much greater importance for the very 
survival of the Maritime Provinces (even in peacetime) represents a much deeper connection 
between the British Empire and the new United States that could be accentuated by war but that 
also endured without it.  Another important distinction is that the Iberia trade carried a thin, but 
vital, legal veneer as neutral trade, and therefore allowed at least plausible deniability for all 
parties involved on the issue of trading with the wartime British enemy.  Trade relations with 
British North America allowed no such cover, although whether this curtailed traffic, or if 
market pressures would dictate commercial interactions will be explored in the next chapter.          
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CHAPTER 7 
SMUGGLING, WAR, AND THE UNUSUAL (BUT FAMILIAR) 
SOLUTIONS TO HUNGER, 1809-1815 
 
In addition to its trans-Atlantic significance, the end of Jefferson’s embargo in 1809 also 
reshaped the US grain trade with British North America.  As with the Iberian trade, the exchange 
of US provisions for access to the British economy via familiar trading routes, the dependency 
on American provisions, and the need for a flexible interpretation of the laws of trade in order to 
sustain the essential trading pattern.  From 1809 until the start of war in summer 1812, open 
trade existed between British North America and the US.  With the advent of war, a separation in 
American policy became apparent between seaborne commerce with the Maritimes and land 
trade with the Canadas.  The licensed trade with Iberia carried with in a winked upon side effect. 
The US government condoned seaborne licensed trade for reasons of higher policy, and that 
consent implicitly condoned seaborne trade with Nova Scotia.  However, this did not extend 
legal permission for exporting grain or other provisions to the Canadas.   
For British and colonial officials, the outbreak of war further illustrated the connections 
binding together the two constituent parts of British North America.  Both the Canadas and the 
Maritime Provinces depended on the US as a source of provisions, especially as wartime 
pressures increased demand for grain.  Thus, American farmers directly supported the British 
war effort in the Canadas while the US government simultaneously attempted to conquer the two 
provinces by force.  In the Maritimes, the context is slightly different as there was no planned 
American invasion.  However, seaborne trade also directly contributed to the British war effort 
by supplying provisions for the Royal Navy and the military establishment.  In time a portion of 
these imports would be re-exported to the Canadas thus supplementing cross-border trade.    
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The close of Jefferson’s embargo in 1809 ended a dramatic but fruitless experiment in 
economic coercion.  In Nova Scotia, Lieutenant Governor George Prevost’s opening of Nova 
Scotian ports to US ships during the embargo represented a break with official imperial policy, 
and was aimed at least in part to discomfort US authorities.  Prevost’s reinterpretation of trade 
law was subsequently deemed “judicious and well timed” by authorities in London.149 The 
underlying economic motivations behind allowing American merchants access had not changed 
with the collapse of Jefferson’s policy.  Particularly, provisions remained a problem for the 
colony.  The regularly scheduled 1809 Parliamentary proclamation on trade policy replaced 
rather than repudiated Provost’s free trade policy, suggesting that such a generous policy 
remained a viable policy option.  The new regulations still permitted trade between the US and 
British North America, however, this was limited to certain enumerated articles including lumber 
products, livestock, and grain “of any sort,” all of which could be exchanged in provincial 
harbors for manufactures of Britain or its colonies.150  The response by Prevost and Sir John 
Sherbrooke, his successor as Lieutenant Governor of the province, is suggestive.  A series of 
proclamations covering 1809, 1810, and 1811 permitting the importation of enumerated goods 
from the US indicates a continued reliance on imported produce.   
Allowing Americans any access to British trade networks was not universally popular 
among British subjects.  Memorials from Halifax merchants regularly complained about 
competition from outside the empire in lumber and fish exports to the West Indies, however, the 
critique of imperial policy was not limited to trade regulations alone.  Incorporated within the 
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memorial of July 1809 was the observation that due to “lack of encouragement” the northern 
colonies of the Maritimes and the Canadas could not supply the West Indies with all of the 
products required.151  Implied, although not explicitly stated, in the phrasing “lack of 
encouragement” was a criticism of the lack of agriculture within the colonies indicating that an 
outright ban on American imports was not feasible.   
Despite the passage of 30 years with minimal results, the essential formula proposed by 
Lord Sheffield’s critique of American trade with the empire still shaped the mentality of the 
merchants—with proper domestic encouragement, eventually US agriculture could be banned 
from the empire due to increased production in British North America, but that day had not yet 
arrived.  The Halifax customs statistics for 1809 and 1810 demonstrate that the city was not able 
to feed itself on local grain, much less support an export trade.  Both reports indicate that the US 
exported over 11,000 barrels of flour to Halifax each year.152   
The 1810 report contains another potentially significant source of grain for Nova Scotia.  
Over 10,000 barrels of flour were also imported by coastal shipping from Newfoundland, 
Canada, and New Brunswick.  It is certain that these imports were not from Newfoundland, 
however, the ledger does not distinguish between imports from the Canadas (indicating surplus 
production and a potential granary in British North America) and New Brunswick (which could 
indicate either local production or re-exports of goods from the US via New Brunswick). The 
Provincial Council minutes for December 17, 1811 contains a petition from two Halifax 
merchants named Hartshorne and Tremain requesting the council’s permission to import grain 
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and flour into the province “by way of New Brunswick” under the authority of a proclamation 
allowing for neutral vessels to enter into Halifax with certain enumerated cargos including 
“wheat and grain of any kind, bread, biscuit, and flour.”  An exasperated council referred the 
merchants to the Order in Council the merchants cited in their petition as an affirmative answer, 
with the notation that the Order should be posted by the customs collector “for the information of 
all persons concerned.”153   
This exchange is curious in two respects.  First, it seems likely that Hartshorne and 
Tremain represented a larger merchant interest in US agricultural imports than just a single 
merchant house.  Second, the emphasis on US produce first imported through New Brunswick 
suggests that the embargo era patterns of exchange through Passamaquoddy (and other Maine 
regions) to British North America remained intact should a worsening political and martial 
context require a more indirect form of trade.      
The land boundary between the Canadas and the US presented another opportunity for 
licit and illicit exchange.  The pattern, however, was somewhat different from maritime trade.  
The travelogue of John Melish’s journeys in North America outlined the general pattern of 
exchange in 1810 and 1811 along the St. Lawrence River:  
exports, chiefly grain, flour, provisions, potash, timber, naval stores, furs, &c. 
have late been very great.  The imports are chiefly British goods, with which the 
inhabitants [of Upper Canada] contrive to supply a considerable part of the United 
States, by smuggling’ and the Americans, in return, smuggle tea, coffee, &c. to 
the Canadians.154 
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Melish’s observations provide several clues on peacetime cross border trade.  The river 
supported a thriving export market for US agricultural goods. He does not indicate points 
of origin, it is significant that the destination for agricultural surpluses are distant markets 
rather than local consumption.  Second, the commodities transported to the Canadas 
through the US border communities are all tropical in origin rather than domestic.  This 
can easily be explained as a result of the taxes placed on legally imported goods and the 
subsequent savings realized by illicit trade.       
As 1812 dawned, an uneasy peace reigned between the United States and the British 
Empire.  Whether that peace could survive as the ongoing war in Europe raged was much less 
certain.  Although the United States was not officially at war with any nation and Great Britain 
was not at war with the United States, tensions between the two nations as a result of the conflict 
with Napoleonic Europe threated to instigate another expansion of a conflict that now enmeshed 
(directly or indirectly) the entire Atlantic World.  Congress declared war on Great Britain on 
June 18, 1812 in a calculated gamble that a quick, victorious war against a distracted foe would 
render concessions from Great Britain on numerous points of conflict ranging from trade policies 
to alliances with the First Nations.  The glorious vision, however, ignored a host of difficulties as 
the question transitioned from should there be a declaration of war to could the US actually 
conduct a war.   
A simple declaration of war with Great Britain did not necessarily mean that the war was 
widely supported in either nation, nor that the means of conducting the new war actually existed.  
Although Congress could declare a war between nations, it could not declare a war between 
peoples.  Remembering the lessons taught by the embargo and other foreign trade restrictions on 
the American economy, Congress did not move to sever the seaborne between the United States 
222 
 
and the British Empire as part of the war declaration.  The disconnect between economic 
necessity and foreign policy created a peculiar situation in which trade continued in the midst of 
war with the explicit and tacit consent of both warring powers; the persistent connection further 
illustrates the link between the American grain economy and the British Atlantic.  Most 
ironically, the war would also illuminate and strengthen the ties between British North American 
and the US.   
The rationale behind the American declaration of war remains a matter of scholarly 
dispute.  A sampling of theories range from “desperation” and the desire to avoid disgrace, to 
more substantive US considerations of British interference with American overseas trade, US 
opposition to British alliances with the First Nations that restricted westward expansion, and 
American fury at impressment.155  J.C.A. Stagg offers an intriguing and persuasive economic 
rationale for the US goals that its invasion of Canada was an effort to “affect Britain’s capacity 
to exercise its commercial and naval powers against Americans in harmful ways that they could 
not otherwise control.”156  The war was a reactionary measure designed to indirectly combat 
British trade regulations by improving the bargaining position of the United States through the 
use of Canada as a bargaining chip to obtain concessions on neutral trading rights under the 
Orders in Council.  This would hold the British West Indies hostage to American goodwill for 
provisioning the islands.  According to Madison, the failure of the 1807 embargo was because of 
illicit trade through Canada, therefore, the conquest of Canada was essential for the full force of 
the US commercial coercion strategy to work.157   
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Conquest was also a proactive measure to ensure that the West Indies remained 
dependent on the United States for food and lumber supplies.  In time, British North America 
might provide an alternative to US exports.  This would eliminate any possibility of the United 
States using economic restrictions as a tool to influence British policies.158  This follows the 
logic of casting British North America as a replacement for the US as a source of supply within 
the empire espoused by figures such as Lord Sheffield in the 1780s.  However, this chapter will 
demonstrate that not only did that premise fall short in reality, British North America was unable 
to even meet its own wartime consumption needs, nor could it generate a surplus for Caribbean 
markets.   
British officials may not have expected the declaration of war given that the 
objectionable Orders-in-Council had already been repealed, however, closer consideration 
suggests that the fear of famine, poverty, and the possible disruption of supplies from the United 
States created significant anxiety for British colonial authorities even prior to the outbreak of 
hostilities.  As early as January 1812, Commissary General W.H. Robinson in Quebec wrote that 
“a rupture with the United Sates the most permanent evil might arise as our only dependence at 
present is upon the principal towns in the country for the disposal of [commissary] bills.”  The 
lack of currency was a systemic problem.  Robinson estimated the peacetime expenses to 
provision the Canadas at £400,000 per year with that of Nova Scotia another £200,000 of which 
less than one quarter could be raised locally. The only recourse was to import specie from the US 
where “specie is also scarce, the exchange rate equally against England, and whose government 
now loudly threatens hostility.”159   
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Later dispatches in May provided little solace to Robinson as the US government made 
the exportation of specie to Canada “dangerous and perhaps impractical.”160  By the middle of 
the month the military chest was “nearly exhausted,” although Robinson expected to receive 
£30,000 from Halifax and the Bahamas; despite this transfer, the expenses of the colony’s 
defense could not be “defrayed without assistance from home.”  A May 18, 1812 dispatch from 
Robinson to Commissary-in-Chief J.C. Herries in London noted that the policies of the US 
government had “already occasioned a considerable increase in the price of every article of 
provision in these provinces and will soon produce a scarcity if no alteration takes place.”  
Further, supplying the active provincial militia would require an immediate increase in 
shipments of salted meat to the Canadas from England, while Robinson promised to purchase 
flour, pease, and pork locally “upon the best terms I can make.”161        
 Demands on Robinson’s commissariat in the event of war would be substantial.  His 
estimated supply and demand report provides an interesting insight into the problems of flour 
supply in British North America.  Basing his estimates on needing to feed an army of 7,050 
(including women and children) for 400 days as well as 2,500 embodied militia for one year 
would require slightly over 3.5 million pounds of flour.  In addition, another 1.2 million pounds 
were designated for shipment to Halifax based on a requisition from October 1811. Combined, 
the estimated demand amounted to slightly over 4.8 million pounds.  Robinson’s magazines held 
862,884 pounds of flour in hand, and he estimated that he would receive 2.9 million pounds 
more from contractors in Lower Canada leaving him with an estimated deficit of slightly over 
one million pounds of flour.  Conspicuously absent from Robinson’s estimates are any estimated 
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contributions from Upper Canada, England, or the United States, although he notes that “the 
supplies of flour and pease may with certainty be provided in this province,” he does not specify 
where, how, or with what money the flour deficiency would be filled.162           
Imports to Halifax follow a slightly different pattern in the spring before war.  Direct 
shipments from Quebec provided one potential source of grain, although no shipping entered into 
Halifax from Quebec during the first quarter.  However, Naval Office records suggest that ports 
of origin for these supplies differ significantly from Robinson’s expectations.  The ledgers record 
one ship from Boston with a cargo of flour and corn listed individually as well as “twenty three 
sail of American vessels entered under the orders of the Governor in Council…between 20th 
March and 16th May 1812.”  In total, these 23 vessels carried 7,405 barrels of flour, 9,481 
bushels of corn, and 337 barrels of bread.  In the quarter ending April 5, 1812 these figures are 
out of total imports of 9,937 barrels of flour, 10,181 bushels of corn, 337 barrels and 180 
hundredweight of bread.163  US imports amount to approximately 79% of all flour imports, 99% 
of corn imports, and all the bread imports, with the exception of 180 hundredweight imported 
from St. Andrews.   
The ledger raises two questions without answers.  First, why would data from March 20 
to May 16 be included on quarterly returns ending on April 5?  Second, why would American 
shipping with the exception of one entering on March 20 be reported as a group given that all 
other entrances are listed individually with information including the name of the ships’ masters, 
size of the ship, place the ship was built and when, ships’ owners and specific port of origin.  The 
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first question can perhaps be dismissed as an administrative function; the second is potentially 
more intriguing.   
Trade with the United States in certain enumerated goods, including grain and grain 
products, was permitted by an Act of Parliament dated March 25, 1812 and administered through 
an Order in Council dated April 8, 1812.  Included within this legislation was permission for US 
ships to enter into the ports of Halifax, St. John, and St. Andrews for the purpose of importing 
“wheat and grain of any kind, bread, biscuit” and for exports to be shipped from the same 
colonial ports.164  The slow communications of the era presented Lt. Governor John Sherbrooke 
with a dilemma.  Absent timely notice from London, he decided on his own authority to allow 
continued access to American merchants.165  This potentially accounts for the anomaly within 
the port records, and speaks to the importance of this trade that the Lieutenant Governor would 
extend his authority in this manner, that the imperial government agreed with his conduct, and 
the confusion stemmed from the delays in communication rather than any disagreement on what 
trading policy should be.                   
Entrances into Halifax for April and May 1812 included the arrival of 11 grain ships from 
St Andrews, New Brunswick, laden with a total of 2,307 barrels of flour, 60 bushels of corn, and 
51 barrels, 88 hundredweight, and 1,234 bags of bread.166  These two months are not an outlier, 
as the records for June record entrances for five ships laden with 424 barrels of flour, 20 bushels 
of corn, and 71 hundredweight of bread along with an additional ship with 130 barrels of flour 
from “N. Brunswick.”167  This pattern of trade makes little sense on the surface.  According to 
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historical geographer Cole Harris, “New Brunswick imported wheat and flour, and exported 
almost no agricultural produce.”168  Historian Joshua Smith notes that flour and grain products 
were commonly smuggled through the US ports on Passamaquoddy Bay into New Brunswick 
during the embargo.169  In light of the April 8 Order in Council opening St. Andrews to US 
imports, the long history of smuggling flour into St. Andrews, and the weakness of local New 
Brunswick wheat agriculture, the circumstantial evidence for a persistent trade with the US is 
persuasive.  
The War of 1812- Trade during the War Years 
As the war started in June 1812, American plans for war consisted of a four-part 
American scheme against British North America.  British naval superiority over the United 
States was somewhat limited due to the demands of the Napoleonic war in Europe.  An effective 
blockade of the entire US coastline could not be sustained assuming it was desired.  An 
ineffective blockade allowed the handful of US warships to inflict several well publicized but 
strategically indecisive victories over the Royal Navy.  According to Lance Davis and Stanley 
Engeramn, “throughout 1812, the British blockade was neither extensive, tight, nor particularly 
effective.”  Part of this was by design.  Only the coastline between Charleston, South Carolina 
and Florida was declared blockaded in 1812.  It was not until spring 1813 that the blockade was 
extended north to New York and south to Louisiana.  Notably, the ports of New England were 
not included in these measures.170  It is easy but misleading to remove New England and the 
Maritimes from the wartime story.  Although losses due to privateers on both sides caused 
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hardship for civilians, the scope and scale of conflict falls far short of the level of violence seen 
during the land campaigns in the Canadas.  In relation to grain and provisioning, this division is a 
serious mistake.  The need for supplies, and the efforts to secure supplies for the war effort was 
an integrated problem spread over a broad geographic scope.  The integrated problem produced 
an array of solutions by British authorities as the army commissariat, naval authorities, and 
political leaders coordinated efforts across British North America to resolve the common 
problem.     
 Along the border, the US planned a three-pronged assault on the Canadas.  The first 
prong would be General William Hull’s advance from Detroit into southwestern Upper Canada.  
Confronted by General Isaac Brock and the First Nations leader Tecumseh’s unexpectedly active 
defense, Hull retreated to Detroit.  Closely pursued and besieged by inferior forces, Hull 
surrendered his entire command on August 16.  Combined with the fall of Fort Michilimackinac 
(July 17) and the abandonment of Fort Dearborn (August 17), American forces in the Old 
Northwest suffered a crushing defeat.  Far from invading Upper Canada, the northwestern most 
post remaining under American control after two months of war was Fort Wayne, Indiana.171       
The second prong focused on the Niagara frontier.  The Niagara campaign illustrated the 
logistical and political weakness of the American army.  An ill-advised assault across the 
Niagara River on October 13 resulted in a bloody repulse at Queenston Heights.172  Crippled by 
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logistical challenges, poor morale, and uncertain leadership, the army was effectively out of the 
war for the remainder of the 1812 campaign.  
The third prong followed the traditional invasion route of Canada utilizing Lake 
Champlain and the Richelieu River.  General Henry Dearborn, the lethargic American 
commander in this region, proved a better negotiator than combat commander.  After negotiating 
a truce with Prevost upon receiving news of the repeal of the Orders-in-Council, Dearborn 
waited for orders from Washington prior to proceeding with the campaign.  Hostilities did not 
official resume in this theater until September 4, and Dearborn’s forces made no effort to 
advance.173  The third offensive thrust into Canada did not break camp.  The grandiose plans 
concocted by Madison and his advisors resulted in two decisive defeats and little else.                  
Despite declaring war and constructing grandiose plans for pursuing the conflict, the 
materials needed for a successful campaign were in short supply in the US.  Both sides also had a 
vested stake in retaining peaceful (if managed) seaborne trade while pursuing military operations 
in the continental interior.  A June 10, 1812 letter from Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin to 
Congressman Langdon Cheves, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee on  import 
duties hints at the ongoing debate between enforcing the embargo and non-importation acts, 
government revenues, and a war that could not help but impact both calculations.  The letter 
noted that if the trade restriction laws were repealed, US exports would be consumed by Britain 
directly as well as by Spain, Portugal, and the British West Indies.174  Upon further study, 
Gallatin estimated that repeal would double government revenue from customs duties, thereby 
reducing the need for unpopular internal taxes and governmental borrowing.175  Gallatin was 
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fully aware of the progression of the declaration of war through Congress, and the likelihood of 
approval by President Madison. He must have also been aware of the superiority of the Royal 
Navy and the potential devastation of US trade through blockade or seizure of American ships on 
the high seas as the United States Navy lacked the ability to protect its merchants.  Essentially, 
funding the war against Britain required customs revenue obtained by trading with Britain or a 
fundamental revolution in Jeffersonian political economy.  The second premise would prove 
politically difficult for the administration, while the first depended on a pious hope that demand 
for US exports would be so vital to the British economy that some sort of accommodation could 
be reached that would protect American ships in spite of their nation’s belligerent status.  
Legally, the declaration of war had little impact on trade.  Exports to Napoleonic France 
were legal, but due to the impact of the British Royal Navy, this trade already had been severely 
curtailed.  Direct commerce with Great Britain was still technically illegal under the Non-
importation Act of 1811, although there was an effort to repeal this ban in order to increase tax 
revenues and violations of the law were routine.  The grain trade with British allies Spain and 
Portugal remained legal and encouraged by both US and British officials through the 
establishment of a licensed trading scheme that protected some American shipping from capture 
by British cruisers   In this light, there was nothing in the declaration of war or any subsequent 
legislation that made trading with a British license to neutral ports throughout the world illegal 
through 1813, while Gallatin’s hope of an accommodation allowing trade was answered for the 
first 18 months of war.  Although the intent was to support Iberian trade, the principles of the 
license trade also applied to seaborne commerce between Nova Scotia and the United States.  It 
was only after 18 months of war that seaborne commerce became more closely regulated.  
Inland, boundaries between the Canadas and the US represented a different form of trade, 
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however, support also existed for the continuance and expansion of commodity trade by land.  
According to historian Donald Hickey’s “American Trade Restrictions During the War of 1812,” 
the British blockade and trade restrictions were not designed to stop American trade with Canada 
nor could American laws designed to end trade with the enemy be enforced.176     
The uncertain nature of the American war effort opened opportunities for British North 
America.  The best solution to the supply difficulties caused by war with the US was, perversely, 
the US.  July 1812 saw a number of letters from Sir John Sherbrooke, Lieutenant Governor of 
Nova Scotia, and Sir George Prevost, Commander in Chief and governor of British North 
America as to how the war would be conducted by British forces.  General Prevost’s orders 
allowed for continued cross-border provisions trade provided that the merchant applied for and 
received a permit.177  A continuous supply of provisions and specie from the United States was 
vital for the defense of the Canadas, as Commissary General Robinson in Quebec tersely noted 
to J.C. Herries of the Commissariat Department.  Robinson wrote in July 1812 “of flour a 
sufficiency may be had in the country tho’ the price has much augmented particularly as I have 
no cash.”   Further, immediate shipments of salted meat were required as “these provinces cannot 
furnish meat for its’ inhabitants.  It has always been imported from the states in large quantities.”  
Further adding to his burdens were the demands for provisions in Halifax, which were fulfilled in 
part by shipments from Quebec.178  According to the Halifax Naval Office records, eight ships 
laden with wheat and bread arrived from Quebec between July 6 and July 15, however is was not 
                                                          
176 Donald Hickey, “Trade Restrictions During the War of 1812” The Journal of American History, Vol. 68, No. 3 
(December 1981), 517-538, 533-534.    
177 James McGill, Temporary Regulations…. 23 July 1812. 
178 W.H. Robinson to J.C. Herries, 18 July 1812. LAC, roll C-10867: “The amount of the annual requisition for 
provisions for Halifax has been furnished by me, and the last vessels will sail tomorrow.” This suggests that this is a 
regular exchange, thus linking the Canadas to Halifax as a grain supplier at least for military consumption.  
232 
 
sustainable.179  July also finds the entry of four additional flour ships from St. Andrews and three 
ships from New Brunswick laden with corn and bread amounting to 622 barrels of flour and 
326.5 bushels of corn.180 
1812-13:  Halifax and the Maritime Trade          
For Sherbrooke, the prospect of war with the United States required careful management 
as Nova Scotia was ill-prepared for conflict.  Fortunately, the US war plan did not include an 
attack on the Maritimes.  One means of maintaining the peace was through cultivating trade 
relations across the border both for economic benefit but also to maintain peace on the 
international boundary between the Maritime Provinces and Massachusetts.  Sherbrooke’s July 3 
proclamation declared to borderland inhabitants his desire that residents would “pursue in peace 
their usual and accustomed trades without molestation.”181  Further, the proclamation protected 
American goods and unarmed vessels in the region provided no hostile acts occurred.   
This action met with approval from disparate audiences.  His Royal Highness the Prince 
Regent “entirely approves the substance” of the de facto truce, while recommending “an 
amicable and liberal communication and intercourse between the inhabitants of the respective 
borders whatever may be the actual state of relations between the two governments.”182  Further, 
authorization permitting trade relations between Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and the United 
States under the authority of an Act of Parliament issued prior to the war would remain in effect 
until its scheduled expiration in April 1815. Sherbrooke suspected that the war would “prevent 
the inhabitants of Nova Scotia from deriving the intended benefit from His Royal Highnesses 
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order as the regulation therein contained cannot now be carried into effect.”183  This pessimistic 
observation did not entirely happen, although some modifications of trade were inevitable under 
the circumstances.   
British consul Andrew Allen in Boston reported on July 23 that the proclamations 
preserving the peace “has been received here [Boston] with the most markd [sic] satisfaction.”  
Popular opinion in the Eastern States opposed war with Great Britain; in Boston fears of  “the 
exhaustion of the treasury, the imposition of taxes, the depreciation of real property, and the want 
of a vent for their produce” combined with fear of the result of a war with Britain dominated 
public perceptions of the war effort.184  This mirrored Sherbrooke’s  fears  on the indefensibility 
of the province due to the lack of soldiers and weapons.  More importantly, perhaps, was the lack 
of provisions and specie to sustain Nova Scotia; this fear and the American need for trading 
partners combined with public sentiment to create an environment more conducive to peace and 
trade than the official state of war would suggest.185      
Driven by multiple reinforcing goals, Sherbrooke issued trading licenses similar to that 
issued to the merchant Edward Perkins in July 1812.  The license allowed Perkins to “import and 
bring into the port of Halifax from any port of the United States of America in any ship or vessel 
a cargo of flour, meal corn, or provisions of any kind.”186  This included US ports that were 
theoretically under British blockade.  Perkins was one of many traders who took advantage of the 
opportunities provided by the licensing system as the commercial connections between Nova 
Scotia and New England remained remarkably intact.  In a lengthy letter from Sherbrooke to 
Lord Liverpool in August 1812, Sherbrooke noted that a number of American traders continued 
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to trade with the province due to the demand for British manufactures, “the consequence of such 
a commercial intercourse between this colony and the states of America would doubtless be a 
supply of both specie and provisions to the former, articles much wanted and likely to be 
increasingly demanded” within the province.  If this trade was officially sanctioned, and 
protections for American merchant vessels trading with Halifax enacted “very considerable 
supplies might be expected” from this quarter, however, authorization from the home 
government was required.187  
 In reply Liverpool authorized and encouraged Sherbrooke to cultivate “an amicable and 
liberal communication with the neighboring states, and of promoting any friendly disposition 
which may manifest itself in the manner which may appear to you best calculated to ensure its 
continuance.”188  Licensed trade also enjoyed the support of Sir John Borlase Warren, the 
Commander in Chief of the Royal Navy’s North American Station, who promised his 
cooperation “as the import of provisions into this province is desirable.”189  Support from these 
three sources is significant as it represented the assent of the imperial government in the persons 
of Liverpool and the Prince Regent and the assurance of an available and legal market for US 
produce through the consent of Sherbrooke.  The role of Warren is especially significant.  His 
ships conducted the blockade of US ports and patrolled the sea-lanes leading to Nova Scotia.  
His consent to the license system provided the essential practical security for trade to continue.  
Although this would change over the course of the war, the pertinent British authorities were 
united in their support for continued seaborne trade at the start of the war in North America.   
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Sherbrooke’s efforts to encourage trade with the United States bore fruit in the fall of 
1812.  In October he reported to Lord Liverpool that “this province has of late been supplied 
with flour and other articles of provisions imported from the United States under licenses signed 
by me and ordered by the admiral [Sir John Warren] to be respected by the cruisers on this 
station.”190  The license system established by Warren and Sherbrooke was approved; despite the 
outbreak of hostilities the provisions of the Orders-in-Council of April 8, 1812 allowing for trade 
in certain enumerated products remained in effect.191    
However, these happy circumstances may be temporary depending on the next session of 
Congress; Sherbrooke expressed the real fear that the trade between enemies would be formally 
banned by the US government.  If this should come to pass, “the want of sufficient supply of 
provisions” would cause “a situation of very great embarrassment.”  Later in the same letter, 
Sherbrooke linked the fate of Halifax and the trade in American provisions to other portions of 
the British Empire and the war in Spain as “large quantities [of provisions] have again been 
exported from hence, for our West India Islands, and for Spain and Portugal.”192 
This hints at the same combination of supply and demand factors as Robinson’s July 
1812 letter but with an additional and significant addition to the calculations.  Sherbooke’s 
inclusion of the US as part of the calculous further reinforces the interlocking nature of 
provisions trade and adds a layer of political complexity as one of the proposed suppliers was 
firmly outside British political control.  Only market pressures and political acquiescence of both 
belligerents allowed this commerce to continue.  The supply and demand dynamics of grain were 
not restricted to a single colony or even a single side of the Atlantic; rather the grain trade was an 
                                                          
190 Sherbrooke to Liverpool, 7 October 1812. PANS, roll 13874. 
191 Chetwynd to Sherbrooke, 7 October 1812. PANS, roll 15241. 
192 Sherbrooke to Liverpool, 7 October 1812. PANS, roll 13874.   
236 
 
integrated system connecting Europe, the West Indies, British North America, and the United 
States.  The letter also hints at the fragility of this trade; just as both nations could rationalize 
allowing commerce, both sides might also rationalize ending trade.  Much as the wheat harvest 
fluctuates from year-to-year, dynamic political and economic factors regulating commerce joined 
a host of factors encompassing the progress of two separate wars, harvests throughout the 
Atlantic basin, and the political machinations of varied individuals and states.  How, when, or if 
any of those factors would shift, and thereby create a new cost-benefit analysis, remained 
unknown.   
Quantifying the extent of trade from the US to Halifax is difficult for the last half of 
1812.  This is especially true for commodities such as grain and flour, which were not subject to 
customs duties.  Fortunately, the Naval Office recorded incoming and outgoing shipping based 
on the physical entry or exit of individual ships rather than by cargo.  Despite the importance of 
US grain and of Sherboorke’s licensing scheme, there is no record of any American vessels 
entering into Halifax between the quarterly report ending with May 16 and the quarterly report 
ending in December, which records the entry of 14 American ships laden with flour and salted 
meat.193  For the quarter, the 14 American ships recorded in aggregate were responsible for a 
significant portion of all provisions imports- 30% of all flour and 96% of salt meats, however 
with the exception of three ships all imports from Quebec and St. Andrews occurred by the end 
of October.194  
The quantitative data is much more ambiguous as to the volume and importance of trade 
between Halifax, the West Indies, and Iberia.  The fourth quarter of 1811 suggests that Halifax is 
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the hub of a thriving grain trade based on exports to Newfoundland, New Providence, Bermuda, 
and, intriguingly, Miramichi.195  1812 saw a dramatic decline in volume; the first quarter only 
saw two clearances for grain cargoes for Newfoundland and none for the West Indies or Iberia.  
The second quarter record of clearances amounts to two ships for Newfoundland, one for 
Liverpool, one for Bermuda, and one for Miramichi; bread and flour exports amount to these five 
ships and total cargoes of 500 barrels of flour and 265 hundredweight of bread.196  Third quarter 
returns are also relatively small; amounting to a total of six vessels and cargoes of 3,076 barrels 
of flour and 119 hundredweight of bread distributed between the British West Indies, New 
Brunswick, Barbados, Falmouth, and Miramichi.197   
Accepting Sherbrooke’s letter of October 7 emphasizing the American trade as an 
important source of supply for the West Indies and Iberia as fact, this raises a potential problem 
as there is no indication in the records of any exports to Spain or Portugal in the Naval Office 
records and, unlike Robinson’s reports, Sherbrooke’s writings do not provide any particular 
shipment or set of clearances for Iberia during this time.  Likewise, clearances for the West 
Indies amount to a small handful of vessels through the end of 1811 and the first three quarters of 
1812.  Unfortunately, the records for the fourth quarter are faded in spots rendering it impossible 
to discern portions of the ledgers.  Fortunately, the column reporting the total exports for the 
quarter are intact; according to the records a total of 887 barrels of flour were exported from 
Halifax during this quarter.198  Although the destinations are unclear, the pattern for the previous 
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four quarters may provide some clues and regardless of destination, the quantity of exports are 
minor for this quarter and for this entire 15-month period.   
By November, a second and perhaps more serious problem arose for the licensed trade.  
Demand for provisions within Nova Scotia was such that even the existing interruptions of 
commerce resulted in provisions becoming “scare and dear as to excite considerable alarm” 
within the province.  The political solution of licenses did not solve the problem of creating a 
profitable or sustainable trading relationship given the restrictions place on exports from Nova 
Scotia resulted in American trading vessels leaving without a return cargo, as Sherbrooke did not 
believe that his authority permitted him to authorize US ships to export fish and lumber from 
Nova Scotia to the West Indies.  In his view, American ships required “the privilege of trading to 
any port whatever any articles being the growth produce or manufacture of the United 
Kingdom….or of any of His Majesty’s colonies or settlements for economically sustainable 
trade.”  Therefore, he requested imperial approval to authorize such trade if favored by the 
Lieutenant Governor with the advice and consent of the council.199   
Two weeks later, dire need compelled Sherbrooke to acquaint Liverpool that “I have felt 
myself under the necessity of encouraging the importation of provisions so far as to allow neutral 
vessels bringing such cargoes licenses to export lumber to our West India islands.  I hope your 
lordship will be of the opinion that our necessities will justify the measure.”200  This somewhat 
benign request concealed two potentially more controversial elements.  First, did the Lieutenant 
Governor hold such powers over trade policy, and, second, the practice of American ships 
entering into Halifax under neutral flags was already an established fact.  Whether this 
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permission extended to American ships sailing under a neutral flag or only truly neutral vessels 
is unclear.201   
After six months of war, the economic patterns linking the colony to US agriculture were 
clear and familiar.  The custom of permitting American provisions into the colony due to need 
and a lack of local production on an “emergency” basis was an established pattern since the 
loyalist influx during the 1780s.  Naval Office returns for the first quarter of 1813 record 17 
American vessels clearing Halifax harbor.  Although records of each cargo are illegible, the pre-
war and wartime patterns provide a persuasive contextual argument that the cargoes were 
agricultural products. 
Whatever the problems faced by Sherbrooke in Halifax, there would be no help 
forthcoming from the commissariat department in the Canadas.  Robinson’s cheerful optimism 
from July did not persist as the demands of the war outstripped his capacity to provide food and 
material for the war. By December 1812 the tone of his correspondence with Herries was 
despondent: “in the event of a continuance of the war it will I am confident be impossible to 
furnish a sufficient quantity either of salt pork or flour which a former letter of mine….will have 
prepared you for.”  Further, it was his unfortunate duty to report that he had already informed 
Deputy Commissary General Manby in Halifax “that he must not look to me for the usual annual 
supply for Halifax and its dependencies.”202  As it came to pass, only three grain vessels from 
Quebec entering the port of Halifax from October to the end of the year.203   
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According to economic historian Fernand Ouellet, the 1812 Canadian harvest suffered 
from a late snow melt and early frosts, which may explain Robinson’s changed outlook.204  The 
vastly different tone found within Robinson’s letters is suggestive of the state of Canadian 
agriculture, and of the marginal nature of Canadian surpluses as the commissariat department’s 
outlook on the state of provisions transitions from having an exportable surplus at the end of 
September to a dangerous shortage by the beginning of December based on a single subpar 
harvest. Robinson’s correspondence also hints at a number of significant features of the 1812 
provisions trade.  The inability of the Maritime Provinces to reach even self-sufficiency in 
agricultural production required the diversion of scarce and uncertain resources from the 
Canadas to sustain the Maritimes.  Failing this support, finding alternative sources of supply was 
crucial.  Little help could be expected from Great Britain as a result of disastrous harvests there 
in 1811 and 1812, which had made Britain dependent on grain imported under license from 
Napoleonic Europe in 1811 and the upcoming 1812 campaign destroyed this source of 
imports.205  
   Under these circumstances, non-British sources of supply were essential.  The only 
plausible and reliable source of grain for the foreseeable future was the United States.  The 
Halifax port records for the first quarter of 1813 record the entry of 13 American ships laden 
with 2,481 barrels of flour and 543 hundredweight of bread.206  The volume of trade suggests a 
vibrant marketplace, although other documents suggest some level of confusion as the mechanics 
of licensed trade uncomfortably meshed with larger political forces.  The saga of the American 
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brig Dispatch in January 1813 provides an interesting case study in the difficulties of conducting 
trade between two warring powers.  Two American merchants named Plasket and Clarke sailed 
the Dispatch into Halifax with a license to carry provisions and naval stores from the United 
States.  However, part of the cargo was “a few casks of cyder [sic] and about one hundred boxes 
of spermaceti candles, which was done by them solely with a view of concealing from the 
custom house officers in Massachusetts the real place of the brig’s destination.”  The candles 
were seized by the Halifax port collector as contraband, however Plasket and Clarke applied to 
Sherbrooke for the restoration of the seized goods, as there was no intent of selling the candles in 
the Halifax markets.  After making “a very minute inquiry into the particulars of this case” 
Sherbrooke found that “the candles were embarked by the adventurers solely with a view to 
deceive their own government” and therefore should be returned to the merchants.  In his report 
to Lord Liverpool on the incident, Sherbrooke requested that special instructions be sent to port 
collectors about the management of American trade, for “if the revenue laws were to be rigidly 
enforced there, an immediate stop would be put to our communication with the states, upon 
which we must now so much depend for our supplies of flour and other necessities of life.”207   
1812-13:  The Canadas and Cross-Border Trade 
Commissary General Robinson’s dire warning on the state of provisioning in the Canadas 
found relief via American trade.  Unlike the seaborne trading system, no formal system of 
mutually recognized licenses existed for this land trade. A series of personal truces between 
individuals combined with a weak or corrupt American customs service allowed for an informal 
licensing system to operate.208  The Lake Champlain-Richelieu corridor illustrates this difficulty.  
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Initially, the state of Vermont expressed support for the war through legislation designed to end 
trade with British North America.  A November 1812 act of the Democratic-Republican 
dominated Vermont Legislature made it illegal to enter into Lower Canada under any pretext 
whatsoever without a pass from the governor or his agent.  The act also made it illegal to trade 
any cattle or horses with Canada under the penalty of seizure.  Half of the property seized would 
be sold for the benefit of the state, while the other half would be given to whoever reported the 
crime.209   
This level of commitment to the national cause would not be sustained.  The November 
act was subsequently repealed by the Federalist-leaning 1813 legislature.210  In April 1813, 
smuggling in upstate New York reached such epidemic proportions that 50 soldiers under the 
command of US army Lieutenant Lorin Austin were detailed to reinforce customs officials. 
During a raid on Americus, New York, thirteen alleged smugglers were arrested.  The smugglers 
received bail from a sympathetic local judge; upon their release, they filed charges against 
Lieutenant Austin.  Austin was arrested and remained in jail until bailed out by his commanding 
officer, Colonel Zebulon Pike. In Vermont, a brawl broke out in September 1813 between a pro-
war mob acting in support of customs officials and a pro-smuggler mob over a collection of 
illicit goods.  The brawl ended “in the complete discomfiture of Uncle Sam’s party, who retired 
from the conflict with many a broken head and bruised limb.”211   
Other smugglers used more peaceful, if brazenly corrupt, methods to trade between the 
United States and British North America.  In his article “A Traitorous and Diabolical Traffic,” 
historian H.N. Muller outlined the experiences of customs collector Cornelius Van Ness.  
                                                          
209 State of Vermont, “Law of Vermont to Prevent Intercourse with Canada” (Montpelier: Wright and Sibley, 1812), 
1. 
210 Williamson, Vermont in Quandary, 275. 
211 Sturm, “Smuggling in the War of 1812,” 536-537. 
243 
 
According to Van Ness, trade across the boundary could be arranged through the good offices of 
the customs collector.  An importer would give notice that a shipment of smuggled goods was 
located near the border.  The goods would be seized, a bond was collected from the smuggler, 
and the goods were left in his hands.  The smuggler then filed an application with the courts for 
the remission of the forfeiture, which was usually granted.  According to Mueller, this system 
amounted to a legalization of enemy trade by means of legal chicanery implicating the court 
system and the customs service.  This was officially tolerated because “stopping the commerce 
along the Champlain-Richelieu path flirted with the possibility of open rebellion in Vermont.”212 
Planning for the 1813 campaign presented Madison and his adviser with a number of 
difficulties.  At sea, American warships faced increasingly effective Royal Navy efforts to 
blockade the United States Navy in port.  More bad news arrived from the far west as efforts to 
recapture Detroit failed.  Losses suffered at Frenchtown (January 1813) preempted the advance 
of William Henry Harrison’s army for the remainder of the winter.  The army would not advance 
again until Oliver Hazard Perry’s victory at the battle of Lake Erie (September 1813) improved 
Harrison’s supply lines.  Victory at the Battle of the Thames in Upper Canada (October 5, 1813) 
liberated Michigan for the US, although controlling southwestern Upper Canada was beyond his 
means.  A more important outcome of the battle was the death of Tecumseh, and the subsequent 
collapse of the First Nations’ war effort.213    
Further east, American planners called for the capture of Kingston, an advance on the 
Niagara frontier and the capture of York (present day Toronto).  The raid on York proved the 
easiest objective to reach.  The lightly defended town fell to a raid in April 1813.  The sack of 
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York embittered the struggle and provided a rallying cry against the Americans, however the 
most important short term effect of York was the destruction of supplies stored there.  Operations 
on the Niagara frontier remained indecisive.  American victories at Fort George (May 1813) 
were counterbalanced by British victories at Stoney Creek (June 1813), Beaver Dams (June 
1813) and Fort Niagara (December 1813).  Despite great efforts and great suffering, the net 
result was a stalemate.214 
 The proposed offensive against Kingston was not launched.  A smaller expedition 
launched in the fall descended the St. Lawrence.  However, this expedition was repelled at 
Chateauguay (October 1813). An informal truce controlled trade along the St. Lawrence River 
between upstate New York and Upper Canada to the west.  The examples of David Parrish and 
John Jacob Astor illustrate the possibilities for sustained cross-border business during wartime. 
David Parish was a wealthy land owner with influence on both sides of the St. Lawrence.  He 
was closely connected to the Madison administration due to his wealth and even made 
substantial loans to fund the war.215  Historian Alan Taylor speculates that Parish had an 
informal understanding with the US government:  in exchange for lending money to the 
government, the administration would ensure that US troops stayed away from the St. Lawrence 
Valley.  Parish also had an understanding with the British government that both sides would 
uphold the peace.  The informal truce in upstate New York was threatened by the introduction of 
forces from outside the borderlands.  From July 1812 to February 1813, US troops under 
command of Benjamin Forsyth of North Carolina conducted a series of raids along the Canadian 
side of the border despite the truce.  A counter raid by British forces threatened to embroil the 
border in war.  In order to preserve the peace, Parish lobbied the US government to remove all its 
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troops from the St. Lawrence Valley.  Forsyth was transferred elsewhere, and the American 
troops were removed.  Parish subsequently subscribed $7.5 million in federal war loans.  By 
March 1813, peace was restored to such an extent that British officers and respectable American 
citizens openly socialized in the city streets of Ogdensburg, New York.216   
John Jacob Astor was a well-connected US businessman with ties to the Madison 
administration as well as significant interests in trans-border trade.  Astor was heavily involved 
in the fur trade, both through ownership of The American Fur Company and the American-
Canadian Southwest Fur Company.  The Southwest Company was designed as a partnership 
between Astor and Canadian fur traders to facilitate cross-border exchange of furs and Indian 
trade goods.217  Astor’s trade with Canada was not dramatically impacted by the start of the war.  
In late June 1812, Astor approached Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin to secure 
permission to import goods from Montreal that he owned prior to the declaration of war.  
Permission was subsequently granted.  Astor then used his connections to Montreal merchants to 
secure a passport from British officials in order to tend to his business affairs there.  By spring 
1813, Astor imported approximately $250,000 worth of furs into the United States from British 
North America.  Much like David Parish, Astor also happened to be one of the primary investors 
in government securities during the war.  In April 1813, Astor invested over $2 million into 
government securities.218  The stories of Parrish and Astor combined with the activities of less 
well known smugglers around Lake Champlain suggest another interesting facet of the War of 
1812; commerce between the belligerent powers was not just a regulated seaborne trade under 
licenses but also a matter of illicit (though often tolerated) smuggling and potentially outright 
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corruption enmeshing the highest levels of US government and influential businessmen with 
access to power. 
The influence of Parish in particular has provoked a great deal of historical debate.  
During the bicentennial celebration of the war, Alan Taylor presented a controversial theory in 
Maclean’s Magazine.  Outside of a short lived raid late in 1813, the decisive St. Lawrence 
Valley remained undisturbed by American forces.  Although he admits that “there is no smoking 
gun” and that it is a “circumstantial case” Taylor posits that Parish’s influence, wealth, and 
connections to the US Treasury extended so far that military operations in the St. Lawrence were 
abandoned as a quid pro quo for Parish’s purchases of government securities.219  Although the 
case is not proven, it reflects the desperation of the US government as the war continued with no 
victory in sight.                   
 Taylor’s supposition represents the most obvious connection between American business 
interests and the war effort on both sides.  Less noticeably, ongoing grain imports from the US 
helped Commissary Robinson in Quebec during the winter crisis, and offered the potential of 
further help in the future. However, American goods failed to entirely solve the provisions 
problem.  Dire need resulted in an incredible transformation in the traditional patterns of the 
peacetime grain trade. The demand for flour in British North America during the war caused the 
flow of the trans-Atlantic grain trade to start reversing itself—flour and grain no longer flowed 
from North America to the West Indies or Europe, but rather from Great Britain and the West 
Indies to the Canadas.   
This process was in part a product of changing conditions in Europe which slowly 
redirected trading patterns from 1812 to 1813.  The complete failure of Napoleon’s Russian 
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campaign also caused the collapse of his continental economic system, which re-opened a 
number of markets in central and Eastern Europe for British trade leading to a more consistent 
source of grain for Great Britain.  Improved harvests in Ireland and Great Britain itself further 
increased the availability of grain in Great Britain; the increased supply and the forthcoming end 
of the peninsular campaign provided a degree of flexibility in the wartime grain markets that had 
not existed since 1809.  This trend is a process rather than an immediate shift; how quickly this 
new found flexibility could transition from theory to practical effect remained to be seen as even 
these momentous events lacked the capacity to create immediate change at the front in Upper 
Canada.  Improving conditions in Europe held the promise of aiding the Canadas, but whether or 
not help from Europe would arrive in time was an unanswered question. 
For the commissariat in Quebec, immediate help was required.  In November 1812 
Robinson wrote to Herries apprising him of the need for the immediate shipment of provisions to 
the Canadas.  Herries responded in April 1813 by shipping 980,112 pounds of flour from Britain 
as well as over 600,000 pounds of pork. A second dispatch cheerfully noted, “I hope that the 
pork and flour which I . . . shipped for your station . . .  will reach you in time.”220  This 
exchange reveals two interesting features of the new path of the grain trade.   The time lag 
between requests and delivery is significant. The exchange of requests spanned five months 
across winter and early spring, receiving the promised goods required still more time:  
Robinson’s November 1812 request resulted in action by the Commissioners of Victualling in 
April 1813. However, it was not until mid-June 1813 that two ships were laden with the 
promised supplies and Herries only notified Robinson that they were en route in September.221  
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Thus, from first request for supplies to notification they were en route covered 11 months.   
Second, the difficulties in providing the needed supplies were significant but not for the obvious 
reason.  It is the problems of time and distance that Herries is hinting at; the question of expense 
for these provisions is not mentioned.  This is a significant departure from the content of the pre-
war letters in which the specie problem played a prominent role. 
Although this could not have been clear in April 1813, these letters represent the 
beginning of a consistent pattern rather than an aberration.  A June 10 letter from Robinson 
asking for additional support was met by an August 12 response promising the shipment of 3,000 
sacks of flour to Quebec from Cork, an additional one million pounds from the Commissioners 
of Victualling in Britain, and (perhaps the most interesting of these promises) the shipment of 
one million pounds of flour from the British army commissariat in the West Indies.222   Halifax 
port records show two entries of flour and bread cargoes from Bermuda in mid-May 1813 and 
two additional cargoes from Bermuda and Jamaica in June.  Although the quantities only 
amounted to 2,432 barrels of flour and 3,980 hundredweight of bread, this is an interesting 
aberration in the traditional patterns of commerce.223   
Herries conceived that the above quantities would be “sufficient to meet your 
consumption of flour until the arrival at Quebec of the first spring fleet, by which the remainder 
of your requisition will be forwarded.”224  This promise was later augmented by the Lords of the 
Treasury.  At meetings held in June and July 1813 they sent four million pounds of flour, the 
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same of pork, and over a half million pounds of rice “by the first convoy to Canada.”225  A 
September 9 letter from Jason Drummond of the Commissariat Department to Robinson 
informed him of the immediate shipment of two shiploads of flour to Quebec amounting to 
slightly more than 330,000 pounds of flour from Cork, Ireland.226  The element of time is again 
critical due to the time lag between shipment and receipt in Quebec as well as an additional delay 
between receipt in Quebec and arrival at the front.    
The difficulty of transporting supplies to the front in Upper Canada challenged the 
commissariat and placed a premium on locally produced foodstuffs.  The distance between 
Quebec City and troops in Upper Canada amounted to 800 miles, which according to General 
George Prevost “presents great obstacles to the transport service, some of them almost 
insurmountable, until the superiority on the lake [Ontario] is obtained by us.”227  The physical 
distance between the port of Quebec and the warfront complicated meaningful provisioning.  The 
long supply lines were also subject to disruption by Americans.  The adventures of Thomas 
Rideout, a commissariat officer in Upper Canada, illustrate the difficulty of supporting the war 
effort so distant from imported provisions.  Writing to his father in August 1813, Rideout 
complained that the disaster at York in April 1813 also had the effect of destroying the flour and 
other provisions required by the British forces in western Upper Canada.228  
This provisioning crisis contributed to the most famous US victory of the war on Lake 
Erie in September 1813. Control of the lake was crucial to deliver supplies, an especially dire 
issue for the British.  In his dispatch to Sir James Yeo announcing the unfortunate result of the 
Battle of Lake Erie, Robert Barclay prefaced his report by noting that “so perfectly destitute of 
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provisions was the port [of Amherstburg, Upper Canada] that there was not a day’s flour in store, 
and the crews of the squadron under my command were on half allowance of many things, and 
when that was done there was no more.”229  The army was in little better condition according to 
Rideout’s later letter to his brother George.  By the beginning of September, the army in Upper 
Canada was reduced to “an extensive robbery of pears, apples, onions, corn….bread or butter is 
out of the question.”230  This startling breakdown in discipline represents both the inability of the 
local countryside to supply adequate flour for its defending army as well as the inability of the 
army to provision the troops from external sources.  Local supplies of grain, even if they could 
be purchased or purloined, proved scanty as the 1813 harvest “lacked abundance.”231 
1813:  Halifax and the Maritime Trade  
The problems of simultaneously having protected licensed trade with the enemy and a 
state of war created a crisis for Sherbrooke in Halifax.  The second quarter 1813 records do not 
record the arrival of any US ships by name or in aggregate.  There is, however, the arrival of 
slightly over 4,000 barrels of flour and nearly 3,000 bushels of corn delivered by “11 foreign 
vessels.”232  The volume and cargo is consistent with the flow of American commerce, and the 
absence of a separate line item for American ships is suggestive that “foreign” and “US” is the 
same trade.  This obfuscation probably arose from the lack of direction from London as to the 
official conduct of the war in North America even over a year past its declaration. As late as 
August 1813, customs officers in Nova Scotia did not have official instructions for regulating 
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trade between the province and the US.  The collector in Halifax reported to Sherbrooke that he 
received no instructions, and “the probability is that they were lost in the May or June mails.”233   
Sherbrooke pleaded for a lenient policy towards American traders, for, in his mind, the 
continuation of trade better protected the colony from attack than the addition of thousands of 
soldiers to the garrison.  Sustaining essential commerce required a flexible interpretation of trade 
laws and protection from prosecution for minor deviations that would give American merchants 
the security to continue trade in foodstuffs.234  As a result the British Lieutenant Governor of 
Nova Scotia beseeched the British imperial government for leniency towards Americans trading 
in Halifax, a fascinating scene symptomatic of the counter-intuitive conglomeration of factors 
that shaped wartime political economy in the region.    
Having a consistent and merciful policy toward American merchants and their 
agricultural imports was especially significant as the province’s agricultural production remained 
limited. Supporting regular troops with local resources proved impossible and embodying the 
provincial militia to defend the colony was impossible given “the situation of the province, in 
respect to its agriculture and fisheries,” which rendered long-term mobilization of a substantial 
militia “inexpedient.”235   
In a lengthy letter to Vice Admiral R.G. Keats in Newfoundland in July 1813, 
Sherbrooke provided a general synopsis of the state of the Halifax grain economy.  Begging 
leave to report that “the exportation of provisions has not been prohibited during my 
administration of this government….being fully sensible that His Majesty’s islands in the West 
Indies and Newfoundland have to a considerable extent depended on this market for supplies.”  
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Prices in Halifax remained high due to “the great quantities purchased for His Majesty’s service 
in Canada and various exportations to other places on private account” but “great quantities of 
flour grain etc. are now in Halifax ready for sale or exportation.”  There were shortages of salted 
pork and beef, which could be solved by increased trade with the US on reasonable terms, 
however these articles were not among the enumerated goods allowed by licensed trade, as it 
“should interfere with the Irish trade in those articles.”  If there was a fear of famine in 
Newfoundland and private importations to the island from Halifax were not adequate, 
Sherbrooke suggested the Keats establish an agent in the port in order to procure better terms and 
more certainty of an adequate supply.236  Despite the notice given by Sherbrooke to the 
importance of Halifax as a source of grain for Newfoundland and the West Indies, the quarterly 
report only records the export of 245 barrels of flour and 287 hundredweight of bread, overall, 
divided between six clearances for Newfoundland, the West Indies, Quebec, and Miramichi.237   
This correspondence raises two important points.  First, one of the difficulties within this 
project is determining what, if any, divisions there are between the grain trade operating under 
the authority of the British government on behalf of its armed forces and the operation of civilian 
markets distinct from the military.  The first would indicate an economic plan driven by a 
centralized effort, while the second would be more indicative of a trading system influenced by 
the war and wartime regulation but not necessarily controlled by the government.  Sherbrooke’s 
letter suggests that the British state was an actor in the Halifax provisions market. However, the 
letter also indicates that the market was not restricted to government officials to the exclusion of 
private actors.  This clarifies an important element of the naval office import records which do 
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not include any information as to who the imported grain is sold to; this indicates that imported 
grain brought into Halifax under license entered into the general economy.   
It is also intriguing to note the persistent element of mercantilism related to imports of 
salt beef and pork in favor of Irish producers.  Agricultural produce within the empire, and 
especially the home islands received legal protection whenever possible.  The stark contrast 
between this example in salted meat and American grain imports over the course of three 
decades illustrates an important feature of this exchange.  The British Empire simply had no 
internal grain surpluses.  The relationship between American supply and imperial demand 
required a series of accommodations that defied the mandates of a mercantile economic system.                
In July 1813, Lord Bathurst relayed an order from the Prince Regent to Sherbrooke 
requiring him to submit a monthly report on the imports and exports between the US and 
Halifax.238  This request for information from the highest levels of the British government 
reflects the importance attached to this trade.  The new reporting procedures also provide a clear 
and concise record of the extent of this trade through the remainder of 1813.  Sherbrooke’s first 
report for September 1813 listed a total of six vessels clearing Halifax for destinations in the US.  
The commodities carried on these ships provides an intriguing insight into the nature of trade 
with the US. Exports from Nova Scotia to the US included brown sugar from the British West 
Indies, muslin fabrics, printed cottons, velvet, and buttons.  In exchange, Nova Scotia received 
grain products in enormous quantities, as well as supplies of onions, apples, pease, and cheese.  
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Table 7.1: Halifax Imports from the US, September-December 1813239 
Month Vessels Flour 
(Barrels) 
Bread 
(Barrels/Bags) 
Corn 
(Bushels) 
Barley 
(Bushels) 
September 11 6,456 70/0 1,308 0 
October 18 9,723 772/339 1,800 100 
November 12 5,734 197/40 930 1,200 
December 16 9,634 190/0 2,275 230 
Totals  57 31,547 1229/339 6,313 1,530 
 
Sherbrooke’s report illustrates the nature of trade between the US and the British Empire and 
that basic colonial era contours persisted.  Despite war, the essential flow of goods remained the 
same:  British manufactures in exchange for American foodstuffs.  Although the context is 
different, the commerce is the same and actually expanded when compared to the volume of pre-
war trade or the statistics from the first quarter of 1813.   
It is unclear what percentage of imports went civilian markets or for military use within 
the colony or elsewhere. However, evidence exists that Halifax was exporting grain to Quebec 
by the end of 1813. Thomas G. Rideout, a commissariat officer in Canada, discovered to his joy 
that transports in the harbor of Quebec City were laden with 20,000 barrels of flour from Halifax 
and an additional 10,000 barrels from England in December 1813.  These arrivals were fortunate, 
due to the country being “miserably poor and unable to maintain its own inhabitants the crops 
being so scanty.”240  Unfortunately, consistent quantitative data to assess this trade does not 
exist.  According to the Halifax port records, flour exports from Halifax through the end of June 
1813 amounts to only 671 barrels overall, of which only one shipment cleared for Quebec.241  
The third quarter finds an increase in the volume of flour exports overall to 3,607 barrels to a 
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more diverse set of ports, including St. Johns, Newfoundland, Arichat in Cape Breton, Labrador, 
the British West Indies, and Jamaica.  Conspicuous by its absence is Quebec as a port of 
destination for flour exports with one single exception.242 
1814:  Halifax and the Maritime Trade   
Continuing trade was lucrative for everyone involved, but as 1814 dawned a new set of 
political and economic calculations arose.  In the US, a new embargo on shipping legally 
prohibited American ships from all seaborne commerce (see chapter 5).  Much like the embargo 
of 1807-09, this proved to be much easier to enforce at port cities rather than along the border 
with the Canadas, as a result the grain economy diverged between the land-based trade across the 
border and that by sea.  Later, a stricter blockade by the Royal Navy combined to sever the 
connection between Nova Scotia and the United States grain markets. This new policy towards 
American trade was a result of the importance of maritime trade to Federal revenue and a new 
dedication by Great Britain to deny this source of income to the US government, while 
recognizing the necessity of encouraging direct trade between Vermont and New York with the 
Canadas because of desperate need to provision distant regions in the continent’s interior. 
The results of this changing regulatory environment on both sides were immediately 
reflected on Sherbrooke’s monthly returns.  In January 1814, only a single American ship laden 
with barley and bread entered harbor. The February returns were “nil,” although three “foreign” 
ships entered laden with flour and bread.243  “Foreign” is undefined.  To Sherbrooke, the 
American embargo posed numerous problems.  In his report to Liverpool, he wrote that 
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It is impossible to calculate at present how far this embargo may operate to the 
determent of our West India Islands and of his Majesty’s North American 
possessions, but the sooner your Lordship is made acquainted with the 
circumstances the sooner we may expect that measures will be adopted to 
counteract its baneful effects.244        
     
The January 26, 1814 edition of The Nova Scotia Royal Gazette provided a somewhere different 
commentary on the embargo and the possible effects, or lack thereof, of the new American 
policy on Great Britain. Citing the bounty of European crops, the decline in price for imported 
English flour to only £3 per barrel in the Halifax markets, and the opening of trade connections 
between Great Britain and the rest of Europe, the editor speculated that “the bitterest enemy of 
the United States could not have wished a greater evil to befall them than the Act is calculated to 
produce.”245   
 Although Congress enacted a full embargo on American shipping, it proved short-lived. 
Although small in numbers, US ships still came to Halifax, the embargo did not preclude the use 
of licenses in the eye of British authorities.  The threat to potential grain supplies, however, 
caused panic for British officials.  Writing to Henry Gouldburn in April 1814, Sherbrooke 
expressed joy at the embargo’s its repeal as “if the act continued in force, I fear we should have 
found great difficulty in supplying our troops in the Canadas with flour during the ensuing 
campaign.”246  The letter confirms the essential place of US provisions for British forces in the 
Canadas.   
In a case very similar to that of Plasket and Clarke in January 1813, February 1814 finds 
another legal case involving an American merchant and the customs service.  In this case, 
Frederick Starling of New Haven entered Halifax with a cargo of 1,100 barrels flour, 25 barrels 
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each of pork and beef, and 6,000 staves cosigned to Halifax merchant Richard Tremain; a few 
prohibited articles intended for St. Bartholomews were also included in the cargo as that was the 
next trading destination for Starling after clearing Halifax.  Unfortunately, the ship was wreaked; 
upon salvage the surviving cargo of beef, pork, and staves was seized by the customs service 
upon entry into Shelbourne.  Starling begged for the restoration of the property, which would be 
expected, however, this petition was accompanied by a declaration from Tremain noting that 
Starling had long delivered to him cargoes of flour under license since the start of the war.247  
Sherbrooke’s response to this petition is interesting.  Finding that the contraband portion of the 
cargo was onboard due to Starling’s goal to “conceal from the American government the next 
destination of the said vessel,” all property seized by the customs service should be restored to 
Starling.248  The intervention of the Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia on the behalf of an 
American merchant in conflict with British customs authorities speaks to the importance of 
maintaining these trading relationships even at this later stage of the war.    
1814:  The Canadas and Cross-border Trade 
The separation between supplies arrived in Quebec City and supplies available to the 
commissariat outside of Quebec remains stark.  Despite Rideout’s observation of 30,000 barrels 
of flour arriving in Quebec, the prospects for more distant Upper Canada were bleak.  Writing to 
his brother George in January 1814, Thomas G. Rideout lamented that supplying the 1,600 men 
garrisoned at Prescott, Upper Canada, “will be very hard, for the country is so excessively poor.”  
The only salvation for the garrison was trade with New York; Rideout noted that “our supplies 
are all drawn from the American side of the river,” and, in particular, he would be “under the 
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necessity of getting most of my flour from their side.”249  Sustaining this cross-border land trade 
required a flexible sense of propriety as well as a good supply of specie.  Two weeks later 
Rideout wrote to his father that he had “paid very large sums in specie for secret service, which 
is the fountainhead of all correspondence with the enemy,” and that he had “2 months supply of 
everything for 1,000” in stock.250  John Rideout, writing from Cornwall, Upper Canada, was 
even more explicit about the link between US suppliers and provisions for the army.  The arrival 
of 60 sleighs loaded with supplies from Vermont caused rejoicing.251 
 Militarily, 1814 provided a new geo-political landscape for the war.  The collapse and fall 
of Napoleon freed waves of British ships and soldiers for service in North America.  A stricter 
blockade was complimented by growing raiding parties of British soldiers, particularly in the 
Chesapeake Bay region and on Lake Champlain.  Raiding in the Chesapeake disbursed American 
strength in the region.  The British victory at Bladensburg (August 24) and the successful 
defense of Baltimore (September 1814) provided the most memorable events of the war for both 
sides.  On Lake Champlain, the United States Navy’s defeat of the Royal Navy at Plattsburg 
(September 11) repelled a British assault down the lake.  However, a decisive victory eluded 
both sides.        
Even an indecisive war requires logistical support.  For the British, the resource base of 
British North America remained inadequate.  The British government promised more aid to both 
the Canadas and the garrison at Halifax once peace in Europe in May 1814 allowed a surplus of 
grain for export to North America.  As more troops from Europe arrived, the supply of 
provisions (as well as demand for them) from the Quebec magazines increased.  Commissariat 
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chief W. H. Robinson’s estimated requirements for April 1814 to September 1815 anticipated a 
total demand for over 10 million pounds of flour, 8.5 million pounds of salt pork, and lesser 
amounts of rice, cocoa, pease, and rum.  Jason Drummond, Robinson’s Commissariat 
Department correspondent in Britain, informed him that the estimate was faulty because “you 
had not received my dispatch of the 12th April no. 180 by which you were appraised of the 
intention of His Majesty’s government to supply from the United Kingdom the whole of your 
wants in the article of flour.”  Of the ten million pounds demanded, Drummond wrote that over 
seven million pounds had already been dispatched by a combination of the Victualling Board, 
the Commissariat in Chief, deliveries from Bermuda, and other supplies already in route.252  This 
supply pattern regularly appears in other correspondence from Drummond to Robinson through 
September 1814 with frequent reports of grain and grain products dispatched from Ireland and 
Great Britain.253     
If fully implemented, this scheme of provision represents the complete reversal of the 
typical trading patterns for wheat and wheat products.  Rather than British North America 
supplying the West Indies or replacing the US as a granary for the southern European markets, 
the poor condition of agriculture in the Canadas required the entire supply of the army to be 
imported from Britain and Europe.  This is perhaps fortunate as the 1814 harvest in the Canadas 
was stricken by severe drought.254  Structurally, this temporary aberration from the accustomed 
patterns of trade illustrate the durability of US grain trade with the empire.  Only the intersection 
of a host of circumstances- the fall of Napoleonic Europe, massive wartime military expenditures 
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by Britain, the unprecedented mobilization of military transport for bulk commodities, and an 
ongoing war with the US could break the pattern.  Thus, removing American agriculture from 
the empire on a regular basis would be prohibitively expensive and disruptive to the domestic 
British economy.  Mercantilism (of the pre-1775 vintage) worked for the grain trade.  
Mercantilism (post-1783 vintage) did not and could not function over a long term.  An 
accommodation with the independent US was necessary.  In this light, the actions of Prevost and 
Sherbrooke in both their civil and military capacities are understandable reactions to an 
economic reality.                       
 Although help was promised, how quickly, or if, the mass wave of pledged imported 
provisions would make it to the front was unclear.  Until the promise and reality coincided, other 
measures were required to sustain the army.  The summer of 1814 sees a persistence of a number 
of trends in Upper Canada’s provisions crisis.  The arrival of supplies in Quebec still meant little 
to the commissariat in places distant from Quebec where the reliance on US supplies continued.  
Writing from Cornwall in June 1814, Thomas G. Rideout recounted one particularly memorable 
cross-border negotiation:  Rideout had contracted with    
a Yankee magistrate to furnish this fort with Irish beef.  A major came with him 
to make the agreement but as he was foreman to the grand jury at the court in 
which the government prosecutes the magistrate for high treason and smuggling, 
he turned his back and would not see the paper signed.255      
 
A later negotiation in July brought 200 oxen from the US with the promise that “several 
thousand more head can be driven in by St. Regis if wanted.”  Clearly cross-border trade 
persisted and was prevalent; however, the same letter suggests that efforts to import flour from 
Europe impacted cross-border exchanges.  Rideout wrote that “flour is here $14 per barrel, but 
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large supplies have arrived at Quebec from France and England so that there will be no want.”256  
He hoped that transportation of these provisions would be possible to alleviate some of the 
burden he faced to procure local supplies.  The inclusion of France as a source of flour was 
possible given the restoration of peace and the abdication of Napoleon earlier in the year, and if 
substantial and sustained would be a novel addition to the trans-Atlantic grain trade.  At the same 
time Sir George Prevost in Quebec City wrote that “two thirds of the army in Canada are, at this 
moment eating beef provided by American contractors, drawn principally from the states of 
Vermont and New York.”257   
  The scale and importance of the cross-border land exchange also drew the attention of US 
authorities.  George Izard, the American general commanding in the Lake Champlain region, 
wrote to the Secretary of War that “many deserters come in, who state that the enemy’s supply is 
exhausted, but that they expect to be resupplied within a short time.”258  In another more strident 
and voluminous letter Izard wrote that: 
From the St. Lawrence to the ocean an open disregard prevails for the laws 
prohibiting intercourse with the enemy.  The road to St. Regis is covered with 
droves of cattle, and the river with rafts, destined for the enemy.  The revenue 
officers see these things, but acknowledge their inability to put a stop to such 
outrageous proceedings.  On the eastern side of lake Champlain, the high roads 
are found insufficient for the supplies of cattle which are pouring into Canada.  
Like herds of buffaloes, they press through the forest, making paths for 
themselves…. Were it not for these supplies, the British forces in Canada would 
soon be suffering from famine, or their government be subjected to enormous 
expense for their maintenance.259 
This correlates with the observations of Rideout and Prevost both on the source of supplies for 
the British army and their importance.  Significantly, references to expense had disappeared from 
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the correspondence between the commissariat department in Quebec and British authorities in 
London.  Although it may have been expensive, the coming of peace in Europe meant that Great 
Britain could afford the maintenance costs at least for the present time.  If cost was no object, the 
weather was.  By the end of September London commissariat J.C. Herries informed Robinson 
that all shipments for the year were suspended due to the oncoming winter.260         
1814:  Halifax and the Maritime Trade (Part 2) 
Whether or not the Royal Navy would permit trade with the US, and on what terms, was 
unclear as the calculous of power changed following the abdication of Napoleon in April 1814.  
With the gradual transfer of troops and warships to North America that spring and summer, the 
nature of the war fundamentally changed.  May and June 1814 marked a turning point for the 
Halifax grain imports from Great Britain.  The Naval Office recorded 10 entries from London, 
Cork, Liverpool, and Bristol laden with bread and corn for Halifax; these entries totaled 5,290 
barrels of flour and 9,398 hundredweight of bread.  Eight entries from the US totaled 1,713 
barrels of flour (24% of imports) and just 372 hundredweight (4%) of bread.261 The existence of 
these eight entries is slightly odd as the enumerated goods permitted by license to pass through 
Britain’s more vigorous blockade was in theory limited to specie, however this regulation does 
not seem to have been rigorously enforced.262 This transition is notable for two important 
reasons.  First, this is the first time since the beginning of the war that the majority of grain 
imports to Halifax originated in Great Britain rather than the US.  Second, the shift from 
American flour to British bread is intriguing.  One possible explanation is that military 
regulations specified “biscuit or good wheaten bread” for rations. Whether raw flour would have 
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been an adequate substitute, if hardtack biscuit was more durable, or if the military establishment 
in Halifax had the capacity to produce bread or biscuit on the scale required is unknown.263      
An advertisement in the July 11, 1814 edition of the Halifax Journal noted the arrival of 
a “Swedish schooner, with 700 barrels of flour and 200 barrels of tar, detained by the Endymion” 
in Halifax harbor.  It is exceptionally unlikely that the blockading squadron off an American port 
would have detained an actual Swedish ship given that in the same article a Portuguese ship 
bound for Boston was only “ordered off” as a result of the blockade rather than “detained.”264 It 
is even more unlikely that a Swedish ship would have carried flour as a cargo to the US.  This 
circumstantial evidence suggests that the ship was actually an American vessel operating under 
false colors ensnared by the blockade.  The tightening of the blockade also brought licensed trade 
to a close, much to the lament of Halifax merchants. The rigid embargoes did not immediately 
stop trade; it was not until July 1814 that Sherbrooke reported that “vessels under my license can 
no longer be permitted to enter the ports of the United States, as they are placed by him [Admiral 
Sir Alexander Cochrane, Warren’s replacement as head of the Royal Navy’s North American 
station] in a state of strict and vigorous blockade,” therefore he would desist from issuing more 
trading licenses.265   However, unlike the case earlier in the war, the British government was now 
less than sympathetic to the merchants, noting that although the imperial government regrets any 
ill-effects on loyal merchants, there was no justification for “any relaxation of the 
measures….which could have the effect of debarring neutral nations from a trade which was at 
the same time carried on by one of the belligerents.”266                  
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Entrances into Halifax for the second and third quarters of 1814 reflect this changing 
economy.  From July 1 through September 30, only four intrepid American merchant vessels 
carrying 144 barrels of flour and 10 hundredweight of bread entered into Halifax harbor.267  
There is another peculiarity within the records however.  Despite the increase in the number of 
troops and naval vessels stationed in or around the colony, the importation of flour actually 
declines.  For the quarter, total entrances for flour only amount to 1,470 barrels, although imports 
of bread rise dramatically to 33,892 hundredweight.  These shipments may correlate with the 
London commissariat’s July letter to Robinson in Quebec reporting the shipment of 7,576 bags 
of biscuit and 2,200 casks of flour to Halifax as part of the flow of provisions to British North 
America during the summer of 1814.268  Outside of the minor US contribution, these imports 
were from Great Britain.269   
Fourth quarter entrances suggest that this may have just been a brief anomaly.  Although 
the records for ports of origin are badly faded, the quarterly totals amount to 5,235 barrels of 
flour and 15,700 hundredweight of bread.270  Very little flour or bread was exported out of 
Halifax; third quarter totals amount to 979 barrels of flour and 472 hundredweight of bread 
distributed to varied destinations with no clearances for Quebec.271  The fourth quarter is even 
more limited, totaling just 101 barrels of flour and 1,126 hundredweight of bread with Bermuda 
as the primary recipient.272  The discrepancy between entrances and exits is interesting as it 
suggests that most of the imported grain was consumed locally, which would be in keeping with 
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the presence of an increased garrison and naval presence. However, it also means that the 
entrepot function of Halifax as a distribution center for supplies to the West Indies was limited.        
Although the Halifax port records do not record direct trade with the US, trade continued 
through the port of Castine in the District of Maine after its military occupation by the British in 
September 1814.  Castine served as a lucrative hub between the British economy and the US, 
since Castine was now British territory it could trade throughout the empire without fear of the 
British naval blockade.  In a September proclamation, Sherbrooke pronounced that the port was 
open to all British subjects and all British goods; with the annexation of the lands east of the 
Penobscot River and the creation of the British customs house at Castine, the proclamation 
created a new land boundary between the US and British North America through which trade 
could be conducted.   
 The volume of trade there was so substantial it threatened the stability of the US banking 
system.  The Niles Register reported at the end of December that “a number of banks to the 
eastward have recently stopped payment in specie; and if the trade with ‘his majesty’s’ port of 
Castine, with the usual smuggling is continued, we venture to say without pretending to a spirit 
of prophecy, that all the rest will soon follow the example.”273  In return, the value of British 
products entering the US also increased.  By January 1815, Sherbrooke estimated the value of 
imports destined for the US stored at Halifax to be worth over £1 million, most of which was 
destined for Castine.  Since the implementation of the general embargo of the US, much British 
trade had been redirected there.274  The end of the war provided another variable for merchants to 
consider.  The Treaty of Ghent did not address issues of trade, and Sherbrooke proved reluctant 
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to reopen unlimited trade without instructions from Britain in spite of demands by local 
merchants.275   
1815:  Peace, and a Return to Normalcy 
The end of the war corrected the trading patterns distorted by the war.  By February 1815, 
Drummond informed Robinson that the quantities of provisions provided from Britain to the 
commissariat in Canada would be strictly limited due to the changed political and martial 
situation.  In March this was modified as Drummond waited on “taking any steps for forwarding 
the supplies required by your present estimate until I hear further from you on the subject.”  The 
next month the provisions shipments previously promised to Robinson were diverted to the 
Netherlands due to the needs of British forces there.276  The rapid redirection of supplies 
elsewhere indicates the fragile and very unusual nature of British grain exports to North 
America.  As soon as the geopolitical situation shifted, the trade was quickly limited, halted, and 
then recalled in the span of less than three months.   
A proclamation Sherbrooke signed March 4, 1815 perfectly illustrates the enduring 
continuity of the political economy of the overseas Anglo-American grain trade.  After over two 
years of war, and numerous political machinations regarding trade, the end of the war left Nova 
Scotian trade almost exactly where it had started.  The proclamation permitted the importation of 
a number of goods including bread, flour, wheat, biscuit, and livestock into the colony from the 
United States for a period of three months.277  A letter from Lord Bathurst approving this 
measure arrived in May.278  More broadly, this proclamation parallels the one by Governor John 
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Parr permitting grain imports into the colony on an “emergency” basis over thirty years prior.  
Nova Scotian production of foodstuffs had not substantially advanced since the Loyalist 
migration overwhelmed it in the 1780s.  The province remained marginally self-sufficient in the 
best of times and dependent on the United States for food security.  
The North American grain trade leading up to and through the War of 1812 reveals the 
persistence of long established trading patterns and the fragile and limited alternatives to the 
essential connection between US agricultural production and British imperial consumption.  The 
flow of grain connected various parts of the Atlantic and shows an especially strong tie between 
the Canadas and the Maritimes that has been understated by the traditional historiography that 
privileges provincial specialization.  For the Maritime Provinces, US grain remained important 
until the summer of 1814 when the British blockade of US ports temporarily severed the 
connection.  In the Canadas, a shortage of grain and specie loomed at the start of the war and 
worsened over time.  Although there were schemes to import grain into the Canadas from 
Britain, Ireland, and the West Indies early in 1813, enacting a practical change in trading patterns 
was not fruitful until the end of 1813, and then only for Quebec City.  The challenges of distance 
and increased demand by the army in Upper Canada rendered efforts to supply the troops from 
across the Atlantic ineffective as most of the provisions consumed by the British army were 
attained from the US.   
The effort to try to reverse the traditional trade pattern required an enormous investment 
of time and money only made possible due to a very particular set of historical circumstances in 
late 1813 and through 1814.  This short span of time saw the collapse of Napoleon’s empire, the 
end of a war that had raged for over 20 years, and an exceptional harvest in Ireland and England 
combined with bountiful crops in Eastern Europe that complemented pent-up demand for British 
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products in Europe.  The war also created agricultural labor shortages and an exceptional 
demand for provisions in British North America, which coincided with weather related shortages 
that unbalanced the supply and demand of food within the colonies.  Essentially, this was a 
fleeting moment where British and European supply of British North America could have been 
attempted, and the swift collapse of this effort in spring 1815 highlights its fragility.  By contrast, 
the traditional trade pattern dating back to at least the mid-eighteenth century (and probably 
earlier) remained intact through two years of open warfare between the US and the British 
Empire.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
269 
 
CHAPTER 8  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Using grain as a lens to examine the late colonial and early republican era political 
economy reveals a number of significant but overlooked elements that provide a fuller 
understanding of this critical time.  Rather than focusing on the traditional story of political 
division, this dissertation demonstrates that economic continuities are also foundational to the 
Anglo-American Atlantic World from the 1760s to the 1810s.  By crossing the traditional 
historiographical division in the field as well as geographic boundaries, we find a surprisingly 
integrated and resilient economy centered on grain.  Grain was the essential commodity that 
underwrote colonial development and social stability in the early modern Atlantic World.  
Without access to timely and reliable deliveries of American colonial grain products, the 
societies of the era would have ceased to function as they did.  Without basic subsistence, other 
economic, political, and social developments would have to have been profoundly altered.   
Tracing the patterns of exchange from the 1760s CO 16 records provides a baseline for 
late colonial American grain trade patterns.  The important links to the West Indies, Iberia, and 
the coastal trade in British North America formed the primary external markets for American 
surpluses.  This exposes a unique trait of the grain economy.  Traditional examinations of the 
colonial economic trading networks focus on imperial regulations and the effect of trade 
restrictions on the development of the colonial economy within a mercantilist framework.  By 
using grain as a point of entry, it is clear that the mercantile framework was more flexible than 
studies of tobacco, sugar, or other enumerated commodities suggest.  Trading grain across 
imperial boundaries was an open practice in the late colonial era.  Reconciling this with 
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mercantilism is possible.  Customers external to the British Empire required grain imports, and 
there were no substitutes.  Thus, a freer trade in grain was complimentary to mercantilism as it 
drew needed resources into the British Empire at the price of an unabsorbable agricultural 
surplus. 
As political and social pressures combined to sunder the empire in 1775, economic ties 
between the independent US, the British Empire, and the empires of other European nations 
would logically become more complex.  At the end of the American Revolution, debates on how 
to (or if) to re-integrate the US back into the British Atlantic economy sparked a voluminous 
public debate through newspapers and pamphlets.  The theoretical conceptions of both American 
and British commentators rested on an underlying reality:  the empire required access to surplus 
grain.  This need refocused attention on British North America.  Could the remaining North 
American colonies replace the US as a source of grain for the empire? 
The resettlement of loyalist refugees in Canada and the Maritime Provinces in the years 
following 1783 provided some hope.  A willing population combined with the availability of 
land seemed to promise agricultural growth.  The reality was far different.  Immigrants to British 
North America faced a formidable environment, a lack of infrastructure, and a complicated 
process of settlement in a new land.  The result of this was unexpected from a political 
perspective.  In immediate need of provisions, British colonial officials turned to the US as a 
source of sustenance.  In a perverse outcome of the loyalist migration, the need for foodstuffs 
bound British North America even closer to the US than prior to the revolution.  Far from being 
a solution for the food needs of the British West Indies, British North America added to the 
imperial difficulties of building a closed British Atlantic economy shorn of the thirteen rebellious 
colonies. 
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Grain exports led the post-war economic recovery in the United States.  The trading links 
to the West Indian colonies of each imperial power and to Iberia were already established.  The 
lack of an alternative supply from British North America also reopened British colonial markets 
to US grain producers.  By the signing of Jay’s Treaty in 1794 that formally re-established 
Anglo-American commercial ties, the grain economy was fundamentally a story of continuity 
rather than one of Revolutionary rupture.  In turn, this raises significant questions as to the true 
nature of the American Revolution.  While the political outcome was new, the underlying 
economic foundation and commercial connections of the new nation remained strikingly 
familiar.  
The outbreak of the French Revolutionary and subsequent Napoleonic Wars created 
tremendous opportunities for neutral US trade.  The upheaval opened a new stream of trade for 
the US in the carrying trade.  This was initially a relatively benign undertaking.  As the new 
Democratic-Republican administration of Thomas Jefferson entered office in 1801, the carrying 
trade was a significant part of both economic and political policy for the nation.  Yet, by 1805, 
the international situation had changed.  The increasingly bitter war between Napoleonic France 
and Great Britain inevitably ensnared the US economic regulations and trade restrictions by one 
power were met by equally stringent responses from the other in an ever-widening vortex.  By 
1807, Jefferson proposed a radical solution to the problem:  an embargo of all US trade with all 
nations. 
Superficially, this was an application of a Revolutionary-era lesson to a present-day 
problem.  Protests and boycotts against British taxation policies had seemed to have succeeded in 
the 1760s.  The idea was undone by the fundamental continuity of the grain trade, it was too 
central an item of trade to be curtailed.  The national political economy of the US was 
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fundamentally export based, and trade disruptions effected the US more thoroughly than any of 
the European powers that the embargo sought to punish.  British North America provided a ready 
market for US producers, and enforcing the embargo on an unwilling American citizenry created 
serious domestic consequences for the Jefferson administration. 
With the end of Jefferson’s presidency in 1809, another change in international geo-
politics provided opportunity for US grain farmers and merchants.  The uprising in Spain against 
Joseph Bonaparte, combined with the continued resistance of Portugal and the introduction of 
British forces into Iberia provided a perfect market for US produce.  In traditional 
historiography, the Peninsular War has little connection to the US. An examination of the grain 
economy, however, reveals a different story.  Although not a belligerent power, a combination of 
long-standing ties to Iberia, the influx of British capital into the region, and wartime economic 
dislocations deeply involved US interests in the war effort.  The importance of American grain 
could have provided the Madison administration with a means to garner concessions from Great 
Britain, however, the US followed another path in 1812. 
For the first time since the American Revolution, a war between Great Britain and the US 
threatened the continuity of the grain trade.  Yet, this is not what actually happened.  Through a 
scheme of licensed trade, US grain exports to British-supported Spain and Portugal continued 
despite the outbreak of war between the US and Great Britain.  It was not until the war in Iberia 
concluded in early 1814 that the US and British governments took steps to abolish the licensed 
trade.  
The US grain trade also continued with British North America despite the region being an 
active theater of war.  Provisions shortages in the Canadas and the Maritime Provinces both 
effected combat operations as British colonial officials sought to encourage continued trade with 
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US civilians willing to trade during the course of the deeply unpopular war.  It was not until the 
end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1814 that this pattern changed, as surplus provisions from Europe 
briefly replaced the US as the source of these vital supplies.  The change in trade patterns was 
temporary, as 1815 witnessed the resumption of trade. 
The grain trade patterns of 1765 and 1815 are very similar to one another.  The American 
Revolutionary War, of course, disrupted trade for a period of time, however, other efforts to 
block the accustomed grain trade through embargo and (eventually) war were ultimately 
unsuccessful.  The trade was too deeply ingrained in the private business interests of the people 
and in the interests of colonial, national, and imperial governments for long-term restriction.  
This examination of the grain trade deepens our understanding of the late colonial and early 
republican US.  Grain was also vital to the British Atlantic and British North American economy 
of this era. The inherent difficulties of overcoming national, imperial, and war-divided 
historiographies conceals grain from our easy gaze.  Mistaken ideas of periodization and 
politically inspired limitations to historical assessments ultimately hide connections that were 
fundamental at the time and should be exposed.  The availability of surplus grain, particularly 
from the mid-Atlantic colonies in what would become the United States, were essential to the 
viability of societies around the British Atlantic.  Simply stated, without food society ceases to 
function.  Ideology falls to the wayside, plantations cease production, populations collapse, and 
long-distance warfare becomes impossible.  Examining the availability of food products, the 
laws enabling or limiting access, and the extraordinary (and sometimes illegal) steps taken to 
ensure that the staff of life was available to fuel social development was crucial to the rise of 
Anglo-American power in a tumultuous Age of Atlantic Revolutions whose political drama 
should not completely eclipse its economic foundations and the vital lens of political economy.                              
274 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Archival Resources 
Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
Sarah A.G. Smith Collection, Collection 1864 
Levi Hollingsworth Papers, Collection 0289. 
Charles H. Baker, Account Book and Letter Book, Collection Am.9071.  
 
Library and Archives of Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada 
War Office 57, Commissariat Department Papers 
Bathhurst Papers, MG24-A8 
 
Archives of Ontario, Toronto, Ontario, Canada 
Rideout Papers, MS Collection 537. 
David Library of the American Revolution, Washington Crossing, Pennsylvania 
Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, Collection 384. 
Customs Office, 16/1, Collection 412. 
Liverpool Papers, Collection 430. 
 
Provincial Archives of Nova Scotia, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada 
Nova Scotia.  Commissioner of Public Records Collection.  RG1. 
 
Vol. 31-35, microfilm roll 15230: Dispatches from the Board and Secretary of State to 
Governors. 
Vol. 50-53, microfilm roll ,15238: Sir John Wentworth Letterbooks  
Vol. 53-57, microfilm roll 15239:  Sir John Wentworth Letterbooks 
Vol. 58-59, microfilm roll 15240:  Lieutenant Governor Dispatches 
Vol. 60-63, microfilm roll 15241:  Dispatches from Secretary of State to Lieutenant Governor  
Vol. 111-113, microfilm roll 15262:  Lieutenant Governor’s Letterbook, 1808-1816  
Vol. 286-87, microfilm roll 15371:  Legislative Files of the Nova Scotia Council  
Vol. 299-302, microfilm roll 15384: Files of the House of Assembly, 1758-1800 
Vol, 344, microfilm roll 15419: Royal Warrants and other Proclamations Relating to Nova 
Scotia. 
 
CO 217- Colonial Office Records- Nova Scotia Fonds 
275 
 
RG 31-104 Volume 8. 
Vol 56, microfilm roll 13860:  Correspondence with the Secretary of State 
Vol 57, microfilm roll 13861:  Correspondence with the Secretary of State 
Vol 60, microfilm roll 13862:  Correspondence with the Secretary of State 
Vol 80-81, microfilm roll 13870:  Correspondence with the Secretary of State  
Vol 82-84, microfilm roll 13871:  Correspondence with the Secretary of State  
Vol 85, microfilm roll 13872:  Correspondence with the Secretary of State  
Vol 87-89, microfilm roll 13873:  Correspondence with the Secretary of State  
Vol 90-92, microfilm roll 13874:  Correspondence with the Secretary of State  
Vol 93-95, microfilm roll 13875:  Correspondence with the Secretary of State  
Vol 96-98, microfilm roll 15876:  Correspondence with the Secretary of State  
 
Colonial Office Record Group 221:  Nova Scotia Miscellaneous (Naval Office Records) 
Vol 28-30, microfilm roll 13968:  Naval Office Records (Halifax) 
Vol. 31-32, microfilm roll 13969:  Naval Office Records (Halifax) 
 
Edward Howe Papers. Microfilm roll 9668. 
 
Published Primary Sources 
 
 “A Citizen of Vermont”, “A Free Enquiry into the Causes both Real and Pretended for Laying 
 the Embargo.” Windsor:  Charles Spear, 1808. 
 
“A Merchant of the Old School”, War with America. The Crisis of the dispute with the United 
 States: being an exposition of the points, political and commercial, now at issue between 
 the two governments; in a series of three letters. Addressed to his royal highness the 
 prince regent; by a celebrated public writer; with an explanatory preface.  London: 
 Richard Taylor and Co., 1811. 
 
Adams, John. “First Annual Message of John Adams, 22 November 1797.”  
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/adamsme1.asp. Accessed 24 February 2019. 
 
 Baring, Alexander Baring, An Inquiry into the consequences of the Orders in council; and an 
 examination of the conduct of Great Britain towards the neutral commerce of America. 
 2nd ed. London: J.M. Richardson, 1808. 
 Broughton, S.D. Letters from Portugal, Spain, & France, Written during the Campaigns of 
 1812,1813, & 1814, Addressed to the Friend in England; Describing the Leading 
 Features of the Provinces Passed Through, and the State of Society, Manners, Habits &c. 
 of the People.  London:  Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme and Brown, 1815. 
         
276 
 
 Cockburn, Sir George.  A Voyage to Cadiz and Gibraltar, up the Mediterranean to Sicily and 
 Malta, in 1810&11.  Including a description of Sicily and Lipari Islands, and an 
 Excursion in Portugal, by Lt. Genl. Cockburn, Vol 2.  London:  J Harding, 1815. 
 
Columella, An Inquiry into the Effects of Our Foreign Carrying Trade upon the Agriculture, 
Population, and Morals of the Country. New York: D. and G. Bruce, 1806. 
 
 Coxe, Tench.  A Brief Examination of Lord Sheffield’s Observations on the Commerce of the 
 United States.  Philadelphia: Carey, Stewart and Co., 1791. 
 
 Dallas, Alexander.  An Exposition of the Causes and Character of the War. Washington: Roger 
 Chew Weightman, 1815. 
 
Edwards, Brian. Thoughts on the late Proceedings of Government, respecting the trade of the 
West India Islands with the United States of North America.  The second edition, 
corrected and enlarged, to which is not first added a postscript, addressed to the right 
honourable lord Sheffield. London: T. Cadell, 1784. 
 
 Gallatin, Albert.  Reports of the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, prepared in 
 Obedience to the Act of the 10th May, 1800, to which are prefixed The Reports of 
 Alexander Hamilton, on Public Credit, On a National Bank, On Manufactures, and on 
 the Establishment of a Mint.  Washington: Duff Green, 1818. 
 
 —. “Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, Transmitting a Statement of Exports to the 
 Dominions of Spain for the Year Ending on the Thirteenth Day of September, 1812.” 
 Washington:  Roger Chew Weightman, 1813. 
 
 —. Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Chairman of the Committee of Commerce 
 and Manufactures.  Washington:  A. and G. Way, 1811. 
 
Gurwood, John ed. The Dispatches of Field Marshall the Duke of Wellington During His 
Various campaigns in India, Denmark, Portugal, the Low Countries, and France from 
1799 to 1818., Vol. 8. London:  John Murray, 1832. 
 
 Hamilton, Alexander.  “Alexander Hamilton’s Final Version of the Report on the Subject of 
 Manufactures, [5 December 1791],” Founders Online, National Archives, last modified 
 June 13, 2018, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-10-02-0001-0007. 
 Accessed November 10, 2018 
 
 Hollingsworth, S.  The Present State of Nova Scotia, with a Brief Account of Canada and the 
 British Islands off the Coast of North America.  2nd ed. William Creech, Edinburgh, 
 1787. 
 
Izard, George.  Official Correspondence with the Department of War, relative to the military 
operations of the American army under the command of Major General Izard, on the 
277 
 
northern frontier of the United States in the years 1814 and 1815.  Philadelphia: Thomas 
Dobson, 1816. 
 
Jefferson, Thomas.  “First Annual Message to Congress, 8 December 1801.”  
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jeffmes1.asp.  Accessed 24 February 2019.   
 
—. “Second Inaugural Address.” http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau2.asp.  
Accessed 18 May 2014. 
 
—. Seventh Annual Message to Congress, 27 October 1807.  
 http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jeffmes7.asp 
 
—. “Eighth Annual Message to Congress” (Washington, DC, 8 November 1808, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jeffmes8.asp.  Accessed December 2, 2018. 
 
 —.  Message From the President of the United States Communicating a Copy of His 
 Proclamation Issued in Consequence of the Opposition in the Neighborhood of Lake 
 Champlain to the Laws Laying an Embargo.” Washington:  A. &W. Way, 1808. 
—. “Message from the President of the United States Communicating a Copy of His 
 Proclamation Issued in Consequence of the Opposition in the Neighborhood of Lake 
 Champlain to the Laws Laying an Embargo.”  Washington: A. &W. Way, 1808. 
 
 Lambert, John. Travels through lower Canada, and the United States of north America in the 
 years 1806, 1807, and 1808.  To which are added, biographical notices and anecdotes of 
 some of the leading characters in the United States; and of those who have, at various 
 periods, borne a conspicuous part in the politics of that country. Vol 2. London: Richard 
 Phillips, 1810. 
 
Madison, James.  A Memoir, Containing an Examination of British Doctrine.  Washington:  
Smith, 1806. 
 
—. “The Non-Intercourse Law, passed June 28.” Salem:  Cushing and Appleton, 1809. 
 
 Massachusetts General Court, “Memorial to the Honorable Senate and House of Representatives 
 of the United States Protest Against the Embargo Act.” Boston:  1809. 
 
 Melish, John.  Travels in the United States of America, in the years 1806&1807, and 1809, 1810, 
 & 1811; including an account of passages betwixt America and Britain, and travels 
 through various parts of Great Britain, Ireland, and Upper Canada, Vol.  2. 
 Philadelphia: Thomas & George Palmer, 1812. 
 
Niles Weekly Register, 31 December 1814.  
 
 Pitkin, Timothy.  A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States, 2nd edition New 
 York: Hamlen and Newton, 1817. 
 
278 
 
 —.  A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States.  Hartford: Timothy Hosmer, 
 1816. 
 
 Randolph, John. Speech of John Randolph.  Windsor, Vermont, 1806. 
 
 Schaumann, August Ludolf Friedrich.  On the Road With Wellington, edited and translated by 
 Anthony Ludovici.  London:  William Heinemann, 1834. 
 
 Sheffield, Lord. Observations on the Commerce of the United States with Europe and the West 
 Indies; including the several articles of export and import. Philadelphia: Robert Bell, 
 1783. 
 
Smith, Adam.  An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Vol. II. London: 
W. Strathan and T. Cadell, 1776. 
 
Smith, James Morton ed.  Letters of the Republic:  The Correspondence Between Jefferson and 
Madison, Vol. 3. New York:  W.W. Norton, 1995. 
 Stephens, James. War in Disguise. New York: Hopkins and Seymour, 1806. 
 
 Stothert, William.  A Narrative of the Principal Events of the Campaigns of 1809, 1810, and 
 1811, in Spain and Portugal; Interspaced with Remarks on Local Scenery and Manners.  
 In a series of letters.  London:  P. Martin 1812. 
 
Thornton, Henry. Historical Summary of the Corn Laws, Containing the Substance of the Statues 
 Passed from the Year 1660 for Regulating the Importation and Consumption of Foreign 
 and the Exportation of British Corn. London: James Ridgway, 1841. 
 
United States.  American State Papers:  House of Representatives. 
 
—.  American State Papers:  Naval Affairs. 
 
—. American State Papers:  Finance. 
 
—.  American State Papers:  Commerce and Navigation. 
 
—.  American State Papers:  Senate. 
 
—.  Treaty of Friendship, Limits, and Navigation between Spain and the United States, October 
27, 1795. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/sp1795.asp.  Accessed 24 February 2019.   
 
—. Constitution of the United States of America, Article I, section 8. 
 https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript. Accessed November 6, 
 2018.  
Statutes of the United States, 10th Congress, 2nd Session, “An Act to Enforce and Make More 
 Effectual an Act Laying an Embargo” (Washington, 1809). 
279 
 
State of Vermont, “Law of Vermont to Prevent Intercourse with Canada” (Montpelier: Wright 
and Sibley, 1812).  
Washington, George. “Farewell Address” 1796.  
 http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp.  Accessed 24 February 2019. 
 
 
United Kingdom.  House of Commons. “Bill to Regulate Importation of Corn into United 
Kingdom (as amended by committee).” 1813-14 session, Vol. II No. 
197.https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/result/pqpdocumentview?accountid=104
06&groupid=106067&pgId=1aaba435-edd0-414f-b354-
7c7cf4726ba9&rsId=16602D1C1E2#108   
 
United Kingdom. House of Commons. “Resolutions of the Committee of Whole House of 
Commons on State of Corn Laws, February 1815.” House of Commons Papers, Vol. 
1337, No. 86. 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/result/pqpdocumentview?accountid=10406&
groupid=106067&pgId=d9c40369-31a1-4cdb-8eb4-86c963c2305e#0 
United Kingdom.  House of Commons. “An Account of British and Foreign Corn and Grain, 
Exported from Great Britain in the Year 1812.”  Sessional Papers, 1813-14, Vol. 12, 159. 
https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t70.d75.1813-
003768?accountid=14583      
 
United Kingdom.  House of Commons. “Accounts Relating to the Trade and Navigation with 
British N. America and W. Indian Colonies, 1805-14” House of Commons Sessional 
Papers, Vol. XIV, Paper No. 417.  https://parlipapers-proquest-
com.prxy4.ursus.maine.edu/parlipapers/docview/t70.d75.1816-004749?accountid=14583   
 
United Kingdom.  House of Commons. “An Account of the Quantity of Grain, Meal, and Flour 
imported into Great Britain from Foreign countries; and also from Ireland, in each year, 
from 1792 to 1814, both inclusive; distinguishing the Countries from which imported, 
and the different kinds of Grain.” House of Commons Papers, Vol. 10, Paper No. 169, 2-
11. https://parlipapers-proquest-
com.prxy4.ursus.maine.edu/parlipapers/docview/t70.d75.1814-004237?accountid=14583.   
 
United Kingdom.  House of Commons. “Account of the Quantity of Grain, Meal, and Flour 
Imported and Exported from Great Britain, 1792-1814.”  House of Commons Papers, 
Vol. 10. https://parlipapers-proquest-
com.prxy4.ursus.maine.edu/parlipapers/result/pqpdocumentview?accountid=14583&grou
pid=95895&pgId=121d6bc4-48a9-4756-b466-30ab4f507c9a&rsId=1688BA45E09    
 
United Kingdom.  House of Commons. “Copy of a Notice published in the Quebec Gazette for 
Thursday, 12th February 1789, relating to the Importation of Corn and Grain into the 
Province of Quebec.”  House of Commons Papers, Vol. 75. https://parlipapers-proquest-
com.prxy4.ursus.maine.edu/parlipapers/docview/t70.d75.hcsp-001550?accountid=14583 
280 
 
 
United Kingdom.  House of Commons. “Copy of a Letter from the Right honourable Lord 
Dorchester to the Right honourable Lord Sydney, dated Quebec, 14th February 1789.”  
House of Commons Papers, Vol. 83.  https://parlipapers-proquest-
com.prxy4.ursus.maine.edu/parlipapers/docview/t70.d75.hcsp-001711?accountid=14583 
 
The Sugar Act. Great Britain The statutes at large ... [from 1225 to 1867] by Danby Pickering. 
 Cambridge: Printed by Benthem, for C. Bathhurst: London, 1762-1869. 
  http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/sugar_act_1764.asp.  Accessed October 27, 
 2018.  
 
 
Secondary Source Books: 
 
Anderson, Fred.  The Crucible of War: The Seven Years War and the Fate of Empire in British 
North America, 1754-1766.  New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000. 
 
Appleby, Joyce. The Relentless Revolution: A History of Capitalism. 1st ed. New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2010. 
 
Armitage, David. The Ideological Origins of the British Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000. 
 
Armitage, David and Michael Braddick, eds. The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800.  New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 
 
Armstrong, Robert. Structure and Change: An Economic History of Quebec. Ottawa: Gage 
Publishing Limited, 1984.  
 
Arthur, Brian.  How Britain Won the War of 1812: The Royal Navy Blockades of the United 
States, 1812-1815.  Rochester:  Boydell and Brewer, 2011. 
 
Bailyn, Bernard. Atlantic History: Concepts and Contours. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2005. 
 
—. “Introduction:  Reflections on some Major Themes” in Bailyn and Patricia Denault, eds., in 
Soundings in Atlantic History: Latent Structures and Intellectual Currents, 1500-1830, 
pp.1-43. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009. 
 
—. The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1967. 
 
Beard, Charles.  An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States.  New York: 
MacMillian, 1913.  
 
281 
 
Ben-Atar, Doron. The Origins of Jeffersonian Commercial Policy and Diplomacy. New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1993. 
 
Bickham, Troy.  The Weight of Vengeance:  The United States, the British Empire, and the War 
of 1812.  Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2012. 
 
Boileau, John.  Half-Hearted Enemies: Nova Scotia, New England, and the War of 1812.  
Halifax: Formac Publishing Co., Ltd. 2005. 
 
Bowler, R. Arthur. Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America, 1775-1783. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975. 
 
Brebner, John Bartlet.  The Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia: A Marginal Colony during the 
Revolutionary Years.  New York: Columbia University Press, 1937. 
 
 
Breen, T.H. The Marketplace of Revolution: How Consumer Politics Shaped American 
Independence.  New York: Harvard University Press, 2004. 
 
Buel, Richard.  In Irons: British Naval Supremacy and the American Revolutionary Economy.  
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998. 
 
Canny, Nicholas and Phillip Morgan. “Introduction: The Making and Unmaking of an Atlantic 
World” in Canny and Morgan eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Atlantic World, c.1450-
1850, pp.1-20. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
 
Carp, E. Wayne. To Starve the Army at Pleasure: Continental Army Administration and 
American Political Culture, 1775-1783.  Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina 
Press, 1984. 
 
Clark, Andrew Hill.  Acadia: The Geography of Early Nova Scotia to 1760.  Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1968. 
 
Clemens, Paul. The Atlantic Economy and Colonial Maryland’s Eastern Shore: From Tobacco 
to Grain. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1980. 
 
Coakley, Robert. The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1789-1878. 
Washington: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1988 
 
Craig, Gerald M.  Upper Canada: the Formative Years, 1784-1841.  Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1963. 
 
Creighton, Donald.  The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence, 1760-1850.  Toronto:  Ryerson 
Press, 1937. 
 
282 
 
Crosby, Alfred W.  Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-1900, 2nd 
ed.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.  
 
Courville, Serge and Normand Sequin. Rural Life in Nineteenth-Century Quebec. Ottawa: 
Canadian Historical Association, 1989. 
 
Darwin, John.  The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970.  
Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2009.   
 
Davis, Lance and Stanley Engerman.  Naval Blockades in Peace and War: An Economic History 
since 1750. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
 
De Bougainville, Louis Antione.  Adventure in the Wilderness: The American Journals of Louis 
Antione de Bougainville, trans. and ed. Edward Hamilton.  Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1964. 
 
De Toy, Brian.  “Wellington’s Lifeline:  Naval Logistics in the Peninsula” in The Consortium on 
Revolutionary Europe, 1750-1850:  Selected Papers, 1995 ed. Donald Horward.  
Tallahassee: Florida State University, 1995.  
 
Doerflinger, Thomas.  A Vigorous Spirit of Enterprise: Merchants and Economic Development 
in Revolutionary Philadelphia. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986. 
 
Dunn, Richard S. Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 
1624-1713. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1972.  
 
Egnal, Marc. New World Economies: The Growth of the Thirteen Colonies and Early Canada. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. 
 
Elkins, Stanley and Eric McKitrick.  The Age of Federalism.  New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993. 
 
Esdaile, Charles J.  The French Wars, 1792-1815.  London:  Routledge, 2001. 
 
Gallman, Robert. “Economic Growth and Structural Change in the Nineteenth Century” in 
Stanley Engerman and Robert Gallman, eds., The Cambridge Economic History of the 
United States. Vol. 2, The Long Nineteenth Century.  Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008, 1-55. 
 
Galpin, W. Freeman. The Grain Supply of England During the Napoleonic Period. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1925.  
 
Gates, David.  The Spanish Ulcer: A History of the Peninsular War.  New York:  W.W. Norton, 
1986. 
 
283 
 
Gould, Eliga. Among the Powers of the Earth: The American Revolution and the Making of a 
New World Empire.  Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 2012. 
 
Guillet, Edwin C.  Early Life in Upper Canada.  Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963. 
 
Gwyn, Julian. Excessive Expectations: Maritime Commerce and the Economic Development of 
Nova Scotia, 1740-1870.  Montreal:  McGill Queens, 1998. 
 
—. “Shaped by the Soil: Were the Minas Basin Planters Successful Farmers?” in The Nova 
Scotia Planters in the Atlantic World, 1759-1830. Ed. T. Stephen Henderson and Wendy 
Robicheau.  Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 2012, 81-98. 
  
—. “Shaped by the Sea but Impoverished by the Soil: Chester Township to 1830” in The Nova 
Scotia Planters in the Atlantic World, 1759-1830. Ed. T. Stephen Henderson and Wendy 
Robicheau.  Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 2012, 99-122.  
 
Haeger, John Denis.  John Jacob Astor: Business and Finance in the Early Republic. Detroit: 
Wayne State University Press, 1991. 
 
Hancock, David. “Rethinking the Economy of British North America” in Cathy Matson, ed. The 
Economy of Early America: Historical Perspectives and New Directions. University 
Park: Penn State Press, 2006, 71-106. 
 
—. “Atlantic Trade and Commodities, 1402-1815” in Nicholas Canny and Phillip Morgan, The 
Oxford Handbook of the Atlantic World, c.1450-1850. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011, 324-340.  
 
—. Oceans of Wine: Madeira and the Emergence of American Trade and Taste.  New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2009. 
 
—. Citizens of the World:  London Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic 
Community, 1735-1785. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
 
—. “Connection and Control in the Atlantic Economy,” in Bernard Bailyn and Patricia Denault, 
eds., Soundings in Atlantic History: Latent Structures and Intellectual Currents, 1500-
1830. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009, 112-140.  
 
—.  Oceans of Wine: Madeira and the Emergence of American Trade and Taste. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2009. 
 
Harris, Cole. This Reluctant Land: Society, Space, and Environment in Canada before 
Confederation. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2008. 
 
—.  Canada before Confederation: A Study on Historical Geography.  Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s Press, 1991. 
 
284 
 
Heckscher, Eli F.  The Continental System: An Economic Interpretation., ed. Herald 
Westergaard. Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1922. 
 
Henretta, James. The Origins of American Capitalism: Collected Essays. Boston: Northeastern 
University Press, 1991 
 
Herson, James P.  “Flour, Full Bellies, and Resupply:  Campaign Logistics at Cadiz” in The 
Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, 1750-1850:  Selected Papers, 1999 ed. Donald 
Horward.  Tallahassee: Florida State University, 1999, 335-346. 
 
Hickey, Donald. The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict, Bicentennial Edition.  Chicago:  
Chicago UP, 2012.  
 
Holton, Woody.  Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution.  New York: Hill and 
Wang, 2007. 
 
Hornsby, Stephen. British Atlantic, American Frontier: Space of Power in Early Modern British 
America. University Press of New England, 2005. 
 
Horsman, Reginald.  The Diplomacy of the New Republic, 1776-1815. Arlington Heights: Harlan 
Davidson, 1985. 
 
Innis, Harold.  The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History.  New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1962. 
 
—. The Cod Fisheries: History of an International Economy, 2nd edition. Toronto: Toronto 
University Press, 1954. 
 
Jasanoff, Maya. Liberty’s Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World. New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 2011. 
 
Jensen, Merrill. The New Nation: A History of the United States during the Confederation, 1781-
1789. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1965. 
 
 Kert, Faye Margaret. Prize and Prejudice: Privateering and Naval Prize in Atlantic Canada in 
the War of 1812. St. John’s: International Maritime Economic History Association, 1997. 
 
Knight, Roger.  Britain Against Napoleon:  The Organization of Victory, 1793-1815. London:  
Allen Lane, 2013. 
 
Klooser, Wim. “Inter-Imperial Smuggling in the Americas, 1600-1800” in Bernard Bailyn and 
Patricia Denault, eds., Soundings in Atlantic History: Latent Structures and Intellectual 
Currents, 1500-1830. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009, 141-180.   
 
Kulikoff Allan. The Agrarian Origins of American Capitalism. Charlottesville, London:  
University Press of Virginia, 1992.   
285 
 
 
Landon, Harry F. The North Country: A History Embracing Jefferson, St. Lawrence, Oswego, 
Lewis, and Franklin Counties, New York. Vol. 1.  Indianapolis: Historical Publishing 
Company, 1932. 
 
Lemon, James. The Best Poor Man’s Country:  A Geographical Study of Early Southeastern 
Pennsylvania. Baltimore: James Hopkins, 1972. 
 
Lipsey, Robert. “US Foreign Trade and the Balance of Payments, 1800-1913” in Stanley 
Engerman, and Robert Gallman eds. The Cambridge Economic History of the United 
States. Vol. 2, The Long Nineteenth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 687-732. 
 
Lovett, Gabriel.  Napoleon and the Birth of Modern Spain, Vol. 1:  Challenge to the Old Order. 
New York:  New York University Press, 1965. 
 
Lydon, James. Fish and Flour for Gold, 1600-1800: Southern Europe in the Colonial Balance of 
Payments. Philadelphia: PEAES, 2008. 
 
MacKinnon, Neil S. This Unfriendly Soil: The Loyalist Experience in Nova Scotia, 1783-1791. 
Kingston, Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1986.   
 
Maier, Pauline.  From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of 
Opposition to Britain, 1765-1776.  New York: A.A. Knopf, 1972. 
 
Marshall, Peter. The Making and Unmaking of Empires: Britain, India, and America c. 1750-
1783. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
 
Marshall, P.J.  Remaking the British Atlantic: The United States and the British Empire after 
American Independence.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
 
Matson, Cathy.  Merchants & Empire: Trading in Colonial New York.  Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins, 1998. 
 
—. “A House of Many Mansions:  Some Thoughts on the Field of Economic History” in Cathy 
Matson, ed. The Economy of Early America: Historical Perspectives and New Directions. 
(University Park: Penn State Press, 2006).   
 
McCalla, Douglas.  Planting the Province: Economic History of Upper Canada, 1784-1870. 
Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1993.  
 
McCallum, John.  Unequal Beginnings:  Agriculture and Economic Development in Quebec and 
Ontario until 1870. Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1980. 
 
McCoy, Drew. The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1980. 
286 
 
 
McCusker, John and Russell Menard. The Economy of British North America, 1607-1789.  
Chapel Hill, London:  University of North Carolina Press, 1985. 
 
McCusker, John. “Growth, Stagnation, or Decline? The Economy of the British West Indies, 
1763-1790.” in Richard Hoffman ed., The Economy of Early America: The Revolutionary 
Period, 1763-1790. Charlottesville:  University of Virginia Press, 1988, 275-302. 
 
Meinig, D.W. The Shaping of America: A Geographic Perspective on 500 Years of History, Vol. 
1. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986. 
 
Moon, Joshua.  Wellington’s Two-Front War: The Peninsular War Campaigns at Home and 
Abroad, 1808-1814. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011. 
 
Morgan, Phillip. Slave Counterpoint:  Black Culture in the Eighteenth-Century Chesapeake and 
Lowcountry. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988. 
 
Nash, Gary.  The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American 
Revolution. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. 
 
North, Douglass.  The Economic Growth of the United States, 1790-1860. New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1966. 
 
Olson, Mancur. The Economics of the Wartime Shortage: A History of British Food Supplies in 
the Napoleonic War and in World Wars I and II. Durham: Duke UP, 1963. 
 
O’Shaughnessy, Andrew.  An Empire Divided: The American Revolution and the British 
Caribbean. Philadelphia:  University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000.   
 
Ouellet, Fernand. Economic and Social History of Quebec, 1760-1850: Structures and 
Conjectures. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1980. 
 
—.  “Colonial Economy and International Economy: the Trade of the St. Lawrence River valley 
with Spain, Portugal, and their Atlantic Possessions” in The North American Role in the 
Spanish Imperial Economy, 1760-1819, eds. Jacques A. Barbier and Allan J. Kuethe 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984. 
 
Paquette, Gabriel.  Imperial Portugal in the Age of Atlantic Revolutions:  The Luso-Brazilian 
World, c.1770-1850.  London:  Cambridge University Press, 2013.   
 
Parry, J.H., P.M. Sherlock, and A.P. Maingot.  A Short History of the West Indies, 4th ed. New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987. 
 
Perkins, Bradford.  Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805-1812. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1961. 
 
287 
 
Perkins, Edwin. The Economy of Colonial America. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1980. 
 
Perkins, Simeon.  The Diaries of Simeon Perkins, Vols. 1-5 ed. Harold Innis. Toronto: 
Champlain Society, 1948-1978. 
 
Rao, Gautham. National Duties: Customs Houses and the Making of the American State. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016. 
 
Riordan, Liam and Jerry Bannister, eds. The Loyal Atlantic: Remaking the British Atlantic in the 
Revolutionary Era. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012.  
 
Russell, Peter.  How Agriculture Made Canada:  Farming in the Nineteenth Century. Montreal: 
McGill-Queens University Press, 2012. 
 
Scott, James C.  Against the Grain: A Deep History of the Earliest States. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2017. 
 
Shepherd, James and Gary Walton. Shipping, Maritime Trade, and the Economic Development 
of Colonial North America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972. 
 
Smith, Joshua. Borderland Smuggling: Patriots, Loyalists, and Illicit trade in the Northeast, 
1783-1820.  Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006.  
 
Stanley, George F.G.  New France: The Last Phase, 1744-1760. Toronto: McClellan and 
Stewart, 1968. 
 
Stuart, Reginald C. United States Expansionism and British North America, 1775-1871. Chapel 
Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 1988. 
 
Taylor, Alan. The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, and 
Indian Allies. New York: Vintage Books, 2012 
 
Townsend, Camilla. Pocahontas and the Powhatan Dilemma. New York: Hill and Wang, 2004.  
 
Truxes, Thomas.  Defying Empire: Trading with the Enemy in Colonial New York. New Haven: 
Yale UP, 2008. 
 
Updyke, Frank.  The Diplomacy of the War of 1812. Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1965.   
 
Wallerstein, Immanuel. Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World Economy. 
New York:  Academic Press, 1980.  
 
Walker, James W. The Black Loyalists: The Search for a Promised Land in Nova Scotia and 
Sierra Leone, 1783-1870. London: Longman and Dalhouise University Press, 1976. 
 
288 
 
Wallot, Jean-Pierre and Gilles Paquet. Lower Canada at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century.  
Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1988. 
 
Ward, S.P.G. Wellington’s Headquarters: A Study of the Administrative Problems in the 
Peninsula, 1809-1814. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957. 
 
Williamson, Chilton. Vermont in Quandary: 1763-1825. Montpelier: Vermont Historical 
Society, 1949. 
 
Wallis, John Joseph. “Federal Government Finances – Revenue, Expenditure, and Debt: 1789–
1939.” Table Ea584-587 in Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the 
Present: Millennial Edition, edited by Susan B. Carter, Scott Sigmund Gartner, Michael 
R. Haines, Alan L. Olmstead, Richard Sutch, and Gavin Wright. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ISBN-9780511132971.Ea584-678 
 
Wood, Gordon.  The Radicalism of the American Revolution. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1992. 
 
 
 
Secondary Source Articles 
Adams, Donald.  “American Neutrality and Prosperity, 1793-1808:  A Reconsideration.” The 
Journal of Economic History, Vol. 40, No. 4 (December 1980),713-737. 
 
Amussen, Susan.  “Political Economy and Imperial Practice.” The William and Mary Quarterly, 
3rd series, Vol. 69, No. 1 (January 2012), 47-50. 
 
Appleby, Joyce.  “Commercial Farming and the ‘Agrarian Myth’ in the Early Republic.” Journal 
of American History, Vol. 68, No. 4 (March 1982), 833-849. 
 
Balinsky, Alexander S. “Gallatin’s Theory of War Finance.” The William and Mary Quarterly, 
3rd series, Vol. 16, No. 1 (January 1959), 73-82. 
Bell, Herbert.  “British Commercial Policy in the West Indies, 1783-93.” The English Historical 
Review, Vol. 31, No. 123 (July 1916), 429-441. 
 
Bjork, Gordon.  “The Weaning of the American Economy:  Independence, Market Changes, and 
Economic Development.” Journal of Economic History, Vol 24, No. 4 (December 1964), 
541-560. 
 
Carrington, Selwyn H.H.  “The American Revolution and the British West Indies’ Economy.” 
The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1987), 823-850. 
 
Copp, Walter.  “Nova Scotian Trade during the War of 1812.” Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 
18, No. 2 (June 1937), 141-155. 
 
289 
 
Dessureault, Christian. L’inventaire Apres Deces et l’agriculture bas-Canadienne.” Material 
History Review, 17 (January 1983), 127-138. 
 
Gallagher, John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson. “The Imperialism of Free Trade.” The 
Economic History Review, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1953), 1-15. 
 
Galpin, W. Freeman.  “The American Grain Trade to the Spanish Peninsula, 1810-1814.” The 
American Historical Review 28, no. 1 (1922), 24-44. 
  
—“The Grain Trade of Alexandria, Virginia, 1801-1815.” The North Carolina Historical 
Review, Vol. 4, no. 4 (1927), 404-27. 
  
— “The Grain Trade of New Orleans, 1804-1814.” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 
Vol. 14, No. 4 (March 1928), 496-507. 
 
Games, Alison.  “Atlantic History:  Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities.” American 
Historical Review, Vol., 111 (2006), 741-757. 
 
—.  “From the Editor:  Introductions, Definitions, and Historiography: What is Atlantic 
History?” Organization of American Historians Magazine of History, Vol. 18, No. 3 
(April 2004), 3-7. 
 
Gilbert, Geoffrey.  “The Role of Breadstuffs in American Trade, 1770-1790.” Explorations in 
Economic History, Vol. 14, (1977) 378-387. 
 
Heaton, Herbert.  “Non-Importation, 1806-1812.” The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 1, No. 
2 (November 1941), 178-198. 
Henretta, James.  “Families and Farms: Mentalite in Pre-Industrial America.” The William and 
Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, Vol. 35, No. 1 (January 1978), 3-32.  
 
—.  “Families and Farms: Mentalite in Pre-Industrial America:  Reply.” The William and Mary 
Quarterly, 3rd series, Vol. 37, No. 4 (October 1980), 696-700. 
Hickey, Donald.  “Trade Restrictions During the War of 1812.” The Journal of American 
History, Vol. 68, No. 3 (December 1981), 517-538. 
 
—, “The War of 1812: Still a Forgotten Conflict?” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 65, No. 
3 (July 2001), 741-769. 
 
Hill, Peter P.  “Prologue to the Quasi-War:  Stresses in Franco-American Commercial Relations, 
1793-96.” The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 49, No. 1 (March 1977), D1039-D1069. 
 
Hunter, Brooke. “The Prospect of Independent Americans: The Grain Trade and Economic 
Development during the 1780s.” Explorations in Early American Culture, Vol. 5 (2001), 
260-287. 
290 
 
 
Irwin, Douglas.  “The Aftermath of Hamilton’s ‘Report on Manufactures’.” The Journal of 
Economic History, Vol. 64, No. 3 (September 2004), 800-824. 
 
Johnson, Sherry.  “El Nino, Environmental Crisis, and the Emergence of Alternative Markets in 
the Hispanic Caribbean, 1760-70s.” The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, Vol. 62, 
No. 3 (July 2005), 365-410. 
 
Klingaman, David.  “Food Surpluses and Deficits in the American Colonies, 1768-1772.” The 
Journal of Economic History, Vol. 31, No. 3 (September 1971), 553-569. 
 
Lemon, James “Comment on James Henretta’s ‘Families and Farms: Mentalite in Pre-Industrial 
America.” The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, Vol. 37, No. 4 (October 1980), 
688-696. 
 
Mackintosh, W.A.  “Some Aspects of a Pioneer Economy.” The Canadian Journal of Economics 
and Political Science, Vol. 2, No. 4 (November 1936), 457-463. 
 
—.  “Canada and Vermont: A Study in Historical Geography.” The Canadian Historical Review, 
Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 1927), 9-30. 
 
Marshall, Peter. “The First and Second British Empires: A Question of Demarcation.” History, 
Vol. 49, No. 165 (1964), 13-23. 
 
Matson, Cathy. “Imperial Political Economy: An Ideological Debate and Shifting Practices.” The 
William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, Vol. 69, No. 1 (January 2012), 35-40. 
 
McDonald, Michelle Craig.  “The Chance of the Moment: Coffee and the New West Indies 
Commodities Trade.”  The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, Vol. 62, No. 3 (July 
2005), 441-472. 
 
Muller, H.N.  “Smuggling into Canada: How the Champlain Valley Defied Jefferson’s 
Embargo.” Vermont History, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Winter 1970), 5-21. 
—.  “A Traitorous and Diabolical Traffic: The Commerce of the Champlain-Richelieu Corridor 
During the War of 1812.” Vermont History, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1976), 78-96. 
 
Peskin, Lawrence.  “How the Republicans Learned to Love Manufacturing: The First Parties and 
the ‘New Economy.’” Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Summer, 2002) 
235-262. 
Pincus, Steve. “Rethinking Mercantilism:  Political Economy, the British Empire, and the 
Atlantic World in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.” William and Mary 
Quarterly, 3rd series, Vol. 69, No. 1 (January 2012), 3-34. 
 
Raymond James Raymond.  “A Reinterpretation of Irish Economic History (1730-1850).” 
Journal of European Economic History, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Winter 1982), 651-664. 
291 
 
 
Robson, Martin.   “’A Considerable Portion of the Defence of Empire’: Lisbon and Victualing 
the Royal Navy During the French Revolutionary War, 1793-1802.” Historical Research, 
Vol. 87, No. 237 (May 2014), 466-490. 
 
Sharp, Paul and Jacob Weisdorf.  “Globalization Revisited: Market Integration and the Wheat 
Trade Between North America and Britain from the Eighteenth Century.” Explorations in 
Economic History, Vol. 50 (2013), 88-98. 
 
Shepherd, James and Samuel Williamson.  “The Coastal Trade of the British North American 
Colonies, 1768-1772.” The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 32, No. 4 (December 
1972), 783-810.  
 
Shepherd, James and Gary Walton.  “Trade, Distribution, and Economic Growth in Colonial 
America.” Journal of Economic History, Vol. 32, No. 1 (March 1972), 128-145. 
 
Stagg, J.C.A.  “James Madison and the Coercion of Great Britain: Canada, the West Indies, and 
the War of 1812.” The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, Vol. 38, No. 1 (January 
1981), 3-34. 
 
Sturm, Harvey. “Smuggling in the War of 1812.” History Today, Vol. 29, No. 6 (August 1979), 
532-537. 
 
Taylor, Peter Shaw.  “War of 1812:  Did the Americans Throw the Fight?” Maclean’s, 25 June 
2012. https://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/the-real-reason-we-won/, accessed 2 
October 2018. 
 
Taylor, Alan. “Introduction: Expand or Die: The Revolution’s New Empire.” William and Mary 
Quarterly, 3rd Series, Vol. 74, No. 4 (October 2017), 619-632. 
Watson, G.E.  “United States and the Peninsular War 1808-1812.” The Historical Journal, Vol. 
19, No. 4 (December 1976), 859-876. 
 
Watkins, Melville. “A Staple Theory of Economic Growth.” The Canadian Journal of 
Economics and Political Science, Vol. 29, No. 2 (May 1963), 141-158. 
 
Weller, Jac.  ‘Wellington’s Peninsular War Logistics.” Journal of the Society for Army Historical 
Research, Vol. 42, No. 172 (1964), 197-202 
 
Wulf, Karin.  “No Boundaries?  New Terrain in Colonial American History.” Organization of 
American Historians Magazine of History, Vol. 25, No. 1 (January 2011), 7-12.         
 
Wynn, Graeme.  “Late Eighteenth-Century Agriculture on the Bay of Fundy Marshlands.” 
Acadiensis, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Spring 1979), 80-89. 
 
“Sampayo, The Contractor.” Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, April 1836. 432-452. 
 
292 
 
 
Unpublished Dissertations 
Clauder, Anna C.  “American Commerce as Affected by the Wars of the French Revolution and 
Napoleon, 1793-1812.” PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1932. 
Fryman, Mildred L. “Charles Stuart and the Common Cause:  the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, 
1810-1814.” Ph.D. diss, Florida State University 1974. 
Hunter, Brooke. “Rage for Grain:  Flour Milling in the Mid-Atlantic, 1750-1815.” PhD diss, 
University of Delaware, 2001. 
Martin, Edward Martin. “The Prize Game in the Borderlands: Privateering in New England and 
the Maritime Provinces, 1775-1815.” PhD diss, University of Maine, 2014.  
 
Digital Resources 
 
Haywood, Robert J. “John Collins” in the Dictionary of Canadian Biography.  
http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/collins_john_1795_4E.html  
 
 
 
 
  
  
293 
 
BIOGRAPHY OF THE AUTHOR 
Patrick Callaway graduated from Couch High School in Myrtle, Missouri, in 1998. He 
attended the University of Montana-Western and graduated in 2004 with a Bachelor’s degree in 
Social Science and a Bachelor’s degree in Secondary Education in 2005. He entered the history 
graduate program at Montana State University in the fall of 2006 and was awarded a Master’s 
degree in 2008 with a thesis entitled, “Religion and Public Order in the 1790s.”  He has served 
an instructor at the University of Montana Western, Husson University in Bangor, Maine, 
Southern New Hampshire University, and the University of Maine.  He received a 2018-19 
Fulbright grant to attend Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia.  Callaway is a candidate 
for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in History from the University of Maine in August 2019.  
